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ABSTRACT

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION
IN JOHN PAUL II’S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY

By
Fr. Shawn Conoboy
December 2021

Dissertation supervised by Dr. William M. Wright IV
In the Theology of the Body, through a series of Wednesday Catecheses, John
Paul II presents a magisterial understanding of the sacrament of marriage and of marriage and
family ethics. At the same time, John Paul II presents a theological anthropology, which forms a
basis for the magisterial teaching. His theological anthropology is developed through an
exegesis of selected biblical texts, especially Genesis 1-3 and Ephesians 5, and through an
application of a philosophical anthropology articulated by Karol Wojtyła. This dissertation
draws the connection between the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, especially as it is
articulated in his major works, Love and Responsibility and Person and Act, and the theological
anthropology presented in the Man and Woman He Created Them.
Ultimately, the roles of poet, professor, and pastor influenced the philosophical and
theological writings of Wojtyła. His key insight is that the integration of the person in human
acts is the foundation of a philosophical anthropology and ethics. Understanding the human
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person as created in the image of God and called to a communion of persons is at the foundation
of John Paul II’s theological anthropology.
This dissertation underscores that John Paul II fully incorporated philosophical
anthropology and employed it in a philosophical exegesis of Scripture. This dissertation
underscores that John Paul II incorporated an interpretation of Scripture developing a theological
anthropology that goes beyond the limits of human reason in understanding the human person.
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Chapter 1
Wojtyła’s Turn to Anthropology
On 5 September 1979 John Paul II 1 began a series of Wednesday Audience addresses.
He introduces them saying, “During the following Wednesday reflections at the general
audiences, we will try, as Christ’s interlocutors today, to dwell at greater length on St. Matthew’s
words (Mt 19:3-8).” 2 On 28 November 1984, John Paul II acknowledges the end of the series
when he says, “The whole of the catecheses that I began more than four years ago and that I
conclude today can be grasped under the title, ‘Human Love in the Divine Plan.’” 3 In the same
concluding Audience, John Paul II notes the use of the phrase, “the theology of the body.” 4 He
first used the term on 12 September 1979. 5 Because of the use of the term “theology of the
body,” early and often in the series, the entire collection of addresses came to be known as the
Theology of the Body.
The Theology of the Body is a continuation and a culmination of the work that Karol
Wojtyła completed before his papal election. In many of his works, Wojtyła focused on the
human person. His methodology often used human experience as a starting point. From that
starting point, as his academic work continued, he developed an anthropology. In his major and
minor works, Wojtyła especially articulates his philosophical anthropology. As an anthropology,
the Theology of the Body continues his pre-papal focus on the human person.
St. John Paul II was canonized on 27 April 2014.
TOB 1:5. John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, tr. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books &
Media, 2006).
N.B. Given the unique genre and history of development of this work, I am following the convention used by
Waldstein. When citing from the General Audience, I use “TOB,” followed by the Audience number, followed by
the paragraph number, for example, in this case, TOB 1:5.
3
TOB 133:1. There were periodic breaks taken over the five years (e.g. some months in 1981 corresponding to time
spent in recovery from the assassination attempt on 13 May 1981, and most of 1983 corresponding to the Holy
Year).
4
cf. TOB 133:1.
5
TOB 2:5. The quotation reads, “Of course, all this has its own significance for theology as well, and above all for
the theology of the body.”
1
2
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For this project, I begin with a survey of some of Wojtyła’s work, especially his minor
essays, illustrating the influences that came from his life as a poet, a philosopher, and a pastor.
Then, I examine in detail both Person and Act and Love and Responsibility, detailing his
philosophical anthropology. With this groundwork laid, then, I offer a detailed analysis of the
content of the Theology of the Body, showing the role of Scripture in developing this theological
anthropology. I, then, detail the characteristics of an “adequate anthropology,” 6 according to
John Paul II, that the fruit of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology and the insight gained from
biblical revelation.
Through biblical interpretation, the theological anthropology of Theology of the Body
goes beyond the philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła.

I. Formative Influences on Wojtyła as a Philosopher and Theologian
As Wojtyła’s life unfolded, he was actively engaged in the arts, academic life, and
pastoral work. Karol Wojtyła’s formal education and professional work exposed him to the arts
and to a variety of other influences, specifically the works of St. John of the Cross, the
philosophies of Thomism and phenomenology, and the teachings of Vatican II. A historical
review of his life and work shows a progression in thought and a definite turn to anthropology.
The same review shows a consistency in his focus on and articulation of his understanding of the
human person.
These various influences are the foundation of the theological anthropology of the
Theology of the Body.

6

TOB 13:2.
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A. Wojtyła’s Literary Work
Born in 1920 in Wadowice, Poland, Karol Wojtyła began his undergraduate studies at the
Jagiellonian University in Krakow in 1938. 7 His field of study was Polish philology and
literature, and his extra-curricular activities included the theater and poetry. 8 Wojtyła wrote and
published a number of plays as well as poetry. These were written both before and after his
priestly ordination. Even though his vocation to the priesthood led him to stop his university
studies in literature, he did not stop producing literary work, which indicates the foundational
place the artistic has in the mind of Wojtyła.

1. Wojtyła’s Plays
Continuing his connection to the theater begun in Wadowice as a child, Wojtyła became
deeply connected to the theater during his early years in university. 9 He was a principal agent in
the Rhapsodic Theater in Krakow. This was a theater group formed to promote Polish culture. It
was an underground group, because such activity was prohibited by the occupying Nazi regime.
The senior member of the group was Mieczysław Kotlarczyk. Kotlarczyk described the
Rhapsodic Theater as “a protest against the extermination of the Polish nation’s culture on its
own soil, a form of underground resistance movement against the Nazi occupation.” 10 Even
before the war, Kotlarczyk had been experimenting with some elements of theater that
characterize the Rhapsodic style. Performed in private apartments, these plays involved no stage
curtain or traditional stage, no scenery, costumes or makeup, and limited actor movement.

George Weigel, Witness to Hope (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 16.
ibid., 40.
9
Karol Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, tr. Boleslaw Taborski (Berkeley, California:
University of California Press, 1987), 2-3.
10
ibid., 6.
7
8
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Instead, the emphasis was on the spoken word. 11 Commenting on the rhapsodic style, Wojtyła
wrote:
The rhapsodic company has accustomed us a theater of the word. What does this mean?
Is not every theater a theater of the word? Does not the word constitute an essential,
primary element of any theater? Undoubtedly it does. Nonetheless the position of the
word in a theater is not always the same. As in life, the word can appear as an integral
part of action, movement, and gesture, inseparable from all human practical activity; or it
can appear as “song”—separate, independent, intended only to contain and express
thought, to embrace and transmit a vision of the mind. In the latter aspect, or position, the
word becomes “rhapsodic,” and a theater based on such a concept of the word becomes a
rhapsodic theater. 12
In this way, rhapsody is equivalent to song, except, without music. It is the words themselves
that lift the spirit. To speak to the inner experience of the observer, rhapsody first captures an
inner experience and then, through the words, communicates that experience to the other. All of
this was done with minimal physical action.
With his decision to enter seminary, Wojtyła could no longer be an actor in the
Rhapsodic Theater. While there is a great resonance between his plays and the work of the
Rhapsodic Theater, Wojtyła’s plays cannot be strictly identified with the plays performed there.
In his Introduction to The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, Boleslaw Taborski writes of
Wojtyła’s plays:
The world of external events is not so much expressed by the dramatist directly as
absorbed into the ‘inner space,’ the psychological space, of the protagonist, where it
exists timelessly, in projections into the past or future (that is, in the memory of the hero
or in his prophecies), supported by the author’s knowledge of history, or even theology. 13
Wojtyła’s plays are a communication of inner experience. One characteristic of this inner theater
is that the dialogue in Wojtyła’s plays is often a series of monologues, individuals reflecting on a
particular experience or on a statement by another character. Wojtyła’s focus is on the drama of

ibid., 16.
ibid., 372.
13
ibid., 16.
11
12
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the inner experience of the character. His plays are written to be performed with a bare
minimum of set and physical movement, perhaps even less that the Rhapsodic style that
influenced him.
Before ordination, Wojtyła wrote several plays of a socio-political nature: David; 14 Job; 15
and Jeremiah. 16 Job is a reflection on suffering. Wojtyła locates this play with an extended
description on the title page:
The Action Took Place in the Old Testament/Before Christ’s Coming/The Action Takes
Place in Our Days/In Job’s Time/For Poland and the World/The Action Takes Place in
the Time of Expectation,/Of Imploring Judgment,/In the Time of Longing/For Christ’s
Testament,/Worked Out/In Poland’s and the World’s Suffering. 17
While the Old Testament biblical figure and his companions are the protagonists of the play,
Wojtyła explicitly introduces Christ’s suffering as giving meaning to the socio-political angst of
those who are suffering in a world at war.
Job limits the play’s characters to biblical figures while Jeremiah incorporates figures
from both the Bible and Poland’s history. Taborski writes: “One should keep in mind, however,
that Jeremiah is not, strictly speaking, a historical play. It is not concerned with external events
and facts, though it alludes to them, but with ideas and attitudes, with a vision of Polish
history.” 18 The primary vision of Jeremiah is the fall and rebirth of a nation. Wojtyła points to
the historical experience of the Kingdom of Judah in the book of the prophet Jeremiah and of the
country of Poland in the time of Peter Skarga. 19 The Parliamentary Sermons of Skarga were
published in 1597. 20 Skarga preached against threats to the post-Reformation Church and to the
ibid., 3. This play, written in 1939 when Wojtyła was 19 years old, is now lost. He described it as partly biblical
and partly rooted in Polish history.
15
ibid., 25-74. This play was written in 1940.
16
ibid., 93-145. This play was written in 1940. The subtitle is “A National Drama in Three Acts.”
17
ibid., 25.
18
ibid., 76.
19
ibid., 79. Fr. Peter Skarga (1536-1612) was appointed court preacher in 1588 by King Sigismund III in Krakow.
20
ibid., 84.
14
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continuance of the nation and its monarchy, which eventually fell. 21 Wojtyła presents large
sections of the Parliamentary Sermons in Jeremiah, showing that, in the words of Taborski,
“Father Peter not only is a prophet of doom but also shows the way of rebirth.” 22 Set during
Holy Week, the play ends with the promise of rebirth and resurrection. Wojtyła is concerned for
the Poland of his time. His message in Jeremiah is that whatever threats there may be to the
people of Poland, there is a promise of rebirth.
After ordination, Wojtyła continued to write plays, although they were now centered on
more philosophical and theological themes. They are Our God’s Brother, 23 The Jeweler’s
Shop, 24 and Radiation of Fatherhood. 25 By 1950, the socio-political situation in Poland had
changed from Nazi occupation and ideology to that of the Communists. While there is a marked
awareness of the prevailing political ideology in the play, Our God’s Brother is a depiction of
the vocation story of Adam Chmielowski.26 Weigel writes: “The play’s main ‘action’ takes
place in the conscience of Adam Chmielowski…. The mainspring of the play’s dramatic tension
is vocational.” 27 Even while serving others and while leading his religious community, Brother
Albert is in a process of self-discovery. That self-discovery includes questions of social ethics.
Weigel writes: “In the play, through the struggles of Brother Albert, Wojtyła is working out for
himself the problem of revolutionary violence.” 28 The play concludes with Brother Albert

cf. ibid., 78.
ibid., 87.
23
ibid., 159-266. This play was written in 1950.
24
ibid., 277-322. This play was written in 1960. The subtitle is “A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony,
Passing on Occasion into a Drama.”
25
ibid., 333-364. This play was written in 1964. The subtitle is “A Mystery.” This play was not published until after
his papal election. Wojtyła published a condensed version of it in 1964 as Reflections on Fatherhood (365-368).
26
ibid., 147-148. Adam Chmielowski (1845-1916), who took the religious name Brother Albert in 1887 in Krakow,
served the poor.
27
Weigel, Witness to Hope, 113.
28
ibid.
21
22
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saying, “I know for certain, though, that I have chosen a greater freedom.” 29 Weigel says, “At
the deepest level, the dramatic action in Our God’s Brother is a struggle over the meaning of
freedom, and by extension the meaning of human existence.” 30 In this drama, Chmielowski
experiences a struggle over those ideologies with which to identify himself. He finds his answer
when he lets himself be “molded by love,” in the words of the play. 31 While he is discovering
his vocation, he is also discovering who he is as a person and what it means to be a human
person. At the heart of the drama is a question of anthropology.
Perhaps Wojtyła’s most well-known play is The Jeweler’s Shop. The story concerns
three couples: Andrew and Teresa, who had become a widow when Andrew died; Stefan and
Anna, who had become deeply isolated from each other despite continued cohabitation; and,
Christopher, the son of Andrew and Teresa, and Monica, the daughter of Stefan and Anna, who
are engaged to be married. Their various and intertwined circumstances provide opportunities to
reflect on the meaning of married love. Through the figure of the Jeweler, each person makes a
discovery about that meaning. Wojtyła, through the words of Adam, a chance interlocutor,
unites the various discoveries in this way:
every person has at his disposal an existence and a love. The problem is how to build a
sensible structure from it. But this structure must never be inward-looking. It must be
open in such a way that, on one hand, it embraces other people, while, on the other, it
always reflects the absolute Existence and Love; it must always, in some way, reflect
them. That is the ultimate sense of your lives. 32
Even with this assertion, The Jeweler’s Shop does not expound upon this meaning. In fact, the
play ends with Stefan confessing that he does not know what it means to reflect Existence and

Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, 266.
Weigel, Witness to Hope, 114.
31
Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, 221.
32
ibid., 321.
29
30
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Love. 33 In this way, Taborski says that Wojtyła “imposes no theological solutions. Though the
play invites us to look for them, it asks us to approach love not just on the level of self-seeking
animal passions but with the whole person.” 34 The Jeweler’s Shop is an invitation to discover
the meaning of existence and love.
Radiation of Fatherhood deepens this reflection on human existence. The protagonist is
the biblical first man, Adam. The play opens with this line: “For many years I have lived like a
man exiled from my deeper personality yet condemned to probe it. … The thought constantly
returns to me that I ought to find myself in every man—searching not from without but from
within.” 35 His main discovery is that he can only overcome isolation by giving of himself, by
love. Wojtyła writes: “People inhabit an earth that has two poles. They have no permanent place
here. They are all on their way, which leads them from the pole of loneliness to the pole of
love.” 36 The choice before Adam is between continued isolation or fatherhood. By accepting
love in the acceptance of fatherhood, he becomes more like God. Kenneth Schmitz writes, “He
realizes that the radiation of the Father’s love consists in giving birth, even as from all eternity
the Father is Father through begetting His Son.” 37 Even with this insight, the play ends with
Adam between the two poles of isolation or creative interaction. In this way, Wojtyła is
underlining that each human person is still facing this same choice, because Adam is each of us,
the “common denominator” of humanity. 38
Wojtyła’s plays explore questions of fundamental human experience.

ibid., 322.
ibid., 275.
35
ibid., 335.
36
ibid., 360.
37
Kenneth Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła/Pope
John Paul II (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 26.
38
Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, 338.
33
34
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2. Wojtyła’s Poetry
In addition to his published plays, beginning in 1939 and continuing until just days before
his papal election in 1978, Wojtyła published a number of poems. 39 Without giving a
comprehensive list of them, his poems include the following: Song of the Hidden God, a cycle of
poems about human and non-human creation, God as Creator and Father, our Father; 40 Mother, a
series of poems about the Blessed Virgin Mary centered around the Incarnation as well as her
relationship with the disciple John; 41 Thought—Strange Space, a series of poems reflecting the
struggle to find adequate words to capture reality, a struggle like Jacob’s wrestling with God; 42
The Quarry, a cycle of poems about the meaning of work and the dignity of workers; 43 Easter
Vigil, a series of poems meditating on how Christ’s Paschal Mystery is experienced in history,
specifically Polish history, set in the darkness of the night waiting for the Resurrection; 44 and
Stanislas, a cycle of poems about St. Stanislaus and the meaning of his martyrdom for the church
and the nation of Poland. 45 The style of his poetry is not unlike his plays. Taborski writes:
The character of his poetry, in fact, is closely linked to that of his plays. Wojtyła’s poems
are usually long and divided into parts, their structures resembling that of a play. They
often contain monologues, even dialogues, dramatic in their intensity. They deal with the
drama of human existence…. In his plays, as in his poems, he is concerned not so much
with external events as with exploring man’s soul; it is there that the ‘action’ often
unfolds. 46
In his poems, as in his plays, Wojtyła is concerned with inner experience. Similarities between
his poetry and his plays can be seen in the content of each, as well. A most obvious connection

These have been collected and translated in English in, Karol Wojtyła, The Place Within: The Poetry of Pope
John Paul II, tr. Jerzy Peterkiewicz (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1982).
40
Wojtyła, The Place Within, 3-26. The original was written in 1944.
41
ibid., 41-49. The original was written in 1950.
42
ibid., 53-60. The original was written in 1952.
43
ibid., 63-71. The original was written in 1956.
44
ibid., 121-140. The original was written in 1966. This theme was continued in Thinking My Country (143-149),
written in 1974.
45
ibid., 179-184. The original was written in 1978.
46
Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, 15.
39
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is the concern with the individual under an oppressive regime. Such is the case in the plays, Job
and Jeremiah, and the poems, Easter Vigil and Stanislas.
Characteristic of Wojtyła’s artistic writings is that almost all of them were published
under a pseudonym. 47 Although there may be socio-political reasons for using a pseudonym
under regimes that repress culture, Weigel suggests that using a pseudonym allowed Wojtyła “to
make a distinction between his literary work and his writings on religion, faith, morals, and
Church affairs, which were always published under his own name, and he thought he had a right
to have his work considered on its own merits, rather than as clerical curiosities.” 48 The role of
an artist is distinct from the role of a philosopher or pastor, even when they reside in the same
person, which deeply connects them.

B. St. John of the Cross
In 1939, at the beginning of World War II, the Jagiellonian University was forced to
operate underground. Continuing his literary studies, Wojtyła took part in clandestine
education. 49 During this time, a sense of a vocation to the priesthood arose in Karol Wojtyła. In
1942, he was accepted into the underground seminary in Krakow. 50 Describing this change in
direction, he wrote: “As I came to appreciate the power of the word in my literary and linguistic
studies, I inevitably drew closer to the mystery of the Word [Jesus Christ].” 51 This new
fascination led him to his studies of philosophy and theology, as he began his formation for the
priesthood.
His two most common ones were Andrzej Jawień and Stanisław Andrzej Gruda, cf. Wojtyła, The Collected Plays
and Writings on Theater.
48
Weigel, Witness to Hope, 112.
49
ibid., 44.
50
ibid., 69.
51
John Paul II, Gift and Mystery: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of My Priestly Ordination (New York: Doubleday,
1996), 7.
47
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Wojtyła was first introduced to St. John of the Cross by his spiritual mentor, the layman
Jan Tyranowski, during the time of Wojtyła’s clandestine studies. 52 Wojtyła, even, had begun a
work on St. John of the Cross during the time of his studies at Jagiellonian University. 53 In the
Apostolic Letter, Maestro en la Fe, John Paul II wrote: “I myself have especially felt attracted to
the experience and teachings of the Saint of Fontiveros. From the first years of my priestly
formation I found in him a sure guide on the pathways of faith. This aspect of his doctrine
seemed to me of vital importance for every Christian, particularly in a time like ours, exploring
new paths, but also exposed to risks and temptations in the area of faith.” 54 Despite this
attraction to St. John of the Cross and Carmelite spirituality, Wojtyła continued with his
formation in the diocesan underground seminary, and he was ordained a priest on 1 November
1946. 55
Almost immediately after ordination, Wojtyła began doctoral studies in Rome at the
Angelicum. In 1948, he completed his doctoral dissertation: Faith According to St. John of the
Cross, 56 which was directed by the Dominican Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. At the outset,
Wojtyła recognizes that the articulation of doctrine in the spiritual theology of St. John of the
Cross is different than what is found in scholastic theology. He says that St. John of the Cross
“treats of only one aspect of faith: its unifying power, which he elaborates with precision and
utmost competence. There are other elements of particular importance in the theology of faith,

Weigel, Witness to Hope, 61.
John Paul II wrote in Gift and Mystery, 17: “At that time I also began to write a work on Saint John of the Cross,
which I then continued under the direction of Father Ignacy Różycki, a lecturer at the University of Cracow, when
the University was reopened. I later completed this work at the Angelicum, under the direction of Father Garrigou
Lagrange.”
54
John Paul II, Maestro en La Fe (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), 2. The translation is mine.
55
Weigel, Witness to Hope, 79.
56
John Paul II (Karol Wojtyła), Faith According to St. John of the Cross, tr. Jordan Aumann (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf
& Stock, 2009). The original title is Doctrina de fide apud S. Joannem a Cruce.
52
53
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but he leaves them aside.” 57 Instead of expounding on faith in a scholastic manner, Wojtyła’s
project is to discover what the Mystical Doctor contributes to an understanding of faith. His
focus is that for St. John of the Cross faith is a means of union with God.
Wojtyła first offers an analysis of the references to faith in the writings of St. John of the
Cross, specifically The Ascent of Mount Carmel, The Dark Night, The Spiritual Canticle, and
The Living Flame. The analysis of these texts is followed by a synthesis of his findings, and a
presentation of his conclusions. Wojtyła’s study thus examines the nature of union with God
through faith. He writes, St. John of the Cross “always states that in the transformation the soul
becomes divine or that the soul becomes God by participation. This clearly presents the
ontological aspect of the question.” 58 But St. John of the Cross also gives much attention to how
union with God through faith is experienced, Wojtyła says, “Faith is therefore a proper means of
union wherein divinity is communicated to the soul; but at the same time it is a dark night
because the communication of the soul with God is effected through faith, which is obscure.” 59
What is happening to the soul (union with God) is different than what is happening
intellectually (an obscuring of human experience). Wojtyła articulates:
The intellect is restricted to the lower level of knowledge and activity that lie within the
scope of its natural power. Consequently, the virtue of faith provides a knowledge of
divine things to which the intellect attains by a borrowed light; its own light does not
reach that far, and hence the natural power of the intellect falls short of such knowledge.
Nevertheless, it is a curious fact that in the very act of knowing, faith is still a darkness.
This is explained psychologically by the fact that the intellect attains the object of
knowledge but at the same time is prevented from knowing it. At first glance, therefore,
faith seems to be an obstacle to the intellect’s natural craving for knowledge and, indeed,
as regards its higher act of knowledge.
The virtue of faith is thus presented as uniting and fusing with the human cognitive
faculty. We could call it the psychological aspect of faith. But to discover what lies
beneath this first impression, it is necessary to study some particulars in greater detail.

ibid., 26.
ibid., 89.
59
ibid., 102.
57
58
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And the first thing to consider is the subject—the intellect—which is described in the text
as overwhelmed and oppressed by “excessive light”. 60
Later Wojtyła states, “Thus, through faith the human intellect is united with the ‘substance’ of
revealed truths ontologically, but not psychologically, because the excessive light of faith in no
way changes the nature and mode of operation of the intellect.” 61 Faith is a means of union with
God and involves a purification of the intellect.
Throughout his dissertation, Wojtyła also considers St. John of the Cross’ teachings on
the role of other virtues, specifically charity, as means of union with God. He says: “Faith
considered in itself, even vivified by charity but not operating through charity, cannot be called
the means of transformation. … The answer is that St. John of the Cross never speaks about faith
alone or unformed faith, but always about faith vivified by charity.” 62 Wojtyła continues,
“Indeed, if faith is to attain its plenitude and total possible perfection, it must open itself to the
other virtues because it needs them. To be perfect, faith must be a living faith, vivified by charity
and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.” 63 The role of charity in faith is to create union with God.
Wojtyła summarizes, “faith is a means of union only in relation to charity.” 64 Wojtyła
recognizes that St. John of the Cross is referencing a qualified version of faith—faith vivified by
charity—even if he uses the word, faith, without any qualification. Although Wojtyła somewhat
artificially analyzes faith in and of itself, he again concludes that, for St. John of the Cross, “faith
is the proper and proportionate means for uniting the intellect with God.” 65

ibid., 73-74.
ibid., 208.
62
ibid., 254-255.
63
ibid., 267.
64
ibid., 137.
65
ibid., 269.
60
61
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In the final pages of his dissertation, Wojtyła compares the work of St. John of the Cross
to that of St. Thomas Aquinas, with regard to their treatment of faith. The two areas considered
are faith as a means of union with God and faith as a virtue of purgation of the intellect. 66
In both cases, Wojtyła lists a number of quotations from the saints. With regard to faith
as a means of union, Wojtyła says: “We can say that the foregoing passages contain the nucleus
of the doctrine of St. John of the Cross on faith as a means of union, so far as through the virtue
of faith the intellect adheres to the reality of revealed truths.” 67 Similarly, he says, when treating
the purgative role of faith:
However, when it is a question of the purification of the intellect which St. John of the
Cross attributes to faith working through charity, St. Thomas, with greater theological
precision, assigns this purifying action to the gift of understanding.
In conclusion, we can say that the entire doctrine of St. John of the Cross on the purgative
power of the virtue of faith, of the preparation of the intellect for the vision of God, and
of the realization of God’s incomprehensibility is synthesized in this passage from the
Summa theologiae. 68
In comparing these two Doctors of the Church, Wojtyła shows the deep agreement of the two.
They agree, but their treatments are not equal. St. Thomas is able to provide answers that are
more theologically precise than St. John of the Cross. St. John of the Cross expounds on, in
greater detail than is found in syntheses and summaries, the experience of the virtue of faith as a
dark night of the intellect. Wojtyła says: “The description is often couched in Scholastic
terminology, but the experience that is described will often give a different nuance or a new
meaning to the technical terminology.” 69 For Wojtyła, St. John of the Cross articulates human
experience in greater detail.

ibid.
ibid., 270.
68
ibid., 272. Wojtyła is referencing Summa theologiae, II-II, q. 8, a. 7.
69
ibid., 25.
66
67

14

C. Scheler
After completing his doctoral studies in Rome, Wojtyła returned to Poland to engage in
pastoral work, which he did until 1951 when he was asked to become a professor. 70 This request
required him to write a habilitation thesis, a second dissertation. His habilitation thesis is entitled
Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Assumptions of Max
Scheler’s System of Philosophy. 71 In this dissertation, Wojtyła presents both the ethical system
of Max Scheler, rooted in the phenomenological method, and some essential elements of being a
follower of Christ, based primarily on Scripture.
Wojtyła initially saw the possibility of using the phenomenological method to build a
Christian ethics. In the course of evaluating that possibility, his conclusion was in the negative,
which he states in this way: “The ethical system constructed by Max Scheler fundamentally does
not conform to the scientific formulation of Christian ethics.” 72 Even if there is an impossibility
of constructing a Christian ethics based on the phenomenological method, a system like
Scheler’s can still have a value for a Christian ethics. Wojtyła expresses that value in this way:
“Although the ethical system created by Scheler is not fundamentally suited to interpreting
Christian ethics, it can be helpful in a scientific work on Christian ethics. 73
With those two conclusions, Wojtyła states that Max Scheler’s system of philosophy
would go beyond its limits if it were used as a basis for a Christian ethics. Yet the
phenomenological method is nevertheless an assistance to a Christian ethicist.
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Wojtyła continues his reflection on the utility of the phenomenological method in his
minor works, which I will look at in this chapter.

D. Vatican II
In 1958, Wojtyła became auxiliary bishop of the Archdiocese of Krakow. In 1962, he
was named the administrator of the archdiocese. 74 At the beginning of 1964, he became the
Archbishop of Krakow, and a cardinal in 1967. 75 His early years as a bishop coincided closely
with the Second Vatican Council, at which he became an active participant in its sessions. 76

1. Sources of Renewal
At the conclusion of Vatican II, Wojtyła once again returned to Poland from Rome, this
time bringing with him the teachings of the Council. His pastoral reflections culminated in one
of his major works: Sources of Renewal. 77 These reflections were written in order to help
implement Vatican II in the life of his diocese. As such, there is a great breadth to the work. In
fact, he includes citations from all sixteen documents of Vatican II. Throughout the work,
Wojtyła takes long citations from the conciliar texts and links them to each other and to the
themes of his commentary. The result is less of a commentary of each conciliar text
individually, and more of a synthetic linking of the appropriate sections of each conciliar text
according to a given theme. The result is also a revelation of an internal unity of the conciliar
texts more than an artificial connection of disparate passages.
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There are three main parts to Sources of Renewal: “The Basic Significance of Conciliar
Initiation,” 78 “The Formation of Consciousness,” 79 and “The Formation of Attitudes.” 80 The
first part is concerned with questions of faith, with Dei Verbum 81 and Gaudium et Spes 82 as the
primary touchstones. He begins the work by saying that “The implementation of Vatican II, or
the process of Conciliar renewal, must be based on the principle of the enrichment of faith.” 83
Wojtyła then considers passages from the documents of Vatican II that speak to an individual’s
faith. He concludes this first part with the consideration of the Church as an article of faith:
The way towards the enrichment of faith rediscovered by Vatican II passes through the
mind and consciousness of the Church. Paul VI formulated it similarly in the first
encyclical of his pontificate, published in the same year as Lumen gentium, the Council’s
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church. This Constitution is in a sense the key to the whole
of the Council’s thought. In it we find once more the complex variety of ways towards
the enrichment of faith, leading from Vatican II into the future. This variety inspires
nearly all of the Council’s documents, albeit in different degrees. The dogmatic
Constitution is best complemented by the pastoral Constitution on the Church in the
modern world, known by the title Gaudium et spes.
For this reason it was important to begin by clarifying the relationship between faith and
dialogue, as it is closely linked with the consciousness of the Church. The Church is itself
a truth of faith and is a subject of an article in the Creed: ‘I believe in one holy, catholic
and apostolic Church.’ If the Council’s approach had been ‘purely doctrinal’, its teaching
concerning the truth of faith as regards the Church might have taken a different form; but
on this very point it had to be pastoral first and foremost. It was impossible to treat the
Church merely as an ‘object’: it had to be a ‘subject’ also. 84
This passage names Lumen Gentium as the key for interpreting Vatican II. It also reveals the
centrality of Gaudium et Spes, as the best complement of Lumen Gentium. Paul McPartlan notes
that, for Wojtyła, “Gaudium et Spes, on the church's relationship to and activity in the modern
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world, complements and completes Lumen Gentium.” 85 If Lumen Gentium is inward focused,
then Gaudium et Spes describes the work of redemption of Jesus Christ, accomplished in the
world. The Church’s self-understanding in faith leads her to pastoral work. McPartlan writes:
“In short, for John Paul, the church was essentially outward looking, and Lumen Gentium
described the inner reality of such a church.” 86
The next major section of Sources of Renewal, “The Formation of Consciousness,”
alternates between Gaudium et Spes and Lumen Gentium as the primary conciliar texts on which
Wojtyła comments. He asserts that the Council raises the consciousness of the individual as
being created by God, as sharing in Trinitarian life, as receiving salvation and redemption, as
being a member of the Church, the People of God. Wojtyła connects these elements of the
consciousness of faith in this way:
The vocation of the individual to communion with God is closely linked with his
vocation to human dignity, and is furthermore, in the most authentic manner, given him
by reason of his own inner nature. This intimately personal vocation of man, which is the
main theme of the Gospel, must, however, be realized in communion with other men, and
therefore it is also a vocation to communal life. 87
With the communal as central, Wojtyła continues: “The Council devotes much attention to
making the faithful conscious of communio as the link binding together the community of the
People of God. Thus it appears that the internal development and renewal of the Church in the
spirit of Vatican II depends to a very great extent on the authentic deepening of faith in the
Church as a community whose essential bond is that of communio.” 88 An individual human
person is to be aware of oneself as part of the communion of persons of the Church.
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The third major section of Sources of Renewal, “The Formation of Attitudes,” describes
the various responsibilities of the Christian, both within and outside of the inner life of the
Church. The major points of reference are Gaudium et Spes and Lumen Gentium. However,
Wojtyła does provide a more sustained look at other conciliar documents as they pertain to
particular responsibilities. For example, he has a number of citations from Sacrosanctum
Concilium when he discusses participation in the Liturgy, 89 and citations from Nostra Aetate and
Unitatis Redintegratio when he discusses ecumenical activity. 90
Wojtyła’s purpose in writing Sources of Renewal was to help the faithful of Krakow to
implement Vatican II. However, he did not provide detailed and systematic presentations of
each of the documents. Wojtyła asserts, “Therefore, we have tried in this present study not so
much to consider ‘how’, but rather ‘what’ it is we have to implement, which is the more
important question.” 91 The mechanisms of implementation are secondary to the formation of the
faithful’s consciousness and attitudes.

2. Wojtyła’s Incorporation of Vatican II
The Council called for a response of faith from Wojtyła. 92 He accepted the teachings of
the Council into his pastoral and academic life. Wojtyła’s relationship to Vatican II was not just
in terms of episcopal responsibilities. His writings consistently included references, even
explicit references, to the texts of Vatican II. 93 Two things can be said about Vatican II as an
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influence on the thought of Wojtyła. First, his experience at the Council does not account for the
development of this thought. The turn to the human person, including ethics, anthropology, and
marriage and sexuality, had begun before the beginning of the Council. The turn to the human
person was largely independent of the Council. Second, the Council did generate in Wojtyła an
increased attention to anthropological questions, providing him with specific concepts and
vocabulary, especially the concept of communio personarum.
The text that had the deepest connection to the pastoral and academic work of Wojtyła is
Gaudium et Spes. The first three chapters of it are concerning the dignity of the human person,
the interconnectedness of human beings, and the faithful’s responsibility in the various forms of
human activity in the world. 94 These three themes connect with the major sections of Sources of
Renewal, and with the development of thought in Wojtyła’s academic writings.

II. Wojtyła’s Essays on Ethics and Anthropology
In 1954, Wojtyła became a university professor at the Catholic University of Lublin,
teaching ethics. 95 Even up until his papal election, he remained a professor, though in a reduced
capacity. 96 During this time Wojtyła published both major and minor works. His minor works
complement his major works.
The major works, The Acting Person and Love and Responsibility, will be reviewed in
following chapters. Here I offer a review of his minor works. This survey of a selection of
Wojtyła’s essays reveals a progression from questions of methodology in ethics to
anthropological questions and, finally, to questions of marriage and sexuality.
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A. The Lublin Lectures
From 1954-1958, Wojtyła produced a lecture series each year, which are now collectively
known as the Lublin Lectures. 97 During those first years in Lublin, Wojtyła was developing his
philosophical methodology.
In the first Lublin Lecture, he articulates that Scheler defined himself in contradistinction
to Kant. Kant based his ethics on duty, while Scheler based his ethics on value. Because of
Scheler’s dependence on Kant, Wojtyła felt obliged to engage Kant. This examination of Kant
led Wojtyła to a dual negative and positive evaluation similar to his previous evaluation of
Scheler. According to Jarosław Kupczak, Wojtyła’s negative conclusion of the two philosophers
is that “Kant and Scheler were both mistaken…in excluding duty or value from the ethical life of
the human person.” 98 Wojtyła also says that Kant and Scheler’s theories both have positive
import for ethics. Kupczak summarizes Wojtyła’s position saying, “Both duty and value
perform important roles in the ethical life, and what is really needed is a new, synthetic
description of the relation between them.” 99 As the Lecture continues, Wojtyła begins
synthetizing the ethics of Kant and Scheler into his own treatment of ethics. Kupczak writes,
“While his Habilitationshrift was concerned mostly with a sharp criticism of Scheler's moral
theory, Lublin Lectures also reveals the positive elements of Kant's and Scheler's respective
systems, which Wojtyła used as the building blocks of his own theory of the acting person.” 100
In the Lublin Lectures, Wojtyła was refining his own methodology.
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B. Essays on Ethics
In his essays on ethics, Wojtyła continued his methodological reflection. In Gift and
Mystery, the autobiographical reflection that John Paul II wrote on the fiftieth anniversary of his
priestly ordination, he remarks about the influences in his education. He writes: “My previous
Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the phenomenological method, and this made
it possible for me to undertake a number of creative studies. … In this way I took part in the
contemporary movement of philosophical personalism.” 101 With his literary interests and
Carmelite influence, the role of experience resonated with Wojtyła as he came to appreciate the
phenomenological method. With the absence of clear ontological foundations in
Phenomenological thought, he continued to employ the insights of Thomism. Wojtyła was
searching for a coherence between Thomism and Phenomenology.

1. Essays on Methodology
Representative of Wojtyła’s answers to methodological questions, these two essays serve:
“The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics” (published in 1955) 102 and
“On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm” (published in 1959). 103
In “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics,” Wojtyła offers an
evaluation of Kant and Scheler. He describes Kant’s separation of experience from the ethical
act in these terms: “1) Kant removed the very essence of ethical life from the realm of personal
experience and transferred it to the noumenal, trans-empirical sphere, and 2) he crystalized the
whole ethical experience of the personal subject into a single psychological element: the feeling
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of respect for the law.” 104 If Kant over-reduces ethical experience to the sense of duty, Wojtyła
says that Scheler, in avoiding that mistake, achieves a better description of ethical experience.
Wojtyła writes, “I must admit that the picture of ethical life that Scheler has painted using only
his phenomenological method is very suggestive and in many points agrees beautifully with what
we know from inner experience.” 105 But Scheler, too, ultimately separates experience from the
ethical act. Wojtyła comments that Scheler failed to recognize that “the only value that can be
called ethical value is a value that has the acting person as its efficient cause.” 106 Both Kant and
Scheler fail to describe Wojtyła’s assessment of ethical experiences. Wojtyła says that one key
element of that experience is this, “Ethical experience is by its very nature something dynamic;
its whole psychological structure involves motion: a passage from potency to act.” 107
The essay, “On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm,”
compares Aquinas and Scheler. After an exposition of both systems, Wojtyła compares the two.
On the question of exemplars in the moral life, Wojtyła writes that for Aquinas, “God as
subsistent existence is the supreme model for all beings as goods.” 108 Wojtyła agrees that God is
the model for the human person. This assertion is problematic in a system based on Scheler
because, Wojtyła says that, for Scheler “resembling and becoming like Christ...occurs in a purely
human manner—in a psychological and merely intentional manner.” 109 Despite the emphasis
that Scheler places on the moral model of Christ, Christ’s example is only of a psychological
order, not an ontological order. 110 Continuing his evaluation, Wojtyła comments on the question
of the basis of moral norms, Wojtyła asserts: “the essence of the moral life is not just the ‘lived
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experience’ of value (or even of the good), but precisely the ‘lived experience’ of the truth of the
good that is an object of action and that is realized in this action.” 111 He continues, “Only by
placing the good under the light of truth is there a place for the norm—including the ethical
norm—in a philosophical system as a whole. By itself, the concept of value would exclude such
a place in advance.” 112 Scheler’s system precludes the existential status of moral goods.

2. Wojtyła’s Philosophical Methodology
In terms of his methodology, although Wojtyła was attracted to Scheler and Kant, there
was something missing in their approach to ethics: the role of metaphysics and the role of
experience. Schmitz writes: “Wojtyła turns to metaphysics, not out of piety toward a venerable
tradition, but in order to retrieve the reality of act and in order to give to act the primary role
within the entirety of the ethical life as it is lived and experienced.” 113 Wojtyła criticizes both
Kant’s and Scheler’s ethical systems because they fail to adequately describe ethical experience.
For Wojtyła, experience is foundational to philosophical and theological reflection.
Wojtyła held in tension the two influences of Thomism and Phenomenology.
Commenting on Wojtyła’s Thomistic influence, Weigel writes: “The Thomism he had learned in
Kraków and at the Angelicum…had given him an intellectual foundation. But, it was precisely
that, a foundation. And, foundations were meant to be built upon.” 114
With Thomism as a foundation only, Wojtyła experienced a tension between ontology
and a description of experience. Wojtyła expressed the tension this way:
But certain questions always remain: Are these two types of understanding the human
being—the cosmological and the personalistic—ultimately mutually exclusive? Where, if
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at all, do reduction and the disclosure of the irreducible in the human being converge?
How is the philosophy of the subject to disclose the objectivity of the human being in the
personal subjectivity of this being? These seem to be the questions that today determine
the perspective for thinking about the human being, the perspective for contemporary
anthropology and ethics. They are essential and burning questions. Anthropology and
ethics must be pursued today within this challenging but promising perspective. 115
The ontological view of the human person treats the human person as an objective object. By so
doing, it does not give appropriate space to the subjective reality of the human person.
When considering philosophical questions, anthropological questions specifically, there
is a tension between Thomism and Phenomenology. Andrew Woznicki offers insight into
Wojtyła’s resolution of the tension between Thomism and Phenomenology saying: “Reflecting
on Wojtyła’s anthropology, we can describe it as an existential personalism, which is
metaphysically explained and phenomenologically described. By consciously using these two
philosophical disciplines, Wojtyła sheds a new light on man.” 116 By working intimately within
their tension, Wojtyła confronts the limitations of both Phenomenology and Thomism. In this
way, he is neither, strictly speaking, a Thomist or a Phenomenologist. He uses both together to
understand and to articulate experience.

C. Essays on Anthropology
As Wojtyła’s intellectual work developed, he broadened his reflections beyond questions
of methodology and ethical evaluations to reflections about the human person in general. His
essays from this time tend towards question of interpersonal relations.
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Representative of his understanding of the human person are the essays: “Participation or
Alienation?” (published in 1975) 117 and “The Person: Subject and Community” (published in
1976). 118 The essay, “Participation or Alienation?,” considers the relationship between an
individual person and another person, an “I-thou” relation. In this relationship Wojtyła asserts
that “Another person is a neighbor to me not just because we share a like humanity, but chiefly
because the other is another I.” 119 Wojtyła describes participation in this way, “that each of us
must continually set ourselves the task of actually participating in the humanity of others, of
experiencing the other as an I, as a person.” 120 Alienation, which as a concept has Marxist
origins, is meant to separate an individual from everyone and everything else. As such, Wojtyła
says, alienation “weakens the ability to experience another human being as another I” to the
extent that it makes difficult or even negates participation. 121 The essay ends with the question
that the title proposes: Faced with the choice, will we choose participation or alienation?
The essay, “The Person: Subject and Community,” continues the reflection on the
relationship of an individual and other people. The essay begins with a description of
experiencing oneself as a subject. He says, “Being a subject (a suppositum) and experiencing
oneself as a subject occur on two entirely different dimensions. Only in the latter do we come in
contact with the actual reality of the human self.” 122 He continues, “After all, the reality of the
person is … ‘trans-phenomenal.’ In other words, we must deeply and comprehensively explore
the ‘phenomenon’ of the human being in order fully to understand and objectify the human
being.” 123 With that methodological assertion and understanding of the individual, he takes up
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the question of community. Community may be understood as a number of individuals in a
common space. Wojtyła defines it differently, “By community I understand not this multiplicity
of subjects itself, but always the specific unity of this multiplicity.” 124 There are some basic
ethical implications of interpersonal relations in a community. Wojtyła asserts, “In interpersonal
I-thou relationships, the partners should not only unveil themselves before one another in the
truth of their personal reality, but they should also accept and affirm one another in that truth.
Such acceptance and affirmation is an expression of the moral (ethical) meaning of interpersonal
community.” 125 Participation is what creates the possibility of community.

D. Essays on Marriage and Family
In part due to his pastoral work, in part due to his reflections on community, in part due
to his consideration of specific ethical questions, Wojtyła was led to questions of marriage and
sexuality. 126 As a final stage of development in his academic writings, questions of marriage,
family, and sexuality become more prominent.
These two essays serve as representatives of his marriage and family reflections: “The
Family as a Community of Persons” (published in 1974) 127 and “Parenthood as a Community of
Persons” (published in 1975). 128 The whole essay “The Family as a Community of Persons” is
written with explicit reference to various sections of Gaudium et Spes. The point of departure in
this essay is the theological anthropology of Vatican II, especially as found in Gaudium et Spes
24. The focal text for Wojtyła is this passage:
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Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, “that all may be one…as we are
one” (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain
likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and
charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God
willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself. 129
In coming to understand the key anthropological insight in this conciliar passage, Wojtyła does
not focus on its implications for an understanding of an individual person. Instead, Wojtyła
focuses on its meaning for interpersonal relationships, for a communion of persons.
In this essay, he immediately applies this understanding to a marriage relationship:
The gift of self is essential for the special communio personarum that takes the form of
marital and familial community, and this gift would be difficult to comprehend without
first comprehending the very being and goodness of each person. … Here, however, I am
concerned with illuminating the logos of marriage and the family in a way that will
provide a firm foundation for their ethos. 130
Family is not just a factual reality, but an ethical one as well. From the standpoint of
methodology, in light of the teaching in Vatican II, Wojtyła says: “Clearly, then, a theological
analysis of the family must proceed from the communal reality, from the category of communio,
and not merely from the category of society.” 131 Especially because a communion of persons is
in the image of the communion of Divine Persons in the Trinity, an analysis of the family cannot
be done simply in human terms. This applies also to procreation. Wojtyła writes:
This applies first of all to conjugal intercourse. We grasp the objective reality and the
objective criterion of this relationship when we perceive that it involves the realization of
a true communio personarum, a union of persons, and not just of bodies—not just sexual
intercourse but a rea1 union of persons, one in which the spouses mutually become a gift
for each other, mutually give themselves to and accept one another. 132
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Wojtyła sees the insights gained from Gaudium et Spes as integral to understanding the family,
to understanding “the divine plan” for the family. 133
Continuing the reflection on marriage, again with various references to Gaudium et Spes,
the essay “Parenthood as a Community of Persons” takes up the question of parenthood—
motherhood and fatherhood. In a family, fathers and mothers are first husbands and wives.
Insofar as they follow the ethical obligations of establishing a communion of person, the
marriage relationship first confirms the personhood of each individually. Wojtyła calls this a
bestowal of humanity, when he writes, “The spouses’ mutual bestowal of humanity, which
determines the authentically personal character and plane of their marital community, leads, by
means of the conjugal act of sexual intercourse, to parenthood. Parenthood is expressed in the
conception of a child and in the subsequent birth of the child into the world.” 134 The
responsibilities of marriage are connected to the responsibilities of parenthood. With regard to
the birth of a child, Wojtyła says: “This external fruit and expression of parenthood, however, is
intimately connected with an internal effect. Parenthood is an internal fact in the husband and
wife as father and mother.” Wojtyła acknowledges both a biological and a moral component to
parenthood.
Wojtyła then comments on the parents’ responsibility for the education of their children.
And, while this does include things like schooling and intellectual formation, Wojtyła identifies
its theological meaning in more fundamental terms, saying: “The whole task that the parents
discover in their child from the very beginning and throughout the years of the child's
development is reducible simply to the exigency of making a gift of mature humanity to this little
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person, this gradually developing human being.” 135 The responsibility of the education of
children involves both an internal and external component. With the internal as primary,
Wojtyła understands the role of parenthood as a bestowal of humanity.
The parents’ bestowal of humanity on their child is the primary task of parenthood.
Paraphrasing Gaudium et Spes, Wojtyła calls this responsibility by the term, personalization: “By
personalization the Council understands ‘the proper maturation of the personality’ and ‘truly
personal relationships.’ This brings us back to the concepts of community and communio.” 136
Personalization helps the child to accept their humanity and to make a gift of self. Wojtyła
elaborates on this point:
The whole family community develops as a communio personarum as though in stages,
and this development in each of its stages includes the development of each person who
comes into the community. This development, in turn, is simply an increasingly more
complete and mature actualization of the human being, who, as Vatican II tells us, in
keeping with the whole Christian tradition, ‘is the only creature on earth that God willed
for itself,’ and who ‘cannot fully find himself or herself except through a disinterested
gift of himself of herself’ (Gaudium et Spes 24). 137
The final section of this essay describes the responsibility of the family to society.
Wojtyła describes the role of the family in the modern world in terms of personalization. The
family helps all individuals in their personal maturation and in establishing truly personal
relationships. He underscores, “And it is precisely in this wholistic sense that the family, both as
a factual reality and as a rich and varied ethical imperative, is indispensable and
irreplaceable.” 138 The role of the family is fundamental to society and is primary to any other
societal structure, especially because of the responsibility of the family to personalize society.
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The responsibility of the communio of the parents can be understood in terms of a
bestowal of humanity—upon themselves, their children, and society as a whole. By exercising
this responsibility, the members of a family create a communio personarum described as “a
mode of being and acting in mutual relation to one another (not just ‘in common’ with one
another) such that through this being and acting they mutually confirm and affirm one another as
persons.” 139

III. Preparation for the Theology of the Body
In 1972, Wojtyła began a project with a student to integrate his ethics and his
philosophical anthropology. The unfinished work is entitled: Man in the Field of
Responsibility. 140 Up to this point, Wojtyła’s ethics and his anthropology were basically
separated, in part due to the sequential focusing of anthropology after ethics. Wojtyła says, “in
my study of the person I did not subject morality itself to analysis. That is precisely what I now
intend to do in this study: This will be a study of morality as such. … morality as a reality
subjectivized in the person.” 141 By beginning this project, Wojtyła recognized the possibility of
synthesizing his philosophical anthropology and his ethics. His turn to anthropology led him to
return to ethics in order to deepen both.
The unfinished Man in the Field of Responsibility shows Wojtyła’s own understanding of
the possibility of incorporating his various works into a unified vision. While Wojtyła did not
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complete his philosophical project, the Theology of the Body can be seen as an incorporation of
this philosophy and his theology, as following through on the trajectory set forth by his minor
works and his major philosophical works.
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Chapter 2
Wojtyła’s Focus on Anthropology
Wojtyła’s works are interconnected and internally consistent. Kupczak writes: “An
impressive characteristic of Wojtyła as a philosopher is his intellectual consistency. One cannot
find any sign of a significant change in his thought during half of the century of his intellectual
career.” 142 Wojtyła only made occasional cross references within his writings to his other works.
Because of Wojtyła’s intellectual consistency, commentators note the connections. They make
explicit the points of contact, which serves to deepen the understanding of each work. Moreover,
commentators illustrate the connection between the works of Wojtyła and the Theology of the
Body.
After a general introduction to the Theology of the Body, this chapter will review some of
these commentaries.

I. Introduction to the Theology of the Body
Some initial comments help to establish the unique status and significance of the
Theology of the Body.

A. Genre of the Catecheses
The papal practice of the Wednesday Audience is a modern custom. Since John Paul II,
the Wednesday Audiences have often developed a theme over the course of weeks and months.
No other series of Audiences, even in John Paul II’s own pontificate, resemble the length and
depth of the Theology of the Body. As a unique manifestation of a relatively new practice, the
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Theology of the Body raises the question of the role of the Wednesday Audience in the
Magisterium.
One author who has assessed the role of the Wednesday Audience in the grand scheme of
magisterial teachings is Charles Curran. Overall, he has concluded that the Catecheses are of a
low magisterial status. Noting that the Audience is often a greeting to the people in attendance
and often not written directly by the pope, Curran asserts that “talks to general audiences have
little or no authoritative character.” 143 Nevertheless, Curran also notes that the Theology of the
Body has a privileged place “to know and study John Paul II’s approach to human sexuality and
marriage.” 144 And he says that they are certainly in the genre of teaching. 145
Michael Waldstein, however, makes the case that greater import could be granted to an
Audience. Waldstein says that Wednesday Catecheses should be considered as having a
“primacy of place in the ordinary magisterium of the Bishop of Rome as pastor of the Universal
Church.” 146 In the case of the Theology of the Body, in the course of the series, John Paul II
refers to the audiences as a study, or as reflections, meditations (which take the posture of
receptivity), and analyses (which take the posture of spontaneity). 147 Waldstein also notes that,
close to the beginning of the series, in 1979, John Paul II issued an Apostolic Exhortation,
Catechesi Tradendae, on the role of catechesis in the Church. Given the indicators of the
method and content in the Apostolic Exhortation, Waldstein identifies the Theology of the Body
as “John Paul II’s catechesis par excellence.” 148 As catecheses, audiences are more than a
greeting that might also be useful to understand the mind of the pope. At least in the case of the
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Theology of the Body, Waldstein further notes that the Wednesday Catecheses should be
considered as having significant authority. Waldstein says: “One must measure the authority of
TOB in accord with these findings about office, genre, and content: the authority of a text is high
if the Pope speaks (1) as pastor of the Universal Church, (2) in a form of teaching central to his
office of bishop, and (3) on a topic central to the faith. All three of these indicators are high in
TOB.” 149
Given that the presentation lasted over five years, given that the scope of the whole work
could be lost on the pilgrims each week, it was a deliberate choice to present the Theology of the
Body in the genre of catechesis. Even without an explicit statement by John Paul II concerning
its authority, it is clear that the Theology of the Body is significant and is meant to be considered
as such.

B. The Pre-Papal Text of the Theology of the Body
At the conclusion of the series of the Audience addresses, the catecheses could then be
compiled into a book format. In his Introduction to his translation of the Audiences, Waldstein
articulates the history of development of the book format of the catecheses, noting this
development in a number of language editions. 150 The history of development reveals the
tension between John Paul II speaking of the catecheses as a coherent whole, which invites the
publication of catecheses in a book format, on the one hand, and the lack of clear headings,
chapter divisions, and the like (except for sporadic indications by John Paul II), on the other
hand. This tension yielded non-uniform presentations of the Theology of the Body, with each
editor structuring the material differently, supplying their own book title, chapter divisions, and
149
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headings. Waldstein identifies the variety of structures as revealing insights into the theological
content of the collected series. 151 The symphony of editions results in an inconsistent
presentation of the catecheses.
Yet one edition of the catecheses bears special mention: the Polish edition. Waldstein
describes how the Polish edition of the Theology of the Body has a number of headings and
subheadings not found elsewhere (and does not include a few of the Wednesday Audience
addresses). 152 In his research, Waldstein discovered that the Polish edition of the Theology of the
Body is essentially a pre-papal text written by Wojtyła, published with a few adaptations that
would reflect the nature of the Wednesday Audience. Furthermore, the Polish manuscript, as
Waldstein explains, was used to create the Addresses themselves. Each week, John Paul II
would pen a paragraph or two for an introduction and a conclusion to the Address, and then
indicate which paragraphs of the Polish manuscript should be included. The newly penned
paragraphs (if not in Italian) and the designated portions of the Polish manuscript would then be
translated into Italian for the Address. In this way, the manuscript headings/subheadings (and
the structure to the text that they provided) of the pre-papal text were jettisoned.
Despite the fact that an unpublished pre-papal text written by Wojtyła was used to create
the major content of the text of the series of Wednesday Audience Addresses, the normative text
for the Theology of the Body is the Italian-language Audience addresses—not the Polish
manuscript. 153 Because of their pedagogical value, in his edition of the Theology of the Body,
Waldstein translated and included the headings that are found in the pre-papal Polish text. 154
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The addition of these headings helps to navigate the sea of varying structures of the collected
Audiences. 155
Given the existence of the pre-papal text and given that John Paul II recast it in the form
of catechesis, a comparison between the Theology of the Body and the works of Wojtyła is both
justified and necessary.

II. Contextualizations of the Theology of the Body
A number of authors have articulated the connection and continuity between the works of
Wojtyła and the Theology of the Body.

A. The Theology of the Body and Wojtyła’s Philosophical Work
This selection of commentaries articulates the points of contact between the Catecheses
and the philosophical work of Wojtyła. This review of their thought serves to deepen the
understanding of the Theology of the Body.
In Gift and Communion, Jarosław Kupczak examines two key notions in the
anthropology of John Paul II, and their roots in the works of Wojtyła: gift and communio. 156 The
Theology of the Body highlights the gift of self. Kupczak notes the focus on the gift in the work
of Wojtyła in the decade prior to his papal election, which reveals a philosophical deepening of
the concept of gift. This deepening takes the two paths of gift and communion. Kupczak says:
“It seems that there are two currents in evidence in these reflections: the first concerns the
structure of human self-determination, and the second consists in Wojtyła’s theory of
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participation in the humanity of other persons.” 157 Wojtyła’s analysis of the gift looks at the
inner life of the human person on one hand and on interpersonal relations on the other hand.
Kupczak notes, “The human dynamic of self-possession and self-governance is essential for the
possibility of a self-gift.” 158 Kupczak also notes the connection of participation and communio
personarum. 159 These analyses find their way into the Theology of the Body. Kupczak says:
The theology of the body presents a very realistic picture of human love. John Paul II
emphasizes that only the person who has reached some necessary level of maturity and
internal integrity, described as self-possession and self-governance, is able to become a
self-gift for another. This fundamental dimension of ethical self-governance becomes
especially important in relation to one’s own sexuality. A harmonious integration of
sensuality, emotions, reason, and will turns out to be a necessary condition for
undertaking the effort to affirm the other person, that is, to treat the other person not as an
object, but as a subject. 160
In this way, Kupczak especially connects the concept of integration, so central in Wojtyła’s
philosophical anthropology, with the anthropological content of the Catecheses.
Another key theme from the Theology of the Body that speaks directly to gift and
communion is the language of the body. At the basis of understanding the language of the body
is attention to the body itself, on which Wojtyła already had focused. Kupczak articulates that
for Wojtyła the body—and consequently sexuality—should be understood in terms of the
person. 161 Wojtyła facilitates this understanding through a description of the dynamisms of the
human person. Kupczak presents Wojtyła’s analysis of sensual experience 162 and emotive
experience 163 in a relationship of love between a man and a woman, which culminates in the
assertion: “Human love must not take place ‘on the surface’ of the subject, in his senses and
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emotions, but should engage the whole person, the mind and will of the one who loves.” 164
Prefaced by a review of Wojtyła’s analysis of the body and sexuality, Kupczak turns to John
Paul II’s Catecheses on the Song of Songs, saying: “Using philosophical language from Love
and Responsibility, it can be said that the catecheses speak of how the sensuality and
emotionality of the human body reveal the beauty and mystery of the other sex and also how
mature love transcends the physical ‘language of the body’ and moves toward the affirmation of
and responsibility for the other person.” 165 In this way, Kupczak emphasizes the dynamisms of
the human person at the foundation of the language of the body, which must be spoken in truth to
build a communion of persons.
Kupczak notes that the terms, gift and communion, have both philosophical and
theological developments. 166 With that background, he weaves together seamlessly the
philosophical language of Wojtyła with the Theology of the Body. This especially illustrates the
continuity of thought between the various works. Nevertheless, Kupczak does not erase the
distinctions between the works, the distinction between philosophy and theology. 167 He notes
that they influence each other. One prime example is with regard to the notion of the
communion of persons: Kupczak makes a significant historical note saying, “Prior to the Second
Vatican Council, the concept of communio personarum is simply not present in Karol Wojtyła’s
philosophical and theological reflections.” 168 Commenting on the relationship between
philosophy and theology as it plays out in the Theology of the Body, Kupczak writes: “In the
papal ‘hermeneutics of gift,’ the Word of God is accepted in faith, and then undergoes
‘philosophical exegesis,’ and its ‘biblical images are translated to philosophical notions,’ so that
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the Word can shine with all the radiance of its truth.” 169 In Gift and Communion, Kupczak
deepens the philosophical exegesis as it stands in the Theology of the Body, with the
philosophical anthropology as expressed in Wojtyła’s work. The main limitation with
Kupczak’s work is that it could be more detailed.
In John Paul II on the Vulnerable, Jeffrey Tranzillo connects the Theology of the Body
with the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. 170 Tranzillo states: “Person and Act and the
catechesis on the body are somewhat similar in their basic structure. Each work concerns itself
initially with analyzing the experience and implications of fully mature human acting, so as to
arrive at an understanding of the personal attributes and essential constitution of the human
subject.” 171 The human person is not only considered as an individual, but in relation to other
human persons. Noting the background of Gaudium et Spes 24, Tranzillo says: “The concept of
alienation, as the antithesis of participation in the humanity of others, shows philosophically why
we cannot fulfill ourselves humanly and personally apart from sincere self-giving. Pope John
Paul II develops that idea theologically in terms of the detrimental effects of original and
personal sin on the image of God in us.” 172 Despite their different methodologies, the two works
affirm the same conclusion. Tranzillo says, “both Person and Act and the catechesis on the body
proceed toward and reach the conclusion that the greatest possible expression, and hence
fulfillment, of oneself takes place in actions constitutive of the communion of persons.” 173
In Tranzillo’s analysis, of these works, the central concern is human action in
interpersonal relations. Given the starting point of the human person, individually and as a
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communion of persons, in the image of God in the Theology of the Body, Tranzillo says that the
catechesis “brings out much more clearly than does his philosophical treatment of our
ontologically personal identity that even the most rudimentary activity of a human being cannot
simply be equated with that of a nonpersonal being, however similar the activity of both might
sometimes appear to be.” 174 For Tranzillo, the theological anthropology of John Paul II, with its
development of the revelation of the human person being in the image of God, is key for
extending the Theology of the Body to who he calls vulnerable bodies. Tranzillo says: “While
John Paul’s philosophical/theological anthropology generally centers around ethical and moral
concerns, it is nevertheless also true that in the context of the whole, he has laid the foundation
for a genuine anthropology of the vulnerable.” 175
Tranzillo seems to have a strong insight into the continuity of thought between Wojtyła’s
philosophical anthropology and John Paul II’s theological anthropology. His facility with
interweaving the key concepts and language of the two helps to reveal that continuity of thought.
But, in the end, Tranzillo does not develop the philosophical foundations of the Theology of the
Body, taking a different route to articulate how the vulnerable can make a sincere gift of self.
In Crossing the Threshold of Love, Mary Shivanandan develops a theology of
marriage. 176 Ultimately, she incorporates a number of magisterial documents, from Vatican II
and various popes, along with a number of texts from John Paul II’s papacy to address questions
of marriage, sexuality, contraception, and natural family planning. She also examines some of
the works of Wojtyła, identifying the connection between the philosophical anthropology and the
Theology of the Body. Shivanandan says: “It is not possible to understand fully Pope John Paul
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II’s catechesis on Genesis without grasping the main principles of his philosophical
anthropology. The very words he uses in his commentary on the Genesis text reflect the
philosophical categories of The Acting Person.” 177
Shivanandan notes some specific points of contact, saying, “Self-determination, which
flows from free will, is given in the Garden of Eden with the command not to eat of the tree of
knowledge.” 178 She notes, “Man is defined also through a specifically human action—tilling the
earth, which no other creature is able to do.” 179 Continuing, she says: “Man becomes aware of
the complexity of the structure of the body-soul composite and of his superiority over the
animals. (The phenomenological analysis of conscience, emotional attitudes and instinctual
responses enables Wojtyła to penetrate this complexity in its full richness and to place it within
the context of experience.)” 180 Shivanandan especially highlights original solitude, which she
defines as subjectivity. She says: “The fundamental aspects of man’s transcendence, his
relationship with God and his self-determination, were both put to the test in the Garden of Eden.
…Here, a…meaning of solitude emerges, that of alienation, a state that pre-occupied John Paul
II from his earliest writings.” 181 Original solitude, as alienation, is not overcome without
original unity. Shivanandan says: “For original solitude lay open to original unity, but the
loneliness or alienation resulting from man’s first sin attacked both the unity and integrity of the
soul-body composite and the communion of persons.” 182 Integration and transcendence are
important concepts in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology but are not explicitly present in the
Theology of the Body, which Shivanandan draws out as essential for original solitude and
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original unity. She also points to Wojtyła’s analysis of intersubjectivity by participation as “a
clear philosophic statement that original unity and the communion of person pass by way of
original solitude.” 183
In general, beyond these assertions, Shivanandan does not develop the connections
between Wojtyła’s philosophical work and the Theology of the Body. 184 Shivanandan presents
the organic connection between Wojtyła’s works and John Paul II’s papal writings, especially in
the area of marriage and family. Like Kupczak, she identifies Vatican II as a watershed in
Wojtyła’s thought. 185
In “In the Beginning…”: A Theology of the Body, Eduardo Echeverria treats the question
of homosexuality and Catholic sexual ethics. 186 While not as his exclusive source, Echeverria
includes significantly the Theology of the Body as providing normative value to his theme. 187
In his analysis, Echeverria draws a clear line of continuity between Wojtyła’s
philosophical anthropology and the Theology of the Body, both with regard to content and
method. He identifies the content and method of the philosophical work and the Catecheses as
concerning the experience of human action.
His presentation of the Catecheses begins with an evaluation of the foundational
methodological role of phenomenology in John Paul II’s thought—as a method, not as a
system. 188 Echeverria sees the impact of phenomenology in Wojtyła’s analysis of “lived
experience, the relationship between action and the person, and the personal nature of man's
human body, of his bodily existence, as the dimension in and through which man reveals
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himself.” 189 Echeverria also comments on the content of the Catecheses. The experience of the
human person as described phenomenologically is foundationally linked with the original human
experiences, which John Paul II develops in the Theology of the Body: original solitude, original
unity, and original nakedness. 190 And, then, Echeverria makes explicit the connection between
the phenomenological statements and the original human experiences. Solitude, in the language
of Wojtyła’s philosophy, makes one aware of one’s own subjectivity, the power of selfdetermination, and that the body expresses the person in an authentic human action. 191 Unity, as
reciprocal enrichment, is built on the subjectivity of the other. 192 Nakedness reveals that a
human person is a gift for another, which is possible because of personal integration. With the
introduction of concupiscence inner division marks the experience of the human person.
Echeverria writes: “Indeed, the man of concupiscence is no longer integrated within himself; his
body does not express his reality as a person, something which is fundamental to the meaning of
the acting person qua person.” 193
The above commentaries illustrate the connection of the Theology of the Body with the
works of Wojtyła, illustrating the philosophical anthropology that underlies the Catecheses.

B. The Theology of the Body and Wojtyła’s Literary Work
The deep consistency of Wojtyła’s thought can be seen in the connection between his
literary works and his academic work.
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1. Wojtyła’s Literary Work and his Philosophical Anthropology
Joseph Rice offers an analysis of some literary works of Wojtyła. 194 His essay shows the
continuity of thought between Wojtyła’s literary work and his philosophical anthropology. Rice
notes that the notion of participation is found in both Wojtyła’s literary and philosophical works.
In both cases, participation is predicated upon what Wojtyła calls the proper weight of the human
person. Rice notes that Wojtyła speaks of proper weight and participation in his philosophical
essays and major philosophical works. 195 But Rice does not analyze any philosophical work in
this essay. Instead, Rice notes the insight that can be gained by examining Wojtyła’s literary
writings. Rice says, “let us turn to the…artistic contexts in which Wojtyła employs the notion of
the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man. The key to our analysis will
be to maintain our focus on the notion of humanity, with its weight, for participation is always
rooted in the humanity of those who participate.” 196 Understanding a communion of persons is
rooted in understanding an individual human person.
In The Jeweler’s Shop, at times, the jeweler weighs the rings of the characters in the
drama. If a married person presents their ring separately from their living spouse, then the
jeweler finds that the ring has no weight. The image is that, in this case, the one presenting the
ring has lost the proper weight of the human person. Since the communion of persons has been
disrupted, since the participation of the spouses in each other has been disrupted, their proper
weight has likewise been forfeited. Rice notes: “It is through the mutual commitment of this
weight, the weight of the humanity of each, that a communio personarum is formed, such that the
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two no longer ‘weigh’ separately, but only together.” 197 In terms of Genesis, they have become
one flesh. In philosophical terms, Rice says: “What is in play here is a notion that Wojtyła terms
the mutual bestowal of the humanity of the spouses.” 198 The participation of the husband and
wife also bestows humanity on their child. Rice says, “In essence, their bestowal of the concrete
‘weight’ of their humanity is directed not only toward each other, but also, in some way, toward
the new person that may come to be as a result of a divine action that depends upon the
conditions that they freely decide to bring about.” 199
Another dimension of participation can be seen in The Radiation of Fatherhood. The
proper weight of the human person is only experienced in participation in God. Rice says, “To
become a father, spiritually, one must first be willing to become a child, that is, one must first
experience one’s own dependence in relation to the Source.” 200 The experience of participation
in God is not passive or simply ontological, but relational. It is a participation that is
experienced by a communion of persons, not only individually. Rice says that participation is
also seen in “that instance in which a man and a woman begin to weigh together in relation to the
Creator, the Absolute Person, in the most excellent and paradigmatic example of every
communio personarum.” 201
Rice’s analysis reveals philosophical themes in Wojtyła’s literary work. Furthermore,
Rice shows that the literary work complements Wojtyła’s philosophical writings. Rice
comments, “Formed in a poetic perspective steeped in the traditions of Polish Romanticism,
educated by the theatrical experiments of…[the Rhapsodic Theater], and inspired…by the
mysticism of John of the Cross, Wojtyła’s…poetic vision would…found his philosophical vision
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of the inner life as a life fixed on the good and the true.” 202 The literary work shaped the
methodology and content of, and is consistent with, the philosophical work of Wojtyła.

2. The Role of Literary Expression in Wojtyła
The consistent publication, especially of poetry, indicates that artistic expression
remained an integral, almost necessary, mode of expression for Wojtyła. Weigel notes: “Against
the temptation to see life as a relatively flat terrain…, Wojtyła almost relentlessly lays bare the
dramatic tension to be found in every life.” 203 Wojtyła gives voice to the dramatic tension of
every life by exercising both artistic and technical language.
Other connections between Wojtyła literary work and his other writings can be noted.
For example, Wojtyła’s plays The Jeweler’s Shop, Radiation of Fatherhood, and the poem
Mother resonate with his writings on marriage, sexuality, and parenthood. His play Our God’s
Brother and his poem The Quarry take up questions of ethics as part of their dramatic reflection.
Our God’s Brother and Song of the Hidden God begin to probe questions of anthropology in
general. Perhaps a deeper connection can be seen in Thought—Strange Space. The poem opens
with these lines: “Sometimes it happens in conversation: we stand/facing truth and lack the
words,/have no gesture, no sign;/and yet – we feel – no word, no gesture/or sign would convey
the whole image/that we must enter alone and face, like Jacob.” 204 Wojtyła is not the only
author to acknowledge the inadequacy of words to convey thought and experience. His response
is somewhat unique. Wojtyła treats many of the same themes in both philosophical and artistic
modes of expression. In this way he claims that questions of ethics, marriage, and anthropology
cannot be fully treated in philosophical language. His literary writings thus complemented his
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philosophical and theological writings, for both modes of expression often treated the same
themes.
Weigel notes: “Wojtyła believed that language, either technical or literary, was always
inadequate to the reality it tried to grasp and convey. Thus Wojtyła’s literary activity was not a
hobby.” 205 The two written expressions, the literary and the philosophical, are not just two
different ways of saying the same thing. Wojtyła’s literary expression presents his philosophical
notions in ways that go beyond what he says in even his major philosophical works. The
detailed analysis of human action in Person and Act, for instance, only opens up to the question
of participation and intersubjectivity. As Rice illustrated, in Wojtyła’s literary work, ethics and
anthropology are synthesized in such a way that participation is clearly linked with the
communio personarum of the husband and wife. 206 Moreover, the literary work incorporates the
human person’s relationship with God, individually and as a communion of persons, which is
outside the scope of philosophical work. It is clear in Wojtyła’s literary work that the proper
weight of the human person is found in relation to God. Rice does not consider the writings of
John Paul II in his essay. But there are points of contact between the husband and wife
participating in God and the man and the woman living a communion of persons in the image of
God as seen in Genesis. The proper weight of the human person as a requisite for participation
resonates with the concern for a sincere gift of self in an adequate (proper) anthropology.
The points of contact, through Wojtyła’s literary work, also justify the reading of the
Theology of the Body in relation to Wojtyła’s philosophical work, which can elucidate the
anthropological and ethical implications of John Paul II’s theological anthropology. In my final
chapter, I return to the question of the role of literary expression in the Theology of the Body.
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III. St. John of the Cross and the Theology of the Body
The Theology of the Body is not a presentation of philosophical anthropology, but rather,
a presentation of theological anthropology rooted in biblical interpretation and a theology of
marriage. Some commentators have offered evaluations of the Theology of the Body in light of
theological considerations.

1. Negative Evaluations of the Theology of the Body
One author who has negatively received the moral theology of the Catecheses is Charles
Curran. His evaluation of the Audiences is not entirely negative, though. Curran names some
points of merit. He finds positive the spousal meaning of the body as a foundation for a
spirituality of marriage. 207 Also positively assessed is the presentation of the unity of the body
and soul—and a positive understanding of the body, in general. 208 He also says that this positive
view of the whole person highlights the need to develop self-possession. 209
But then, Curran assesses negatively the Theology of the Body in other ways. He finds
the spousal meaning of the body to be inadequate to speak to other bodies, for example, those
who are unmarried or who have same-sex attraction. 210 And, even if there is basically a positive
understanding of the human person, Curran sees in the Theology of the Body an inadequate
account of the role of pleasure, especially its role in a marriage relationship. He says: “The
impression given by The Theology of the Body is that passion and sexual pleasure are totally
suspect and in need of control. The pope does not seem to acknowledge a fundamental goodness
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about sexuality.” 211 He disagrees with John Paul II’s rejection of the use of contraception
within marriage, saying that, in the Theology of the Body, “The pope’s analysis demands too
much meaning and symbolism from each and every single act.” 212 Curran’s general assessment
is that the Theology of the Body is inadequate. 213
Luke Timothy Johnson issues very similar criticisms of the Catecheses. In The
Revelatory Body, Johnson develops a theological anthropology. 214 And, in the course of
developing his own theology of the body, he incorporates a few comments about the Theology of
the Body, which serve to offer a contradistinction to his own work. Concerning the Audiences
themselves in a statement that goes beyond similar observations, Johnson states: “They are, in
fact, exceptionally difficult to read and almost mind-numbingly repetitious.” 215 As a project that
intends to speak to various bodies—bodies that experience play, pain, passion, and aging, for
example—The Revelatory Body agrees with Curran’s assessment that the Catecheses do not
apply to all persons. 216 Like Curran, Johnson asserts that the Catecheses’ treatment of the role of
pleasure in marriage is inadequate. He says: “John Paul II’s Theology of the Body effectively
eliminated eros from theological consideration—even within marriage.” 217 The focus on selfcontrol in the Theology of the Body (and on other magisterial teachings), Johnson says,
characterizes sexual pleasure as an obstacle to love. 218 As well, Johnson offers his own
disagreement with the magisterial teaching against contraception, e.g. Theology of the Body and
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Humanae Vitae. 219 Overall, Johnson sees the Theology of the Body as inadequate, not just in
content but also in method. Naming this inadequacy, Johnson says, “his effort in this book falls
far short of adequate theological thinking on the subject of the human body as the arena of God’s
self-disclosure.” 220 That is, the doctrinal errors are based on methodological errors. Johnson
says: “Solemn pronouncements are made on the basis of scriptural exegesis rather than living
experience.” 221 A theology of the body needs an adequate treatment of experience.

2. The Sanjuanist Triangle
In his introduction to the Theology of the Body, Waldstein analyzes some background for
the development of the Catecheses. Waldstein examines Wojtyła’s philosophical work and the
thinkers who significantly influenced it (e.g. Kant, Scheler). He shows how these influences
culminated in the formation of the Theology of the Body. 222 Capturing John Paul II’s motivation,
Waldstein notes: “The response to such a violent scientific-technological attack on the body must
be a defense of the body in its natural intrinsic meaning. The spousal mystery is the primary
place at which this defense must take place, because the highest meaning of the body is found
there.” 223 Rather than showing intertextual connections between Wojtyła’s philosophical work
and the Catecheses, Waldstein develops these broader connections.
Waldstein shows the continuity of thought that led to the Theology of the Body (and
beyond) that can be seen already in Wojtyła’s first doctoral thesis on St. John of the Cross. 224
Waldstein comments: “Had Wojtyła chosen the topic of love rather than faith for his dissertation,
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the evidence of the strong impact of St. John of the Cross in his understanding of spousal love
would be more direct and clear.” 225 Since the focus of the dissertation is the union of the human
person with God, it does not treat thematically the question of the interpersonal human
communion. Nevertheless, the theological background for the Catecheses can be found in
Wojtyła’s analysis of St. John of the Cross, in what Waldstein calls the “Sanjuanist triangle.” 226
The specific points of the triangle, the specific points of contact between St. John of the Cross
and the Catecheses, according to Waldstein are these:
(1) Love implies a cycle of mutual giving, supremely the gift of self. (2) The
paradigmatic instance of such self-gift in human experience is the spousal relation
between man and woman. (3) The Trinity is the archetype of such love and gift from
which the love between God and human persons as we as love between human beings
derives as an imitation and participation. 227
The connection of these points with the Theology of the Body is seen over the course of the
Catecheses themselves. Waldstein does make some specific comments. Concerning the first
two points, Waldstein offers a textual comparison between St. John of the Cross, Wojtyła’s Love
and Responsibility, and the Theology of the Body, highlighting the deep coherence concerning
the self-gift of spousal love as it is addressed in the various texts. 228 Concerning human love as
the imitation of the Trinity, the third triangular point, Waldstein identifies the influence of
Gaudium et Spes 24. Waldstein identifies the point of contact between Wojtyła’s book on
Vatican II, Sources of Renewal, and the Catecheses, and their deep foundation in St. John of the
Cross, as hinging on Gaudium et Spes 24. 229 Furthermore concerning that passage from Vatican
II, Waldstein links the statement that God has willed the human person for one’s own sake with
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the personalistic norm, which demands that we respond to a person in an adequate way, and that
the sincere gift of self is an act of love, thus explicating the connection with Wojtyła. 230
While offering an exposition of both the philosophical and theological background of the
Theology of the Body, Waldstein’s specific textual analysis is especially powerful concerning the
theological connection between the works of Wojtyła and the Catecheses. As a summary
statement on the purpose of the Theology of the Body, and the influence of St. John of the Cross,
Waldstein writes: “Faith must penetrate and transform human experience. It must be received
and enriched in the lived experience of personal subjectivity.” 231 This theological understanding
of experience, especially concerning the central importance of experience in human love, is a
line that runs through the works of Wojtyła into the Theology of the Body.
As a foundational work, Faith According to St. John of the Cross, contains many
elements that continue into the anthropology of John Paul II. One primary element is the turn to
the human person, the subject, and to human experience—a turn that is completed in his explicit
treatments of anthropology. In his dissertation, there is a recognition of different levels of the
human person, which he will treat thematically in his later work. There is an acknowledgement
of the limits of human intellect or human reason to know divine things. Moreover, there is an
acknowledgement of the centrality of love in the ethical life of the human person. Wojtyła
describes St. John of the Cross’ notion of experience as an aide to theological reflection in this
way: “Now we refer to his own experience, whether drawn from his contact with other souls in
spiritual direction or from his own interior life. And here, it seems, we touch a constitutive
element of his works. They are not simply speculative treatises on mystical theology; they are a
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witness to mystical experience.” 232 Wojtyła understands experience as a touchstone of
philosophical and theological reflection. It serves as a fundamental aide to theology.
St. John of the Cross articulates the type of experience that John Paul II understands as
necessary in order to develop an adequate anthropology.

III. Summary
From his earliest published artistic works, Wojtyła was concerned with speaking to
human experience. That concern took different forms as his life progressed, influenced by a
number of sources, including the work of St. John of the Cross, St. Thomas Aquinas, Scheler,
and his pastoral work. 233 Wojtyła consistently returned to the world of inner experience. He did
this in his art, his ethics, his theological writing, and his pastoral writing. As he deepened his
focus on inner experience, the themes of anthropology and sexuality take center stage. 234
As Wojtyła continued to speak to human experience, he repeatedly encountered the limits
of the various modes of expression. He approached the limits of ontology, needing the input of
inner experience. He encountered the limits of technical philosophical and theological language,
needing the complement of rhapsody. He recognized that the world of inner experience needs all
of these modes of expression working together. For Wojtyła, personal experience is an essential
point of reference for philosophical and theological reflection. But that experience is not
absolute. Any description of phenomena requires some sort of transcendence, e.g. moral norms
or ontology.
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But, ultimately, Wojtyła approached the limits of human knowledge itself, needing
“vistas closed to human reason,” opened by Divine revelation. 235 So he turns to Scripture when
he takes up the question of theological anthropology and in describing the communio
personarum in the Theology of the Body.
The next chapters will look at Wojtyła’s major works, Person and Act and Love and
Responsibility, in order to illustrate the limits that Wojtyła took human reason in his
development of anthropology.
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Chapter 3
Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology: Person and Act
The next two chapters offer a detailed analysis of Wojtyła’s major philosophical works.
This chapter examines Person and Act.
There has been some debate about the proper way in English to refer to the work, Osoba i
Czyn. The work has been translated and published in English as The Acting Person. 236 The
editor of the volume, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, had been working with Wojtyła on the
publication of Osoba i Czyn, and was working with him on the English translation before his
papal election. While the collaboration was begun, it was not completed by October 1978, at
which point the pope did not get involved in the translation of Osoba i Czyn. 237 Without an
English translation that had received final review and approval by the author, doubt is cast upon
the translation, specifically about the appropriateness of the title, which is not a literal translation
of the Polish title. The debate engaged is ultimately about how to understand Wojtyła, either as a
Thomist or as a Phenomenologist, with “acting person” reflective of a phenomenological
position, and “person and act” seemingly consonant with scholastic metaphysics. Without
entering into the debate of the philosophical merit of the English translation of the entire work, I
refer to the work as Person and Act because it reflects the Wojtyłan style in titling his other
works, e.g. Love and Responsibility.
Person and Act is a sustained philosophical analysis of the human person. It articulates a
language with which to speak about human experience and action, which is used by Wojtyła
throughout his philosophical and theological work. Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology is
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rooted in the human person’s experience of oneself. His philosophical anthropology is based on
an understanding of the human person as a unity of body and soul. Wojtyła describes how the
human person can grow in the experience of inner unity through integration.
The Theology of the Body employs the language and concepts of integration.

I. Human Action
The primary focus of Person and Act is a description and analysis of inner experience.
Wojtyła limits his analysis to the human person’s inner experience, in its complexity. He
identifies the focus of his analyses saying, “This experience, which man has of himself, is the
richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him.” 238

A. Inner Experience
Wojtyła begins Person and Act by making the distinction between two fundamental inner
experiences of the human person: the passive experience of something happening to a person,
within a person, and the active experience of action, articulated in terms of the dynamisms within
a person. The passive experience is captured by the phrase: “It happens to me,” or more for
Wojtyła’s purposes, “It happens in me.” The active experience is captured by the phrase: “I act.”
Wojtyła writes, “The two objective structures, ‘man-acts’ and ‘something-happens-in-man,’
determine the two fundamental lines of the dynamism proper to man.” 239 “It happens” is
characterized by passivity, by the human person being aware that it is not an experience of
action. 240 “I act,” however, Wojtyła describes as “that form of the human dynamism in which
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man himself is the agent, that is to say, he is the conscious cause of his own causation.” 241 In
this case, the person is aware that they are responsible for the action. Wojtyła refers to both “I
act” and “it happens” with the term dynamism. He states clearly that the human dynamism is
that “which issues from within and may have the form either of acting or of happening.” 242
While an initial understanding of the distinction between the active and the passive human
dynamisms is presented in these chapters, Wojtyła will continually refer to them and deepen the
understanding throughout Person and Act.
Another insight mentioned in the preliminary chapters of Person and Act is a recognition
of the levels of the person. Within a single human person are experiences on different levels.
Both the passive and the active dynamisms are each experienced on level of the psyche and the
level of the soma, Wojtyła names them “the psychoemotive and the somato-vegetative” levels of
the person. 243 Wojtyła further articulates the dynamics of these levels as they become thematic
in later chapters of Person and Act. As Wojtyła continues to articulate the experience of the
active and the passive human dynamisms, the recognition of the levels of the human person gives
insight into the complexity of the experiences that he addresses.
Ultimately, the importance of the dynamisms experienced by a human person is found in
the possible changes for the individual. Wojtyła writes, “man changes one way or another with
all his actions and with all that happens in him: both these forms of the dynamism proper to him
make something of him and at the same time they, so to speak, make somebody of him.” 244 The
change into something/somebody Wojtyła captures with the word “becoming.” 245 One clear
demonstration of the process of becoming is seen in the physical development of a human
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person. For example, there is a becoming of a human person in the progress from birth to
adolescence to adulthood. To this somatic development, Wojtyła also adds the psychic
development of the human person. And, he notes that this process of becoming is characterized
by passivity. Wojtyła writes: “both kinds of becoming—one connected with the vegetative
potentiality and dynamism of the organism, and the other with the psychoemotive potentiality
and its corresponding dynamism—depend on a certain passiveness in man.” 246 In other words,
some experiences of “it happens” are part of the psycho-somatic development (i.e. becoming) of
the person. But, the becoming of a person can also be experienced via “I act.” With regard to
action, Wojtyła employs the term efficacy. He says, “the moment of efficacy is to be understood
as the having of the experience of ‘being the actor.’ … When acting I have the experience of
myself as the agent responsible for this particular form of the dynamization of myself as the
subject.” 247 Through action the person experiences the becoming of a human person. For
example, Wojtyła indicates that action leads the human person to become morally good or
morally bad. He writes, “Moral conduct partakes of the reality of human actions as expressing a
specific type and line of becoming of the man-subject.” 248 Morally good actions lead a person to
become a morally good person. Rather than understood as a static reality, the human person is a
dynamic one.
In his analysis of complex inner human experiences, Wojtyła acknowledges that both
passive and active experiences on both the psychic and somatic levels of the person contribute to
the experience of becoming of the human person. These insights of the initial chapters of Person
and Act is further expounded in the subsequent chapters of the work.
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B. Self-Determination and Self-Possession
After establishing the basic distinction between the experiences of passivity and action,
Wojtyła further analyzes human action. He introduces the categories of “self-determination” and
“self-possession.”
Recognizing the possibility to think of action in terms of bodily movement, Wojtyła
writes: “It seems necessary to stress at this stage in our discussion that we are here primarily, if
not exclusively, concerned with action as the inner and intransitive consequence of a person’s
efficacy.” 249 In other words, Wojtyła stresses that action, in the sense used in Person and Act, is
first of all an inner experience. Again, this helps the reader recognize that Wojtyła uses the term
“action” in the technical sense of inner action, instead of “action” as synonymous with physical
movement. It is with this specific approach to “action” that Wojtyła articulates his analysis of
human experience.
A primary characteristic of action is self-determination. Wojtyła writes, “every
authentically human ‘I will’ is an act of self-determination.” 250 In describing self-determination,
Wojtyła aligns it with free will. 251 As an execution of self-determination, action can also be
understood in contradistinction to the experience of happenings in the human person on the level
of somatic dynamisms. On this level, “it happens” has the characteristic of necessity. And,
Wojtyła writes, “Necessity as the opposite of freedom…is thus attributed to the dynamism at the
level of nature alone.” 252 For example, the digestion of food happens by necessity when it is
consumed, but the choice to eat or not is an act of self-determination. If necessity is the opposite
of freedom, then self-determination has the characteristic of response. Wojtyła writes: “Every
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instance of ‘I will’ constitutes such an individual and unique response, which is specially
apparent in every instance of choosing.” 253 Connecting to the above example, the experience of
hunger may seem to direct our action, but, as a response to hunger, the choice to eat or not is an
act of self-determination.
In light of the dynamisms that take place on the level of nature, Wojtyła indicates that
self-determination takes place on the level of the person. He writes, “it is self-determination that
at the level of the person binds together and integrates the different manifestations of the human
dynamism.” 254 In this way, the level of the person stands above the level of nature, above the
level of the psycho-somatic dynamisms. As characteristic of persons, self-determination,
Wojtyła says, “constitutes, defines, and brings into view this level as such. Because of it, in
experience—primarily in self-experience—man is given as the person.” 255 Self-determination
reveals the level of the person.
While Wojtyła introduces self-determination as part of the level of the person, at the
same time, he identifies self-possession as the foundation of self-determination. Wojtyła asserts,
“For only the things that are man’s actual possessions can be determined by him.” 256 And
Wojtyła says, “Because ‘I will’ is an act of self-determination at a particular moment it
presupposes structural self-possession.” 257 But, the relation between self-possession and selfdetermination is not one-sided: self-determination has an effect on self-possession. Wojtyła
writes that self-possession is realized “in an act of self-determination, which is constituted by
every real human ‘I will.’” 258 In this way, self-determination can create greater self-possession.
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Wojtyła writes: “the will, every genuine ‘I will,’ reveals, confirms, and realizes the selfpossession that is appropriate solely to the person.” 259 Even as the foundation of selfdetermination, the experience of self-possession is increased through acts of self-determination.
In other words, self-determination is key to the experience of human becoming. Wojtyła
says that the person “experiences the awareness that he is the one who determined himself and
that his decisions make him become somebody.” 260 The execution of self-determination, as
action, is experienced as becoming.

C. The Spiritual Element in the Human Person
A key concept in the relationship between the level of nature and the level of the person
is transcendence. Describing transcendence, Wojtyła writes: “Etymologically ‘transcendence’
means to go over and beyond a threshold or boundary.” 261 A human person can experience
transcendence in more than one way. Wojtyła identifies “horizontal” boundaries, writing,
“Transgressing the subject’s limits in the direction of an object—and this is intentionality in the
‘external’ perception or volition of external objects—may be defined as ‘horizontal
transcendence.’” 262 This is how the term transcendence may be used in metaphysics or
epistemology. 263 Since it refers to an external object, it is not the focus of Wojtyła’s analysis at
this point.
Wojtyła calls the transcendence that refers to the interiority of the person “vertical
transcendence,” which he then simply refers to as “transcendence.” Wojtyła writes, “The
transcendence we are now considering is the fruit of self-determination; the person transcends
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his structural boundaries through…acting.” 264 The structural boundaries are the levels of the
human person: the level of nature and the level of the person. It is this experience that Wojtyła is
concerned with, as he writes: “Thus conceived, transcendence as an essential of the person can
be best characterized by comparing the dynamism of the person with the dynamism of
nature.” 265 Once again, the dynamisms of activity and passivity come to the fore. Wojtyła
writes, “In the dynamism at the level of nature there is no self-determination to serve as the basis
from which acting itself as well as its direction and purpose are derived. The dynamism at the
level of nature lacks that special dependence on the ego which is the characteristic mark of the
specific dynamism of the person.” 266 The passive experience of happening characterizes the
level of nature. The experiences which happen on the level of nature are precisely moments of
passivity. They are not experiences of action. The purpose of contrasting the level of nature and
the level of the person is to illustrate that acting—not happening—is the cause of the
transcendence of the structural boundaries of the person. Moreover, actions are proper to the
level of the person. Wojtyła writes, “The fact of self-determination and all that selfdetermination relies upon in the structure itself of the person…provides the key to the reality of
the person we are attempting to reach.” 267
Transcendence is what bridges the level of nature and the level of the person, through
acting, through self-determination. The boundary between passivity and activity is crossed by
transcendence. On one hand, Wojtyła writes, “the person’s transcendence in the action also
shows a certain complexity; the one who possesses himself is simultaneously the one who,
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according to the same principle of self-determination, is possessed by himself.” 268 On the other
hand, this complexity reveals the unity of the human person. It is the one and the same person
who possess oneself and is possessed by oneself. By reaching the level of the person,
transcendence is aligned with the act of possession, rather than the “is possessed” of the person.
The transcendence to the level of the person from the level of nature shows a complexity of the
person. But the experience at the level of the person, especially of self-possession and of selfdetermination, shows that there is a single subject experiencing these complex experiences.
Wojtyła acknowledges that the unity of the human person is a metaphysical principle. He
writes, “It belongs to metaphysics, in which throughout the ages thinkers have been unraveling
the nature of man as a being consisting of soul and body, of spirit and flesh.” 269 In Wojtyłan
terms, the body corresponds to the level of nature, and the spirit corresponds to the level of the
person. 270 With this bipartite understanding of the human person, the soul is the principle of
unity. Wojtyła writes, “It is to metaphysical analysis that we owe the knowledge of the human
soul as the principle underlying the unity of the being and the life of a concrete person.” 271
Wojtyła asserts that there is no direct experience of the soul. 272 The ability to understand the
soul as the principle of unity does not come from phenomenology.
Nevertheless, Wojtyła asserts that his phenomenological analysis points to “an
immaterial factor which is inherently irreducible to matter.” 273 In other words, the experience of
personal unity reveals the spiritual element in the human person. Wojtyła further articulates the
contribution of the phenomenological method in describing the spiritual nature of the person,
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writing, “it seems however that we have gone much farther than traditional philosophy in its
conception of man, inasmuch as in our analyses we have accumulated sufficient evidence of the
spirituality of man.” 274 Again, the key experience that reveals the spiritual element of the person
is transcendence. Wojtyła writes, “Thus we come to the conclusion that the evidence of the
spiritual nature of man stems in the first place from the experience of the person’s transcendence
in the action, which we have been trying to describe and analyze.” 275 He further writes, “Indeed,
self-determination manifests itself as the force holding together the human dynamism and
integrating it at the level of the person.” 276 Transcendence not only reveals the complexity of the
person, the different levels of the person, the dynamisms of the body and the psyche. Wojtyła
says that transcendence also reveals this complex structure as “a specific organic unity and not as
an unintegrated manifold.” 277 The experience of transcendence reveals the experience of
personal unity.
The phenomenological analysis does not just point to the metaphysical principle of unity,
the soul. Phenomenological analysis also deepens the understanding of personal unity. The
unity of the person is not just a metaphysical principle. Wojtyła asserts that the unity of the
person is something that is created. Action reveals the unity of the person, but it also “helps to
compose the unity of the person.” 278 In action, the person has the experience of becoming
somebody. In becoming, the person has the experience of transcending the level of nature into
the level of the person. And, insofar as the experience of “it happens” is transcended by the
experience of “I act,” the person increases their self-possession. Wojtyła writes, “The fact that in
the performance of the action man also fulfills himself shows that the action serves the unity of
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the person, that it not only reflects but actually establishes this unity.” 279 The unity of the person
is something that is created through action. The human person as an author of action, as opposed
to a subject of happenings, is the key to becoming.
Every person has experiences in the form of acting and happening, activity and passivity.
Wojtyła recognizes that these dynamisms reflect the need for self-fulfillment, for the creation of
self-unity. In other words, even though the human person is a unity, a person stands in need of
fulfilling oneself. Wojtyła writes, “To fulfill oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to
the proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his
personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something.” 280
In this way, the role of action—including efficacy and transcendence—as the means of
realizing the fulfillment of the person, is revealed as the central concern of Person and Act.

II. Integration and Disintegration
Wojtyła introduces and defines integration in this way: “the term ‘integration’ is used to
denote the realization and the manifestation of a whole and a unity emerging on the basis of
some complexity rather than the assembling into a whole of what was previously
disconnected.” 281 Integration is not assembling component parts. Integration is the increase in
unity of elements that are already connected within the human person. Integration complements
what has been already said of transcendence. Wojtyła writes, “‘Complementary’ is to be
understood here … in the sense that without integration transcendence remains, as it were,
suspended in a kind of structural void.” 282 That is to say, through transcendence the human
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person crosses the threshold from passivity to activity. Transcendence, then, leaves passivity
behind conceptually. But, as Wojtyła writes, it is not possible “to have active possession of
oneself without a passive response in the dynamic structure of the person.” 283 In action, the
human person experiences that it both possesses itself and is possessed by itself. The unity of the
person necessitates the conceptual inclusion of passivity. The human dynamisms, all that
happens in the human person, are to be understood as part of the personal dynamism. Every
experience, passive or active, is part of an individual’s personal experience.
Transcendence reveals the person as “above” the level of nature, whereas integration
reveals the dynamisms as part of the level of the person. Integration includes the happenings that
are part of the complex inner experiences in a way that transcendence does not. In action, the
dynamisms of each level of the person are present, included, integrated in the action. Because of
this Wojtyła can write: “When I act, I am wholly engaged in my acting.” 284 In action, or
efficacy, the person experiences oneself as being wholly present in the action, through
integration. In this way, the unity of the person—the psychosomatic spiritual unity of the
person—is more completely understood. Integration accounts for the experience of the human
person as being wholly present in the action. Integration describes the manifestation and the
realization of the unity of the person in becoming.
Wojtyła’s analysis of integration, immediately leads him to the concept of disintegration,
in order to further articulate his explanation of integration. Wojtyła writes, “‘Disintegration’ in
its fundamental sense signifies what in the structure of…self-possession of the person appears as
a defect or failing.” 285 In other words, Wojtyła asserts, “disintegration…signifies a more or less
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deep-seated inability to govern, or to possess, oneself.” 286 It is an experience of personal
disunity. If integration includes happenings, then disintegration is when “what happens” remain
happenings and are not self-possessed, not raised to the level of the person. When there is a new
experience of a new happening, there is a new occasion to experience the integration (or
disintegration) of all of the levels of the person. Consequently, the term disintegration either
reflects a structural reality (the non-integrated levels of the human person before efficacy) or is
the result of a failure to act, failure to raise a happening to the level of action (integration of the
person in the action).

A. Integration of the Soma
Having established the concepts of integration and disintegration, Wojtyła then presents
an analysis of those concepts in terms of the psycho-somatic spiritual dynamisms of the person.
Wojtyła considers integration in terms of both the somatic and psychic levels of the person
separately and together.

1. Somatic Dynamism
Focusing on the somatic level of the person, separately, Wojtyła indicates what he means
by the soma. In addition to all that can be seen and colloquially referred to as the body, Wojtyła
includes the inner functioning of the body. He writes, “While the complexity is outwardly
reflected by the diversity and the mutual coordination of bodily members, its inward reflection is
in the diversity and the mutual coordination of the bodily organs.” 287 So to include both the
inner and outer realities of the human body, Wojtyła uses the term soma in his presentation. He
286
287
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writes, “The term ‘somatic’ refers to the body in the outer as well as the inner aspects of the
system…with its appropriate members…and the joint functioning of all the bodily organs.” 288
The somatic dynamism includes things like the development of the human body, the lengthening
of hair, breathing, the beating of the heart, digestion. Wojtyła says, “the dynamism of the human
body as such does not depend on the self-determination of the person.” 289
The integration of the soma needs to consider the independent somatic dynamisms. They
are beyond self-determination (and consciousness). But, the independent reality does not
undermine the unity of the human person or the possibility of integration. Wojtyła says: “the
body seems to have a somewhat separate ‘subjectivity’ of its own—without, however, affecting
in any way the ontic unity of man.” 290 The integration of the soma, then, means uniting the
somatic dynamism with the personal dynamism. Wojtyła defines it this way: “The integrity of
the man-person consists therefore in the normal, indeed, in the possibly perfect matching of
‘somatic subjectivity’ with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of the person.” 291 The
somatic dynamisms (e.g. bodily growth) remain processes outside of self-determination. Yet, the
integration of the soma includes working with these dynamisms. In Wojtyła’s words: “We may
say that at the moment of self-determination man puts into operation the reactive dynamism of
the body and in this way makes use of it, or, putting it differently, that at the moment of selfdetermination he consciously uses it by taking part in its operation.” 292 For example, the
preparing and eating of a meal as an act of self-determination takes into account the autonomous
need of the body to eat and to eat healthily.
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The general example that Wojtyła uses to illustrate the integration of the soma is
movement. The body’s ability to move in reaction to a stimulus (e.g. the patellar reflex of the
leg kicking out after being hit below the knee) is part of the somatic dynamism. That ability
becomes integrated in the action of kicking a ball, as a willful choice. In this way, movement
becomes an act of personal efficacy. In this way, the somatic dynamism has been integrated into
the action that is taking place on the level of the person.
Wojtyła immediately notes that the integration of the soma in movement is so
commonplace that it is usually imperceptible. Wojtyła says: “The presence of skill makes the
whole motor dynamism, the whole of human mobility so spontaneous and fluent that in most
cases we never notice the causative effect of the will in the synthesis of actions and motions.” 293
When performing some particular action, however, the person can be aware of the integration of
the soma in a clear way. After naming mountain climbing, performing a surgical operation, and
performing liturgical functions, Wojtyła says, “In such special circumstances nearly all our
attention concentrates on making the necessary motions, and then we have a more or less clear
experience of conscious efficacy.” 294 These and similar special circumstances help illustrate the
integration of the soma in action.
Wojtyła further notes that the integration of the soma in action often opens up to contexts
that are broader than the immediate. A person can intend a meaning to an action beyond an
immediate context. In the integration of the soma, he says, “a given motion being dictated by the
will may itself constitute the action or it may form part of an action that consists of a broader
whole (for instance, the action of going to school includes many motions, in particular those of
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walking).” 295 Particular actions or series of actions may reveal both the personal dynamism and
a larger purpose.
This insight leads Wojtyła to comment on two specific somatic dynamisms that he uses to
illustrate the integration of the soma: self-preservation and the sexual drive. He refers to these
dynamisms as instincts—which have meaning beyond an immediate context. In referring to
instincts, Wojtyła is not including somatic, “instinctual,” reactions to particular stimuli. Instinct,
he says, “does not refer to any particular reaction as a purposeful activation of the somatic
subject,” but to “a trait of nature itself.” 296 For an individual, instincts indicate something
beyond the immediate. They reveal the movement of the somatic dynamism beyond a particular
context.
In describing self-preservation, Wojtyła says: “The elementary sensation of hunger and
thirst—as well as their satisfaction—springs from the instinct of self-preservation; in addition,
the enormous progress in medical science and art may be related to this instinct.” 297 More than
just a reaction to specific stimuli (e.g. threats), self-preservation is concerned with maintaining
one’s existence long-term. Wojtyła says: “All the somatic dynamisms preserving the vegetation
of the individual are subservient to this compulsion.” 298 In other words, self-preservation is the
affirmation that one’s existence is good. Wojtyła says, “This feeling meets the intellectual
affirmation of existence, the awareness that ‘it is good to exist and to live’ while it would be ‘bad
to lose one’s existence and one’s life.’” 299 Self-preservation, even in particular acts, reflect an
instinct that has meaning beyond the particular acts. The integration of the instinct of selfpreservation means working with this dynamism, at which point, Wojtyła says, “the instinct of
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self-preservation becomes a consciously adopted attitude, a primary concern of man and a
fundamental value.” 300
In describing the sexual instinct, Wojtyła says, “the desire for sharing with another
human being, the desire that springs both from close similarity and from the differences due to
the separation of the sexes is based on the instinct of sex.” 301 Furthermore, the desire for bodily
union is related to reproduction. Wojtyła says: “The sexual drive…is simultaneously the instinct
of reproduction, to which man owes the preservation of his species in nature. This natural desire
is the basis of marriage and through marital life becomes the foundation of the family.” 302 In this
way, Wojtyła identifies a broader context to the immediate instinct for sexual union: that is,
sharing with another human being and reproduction. With regard to the integration of the sexual
instinct, Wojtyła makes mention of his work in Love and Responsibility and the moral context of
the integration of the sexual instinct. He says: “The point of view of ethics on the need for
controlling the sexual drive was discussed more fully by the author in another book, the theme of
which is human love and the ensuing responsibilities.” 303 Given the detailed analysis of the
sexual instinct in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła, here in Person and Act, is able to describe
the integration of sex as having a proper end (e.g. marriage and family). Thus, the integration of
the instinct of sex means working with this dynamism, controlling it. Wojtyła says, “Essentially
this control consists in the adaptation of the body’s instinctual dynamism of sex to its proper
end.” 304
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At this point, some final insights can be identified with regard to Wojtyła’s description of
the integration of the soma in action, the transition of the somatic dynamism from “it happens” to
“I act.”
Wojtyła describes disintegration in terms of the soma as any defects in integration, “in
the matching of ‘somatic subjectivity’ with the efficacious and transcendent subjectivity of the
person.” 305 Wojtyła stresses that defects in integration are not the same as defects that are
strictly somatic, for example losing an arm, having a lung removed. He writes, “purely somatic
obstacles as such have but a physical and in nowise a moral significance. …On the contrary,
very often a human being with a high degree of somatic disintegration may represent a
personality of great value.” 306
The somatic dynamism in general, and specific reflexes or instincts in particular, can be
integrated into the personal dynamism with an immediate or non-immediate context or meaning.
Instincts, as particular manifestations of the autonomous somatic dynamism, are not absolute.
The example that Wojtyła uses to illustrate this point with regard to self-preservation is self-harm
or suicide. He says: “In his mind, man, as we well know, may reject the value of his own
existence and substitute negation in the place of affirmation, which shows that the instinct of
self-preservation has no absolute control over the person…[even if the choice is to] only cease to
exist in a way that seems to them unbearable.” 307 And, the instinctual dynamism of sex
manifests itself, Wojtyła says, “in strictly defined reactions of the body that to some extent
automatically or spontaneously happen in man. In spite of all their specificity and automatism,
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however, these reactions remain sufficiently conscious to be controllable by man.” 308 Instincts
do not determine the personal dynamism.
The analysis of the integration of the soma is incomplete without including the psyche.
Wojtyła says, the interpretation of instinct “in somatic terms alone can never be complete. In
fact, instinct as a definite dynamic trait affects also the human psyche, and it is in the psyche that
it finds its proper expression.” 309 Again, he says of the somatic dynamism: “We have seen,
however, that this one particular element does not provide the full solution to the question of the
integration of instincts, a question requiring a broader look at the psycho-emotive element.” 310
In other words, the analysis of the integration of nature with the level of the person necessarily
includes both the somatic and the psychic elements of the level of nature.

2. The Body as Psycho-Somatic Dynamism
As already seen in Wojtyła’s description of transcendence, his understanding of the
human person corresponds to a hylomorphic understanding of the human person as a unity of
body and soul. Wojtyła has an ample understanding of the body as soma—containing both
external and internal workings of the body. But, his conception of the body is not even limited to
the description of the soma stated above. His phenomenological description of the bodily
dynamism includes the dynamism of the soma and the dynamism of the psyche. Describing
one’s experience of oneself, Wojtyła says: The human person “has the experience of his
corporality just as he has of his sensuality and emotionality.” 311 It is as if the level of nature has
two levels: the level of the soma and the level of the psyche. Wojtyła states that the “two
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structural levels of the dynamic man-subject…are the psychoemotive and the somatovegetative.” 312 With the description of the somatic dynamism above, Wojtyła still needs to give
a similarly detailed description of the psychic dynamism. Nevertheless, Wojtyła offers an initial
definition of the psychic dynamism: “Thus ‘psyche’ and ‘psychical’ apply to the whole range of
manifestations of the integral human life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the
same time show some dependence on the body, some somatic conditioning…[for example]
eyesight, feelings, emotions [which] are not in themselves corporeal.” 313
Wojtyła analyzes the somatic and psychic dynamism separately, yet, since they are both
part of the level of nature, they remain connected to each other. These two dynamisms
“mutually condition” each other. 314 Wojtyła asserts that the somatic influences the psychic, it
“conditions the various psychical functions.” 315 One example that Wojtyła gives is “the
experience of physical pain…[where] the nature of the experience is basically psychical and not
vegetative, though its objective roots are on the somato-vegetative level.” 316 And, he asserts that
the psychic influences the somatic when he says: “It is also well known and corroborated by
numerous treatises on ethics that emotions may in some respects enhance our actions, but in
others they have a restraining or even crippling effect on” acting. 317 An example of the psychic
conditioning the somatic is the heart racing or the person sweating, when that person is afraid.
Again, Wojtyła says that the psychic conditions the somatic “in the direction of expression.” 318
The psychic dynamics can have bodily manifestations.
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In terms of complex inner experiences, the dynamisms of the soma and the psyche are
both experiences of “it happens,” but each in their own way. Wojtyła assigns the term “reactive”
to the soma (as described above) and the term “emotive” to the psyche, when he speaks of “the
psychosomatic dynamism of man, to whom we attribute reactivity as well as emotivity, the
former corresponding more to the soma and the latter to the psyche.” 319 “Reactivity” describes
the cause-and-effect relationship between a stimulus and the physical/bodily effect. A certain
stimulus yields a particular bodily effect, e.g. the patellar reflex of the leg kicking out after being
hit below the knee. Whereas “emotivity” accounts for the variety of effects of a particular
psychic stimulus. The same person may experience the same stimulus differently at different
times. For example, when a telephone rings, a person may welcome an opportunity to talk to
someone, or that person may be irritated with an interruption. Commonly, it is said that, in each
new case of psychic stimulus, a person reacts differently. Wojtyła uses “emotivity” to capture
the fact that clearly, given the variance in experiences, a person does not “react” to a stimulus, in
a cause-and-effect way on the psychic level. But emotivity is related to reactivity insofar as the
psychical experience “happens” in the human person. The mutual conditioning of the soma and
the psyche interplay to create the full experience of passivity of the person on the level of nature.
Thus, Wojtyła asserts that the integration of the person requires raising the dynamisms of
both the soma and the psyche to the level of the person. In the cases described above concerning
the integration of the soma, Wojtyła acknowledges the importance of including the psychic
dynamism. Concerning self-preservation Wojtyła writes: “Even a brief analysis of the instinct of
self-preservation shows how difficult it would be to reduce it in man to its somatic aspects alone,
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how powerfully it is reflected in the psyche, and how great is the share of consciousness in the
shaping of the processes that it generates.” 320 Concerning the sexual drive, he writes:
The same applies, perhaps even in a greater degree, to the sexual drive. The drive of sex,
which relies on the momentous division of mankind into male and female individuals,
stems from the somatic ground and also penetrates deeply into the psyche and its
emotivity, thereby affecting even man’s spiritual life. … Though possible, the control of
the sexual drive may, and often does raise many difficult problems…; this does not
consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive
type. 321
From this description it is clear that Wojtyła understands that, in the case of at least some of the
passive experiences of the human person, there are the presence of both somatic and psychic
dynamisms. And, given their mutual conditioning, it is possible to speak of a psycho-somatic
dynamism in the person. He says: “At this higher level of the person-action unity the dynamism
belonging to man’s psyche and soma seem to disappear. They fuse together. This does not mean,
however, that they cease to be in some way distinct. On the contrary, they continue to exist in
their own right and essentially co-create the dynamic reality of the person’s action.” 322 Again,
while the somatic and the psychic dynamisms are experienced separately, it is possible to speak
of them together as the psycho-somatic dynamism.
In hylomorphic terms, the somatic and the psychic levels, together, comprise the “body”
of the person. As the body, they are together integrated into the action of the person. Wojtyła
says: “The crucial fact in the total experience of man is that it is in action that the whole
psychosomatic complexity develops into the specific person-action unity.” 323 Before Wojtyła
further analyzes the integration of the psycho-somatic dynamism, he details more fully the
integration of the psyche.
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B. Integration of the Psyche
Wojtyła presents in the sixth chapter of Person and Act his analysis of the integration of
the psyche and its relation to the soma and the spirit.

1. Psychic Dynamism
Wojtyła’s initial description of the psychic dynamism was noted above, in which he says:
“Thus ‘psyche’ and ‘psychical’ apply to the whole range of manifestations of the integral human
life that are not in themselves bodily or material, but at the same time show some dependence on
the body, some somatic conditioning…[for example] eyesight, feelings, emotions [which] are not
in themselves corporeal.” 324 Wojtyła makes the distinction between the soma and the psyche,
while accounting for their unity, saying, “The psyche and the soma are distinctive with respect to
each other even though they form a mutually conditioned unity in man.” 325 But he further
articulates the distinction between the soma and the psyche, saying, “The functions of the psyche
are ‘internal’ and ‘immaterial’ and while internally they are conditioned by the soma…, they can
in no way be reduced to what is somatic,” though they can be expressed by the body. 326 As
distinct from the body, emotions, which Wojtyła notes that the word etymologically comes from
Latin “ex” and “movere” (“to move out of” the body), exceed “the capacity of the body…both in
quality and essence.” 327 The connection between the psyche and the soma and the expression of
the psyche by the soma are revealed, for instance, when a person says that they feel well or ill.
Wojtyła says: “Physically and psychically we always feel more or less ‘well’ or more or less
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‘bad’; man always has present in him some kind of feeling or self-feeling, which forms a sort of
psychic fabric or undercurrent of his existence of acting.” 328
Even though the psyche is internal and immaterial, it is not equivalent to the spiritual
element of the person. It is not equivalent to the soul. Wojtyła says: “In every day use we
contrast the notion of ‘soul’ with that of ‘body.’… Even though the Greek term ‘psyche’ means
the soul, the two terms are not synonymous…. ‘psyche’ and the adjective ‘psychical’ apply to
those elements of the concrete human being that in the experience of man we discern as in a way
cohesive or integrated with the body but that in themselves differ from it.” 329 In short, Wojtyła
is describing the person as a psycho-somatic spiritual unity, borrowing from metaphysics while
supplying details gained from phenomenology. The psyche is neither the soma, nor the soul.
The psyche is deeply connected to both the soma and the soul, even uniting the two. Wojtyła
says: “The psychical strand in emotivity may be seen as running between corporality and
spirituality, but far from dividing them it interweaves with the one and the other, bringing them
together.” 330
Before addressing the integration of the psyche, Wojtyła articulates more fully some
manifestations of the psychic dynamism. Wojtyła asserts that these manifestations are
“connected with the whole wealth of the differentiated domain of human emotions, feelings, and
sensations as well as with the related behaviors and attitudes.” 331 Wojtyła then describes two
specific types of these manifestations: first, excitement (which is a psychic dynamism more
aligned with the soma) and second, stirring emotions or, simply, emotions (which are more
aligned with the soul).
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Wojtyła describes excitement this way: “Excitement is always manifested in a definite
reaction of the body, indeed in a whole complex chain of reactions of the organism (blood
circulation, breathing, a quickened heartbeat, etc.), which are very distinctly felt.” 332 The
experience of excitement is that it is a reaction to a stimulus. Wojtyła does not intend to equate
the reaction of excitement to the somatic reactivity described above. He says, “It is a specific
sensation of the body contained in the feeling of excitement itself; we feel and have the
experience of the emotive and the reactive moment as one dynamic fact, and this circumstance
allows us in a way to call the fact a ‘reaction.’” 333 Wojtyła also points out that the source of
excitement, the stimulus, can be either a physical or a spiritual stimulus. He says, “The source of
excitement, the stimulus that provokes it, does not necessarily affect the senses. The stimulation
may come from the experience of a value that is entirely inaccessible to sense or from
wholehearted acceptance of ideals.” 334 In either case, psychic excitement is expressed
somatically. Excitement also has a close connection to instinct. Wojtyła asserts that instinct
“has its own psychosomatic center, which apparently inheres in a particular excitability, it may
be the sexual excitability or any of the different forms of excitability associated with selfpreservation. …both reactivity and excitability remain at the disposal of the powerful forces of
nature that steer them in the direction of the most elemental and fundamental value that is
existence itself.” 335 This alignment of excitability with instinct helps to reveal another important
characteristic of excitement, which is that it is an experience of “it happens.” 336 The experience
of excitement is intense. Wojtyła says, “Excitability…tends to refer to an awakening of
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emotions…[that] is often rather sudden” and can be characterized as explosive. 337 As such, we
can regard excitement as the most intense somatically-expressed psychic experience of “it
happens.”
Wojtyła names the psychic experience aligned with the soul as “stirring emotions.”
Wojtyła describes this psychic experience as a deep emotional stirring, more moving than
excitement, and “bringing to the surface man’s psychic dimension otherwise remaining
unnoticed.” 338 While somatic reaction still accompanies stirring emotions, there is less of a
mutual conditioning. Wojtyła says, “in the experience of several types of deep emotions bodily
feelings may appear to give priority to spiritual feelings…[including] an aesthetic emotion
generated by the perception of something beautiful, a cognitive emotion that arises from the
discovery of a truth,…remorse at a committed wrong… mental peace and equally deep joy.” 339
In fact, deep emotion can be stirred from the center of the person and dominate other more
superficial feelings. Wojtyła says, “this emotive core may be said to be radiating
internally…[which] spreads it to the whole of man’s psychical sphere.” 340 The depth of stirring
emotions indicate the spiritual element of the human person. Wojtyła says, “These distinctions
presuppose an innerness of the man-person, something like an immaterial space, where on the
ground of the role of feelings we may differentiate between the ‘central’ and the ‘peripheral.’” 341
Like excitement, emotions happen, though engendered by spiritual realities, and more
independent of somatic expression. Wojtyła notes: “When we try to characterize emotions and
call them by different names, we in fact distinguish between the different ways emotions are
stirred. For instance, different emotional stirrings mark the feelings of sorrow and of joy, of
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anger and of tenderness, of love and of hatred.” 342 Wojtyła notes that there is an infinite
spectrum of emotions, which “like colors, can be mixed, they overlap and interpenetrate, they
also enhance or complete and destroy each other.” 343 And, this infinite spectrum of emotions is
caused by the innumerable ways that emotions are stirred.
Wojtyła asserts that deep and central emotions “constitute a separate and powerful realm
within man.” 344 Emotions are integral to identifying this level of the person. Emotions are
useful in identifying the psychic dynamism, without being the only manifestation of the psychic
dynamism. The psychic dynamism as a phenomenological experience of “it happens” provides
an opportunity for integration.

2. Integration of the Psychic Dynamism
As with the somatic dynamism, the psychic dynamism can be integrated into the action of
the human person. Wojtyła comments on the way that the psychic dynamism is experienced as
happening in the human person when he says:
It is remarkable that emotions and passions are not experienced by the human being when
too strong; they are then only “undergone” by him or, strictly speaking, allowed to grow
in him and prevail upon him in some primitive and, as it were, impersonal fashion; for
“personal” signifies only that experience in which also the experienced subjectiveness of
the ego is to be discerned. 345
The fact that emotivity can take control Wojtyła describes as spontaneous efficacy. He writes,
“there is a clearly marked tension between the spontaneous efficacy of the human psyche and the
efficacy of the person.” 346 Yet, even when undergoing the experience of emotivity radiating
through the human person, there remains the possibility of integration. Wojtyła says, “While
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emotions themselves occur or happen in man, he is aware of them, and owing to this awareness
he can in a way control them. The control of emotions by consciousness has a tremendous
significance for the inner integration of man.” 347 Control is exercised by “self-determination and
efficacy.” 348 In this way, Wojtyła is describing that the determination of human action can be
made either by emotivity or by self-determination. And, because of this overwhelming power of
emotions, the integration of the psyche is a “special task” for the human person. 349
The origin of this special task is the spontaneous emotivity to a value. Wojtyła asserts
that the “emotional dynamism introduces a spontaneous turn toward certain values. The turn may
have an attractive or a repulsive character.” 350 The spontaneous efficacy is a turn towards or
away from a certain value. The turn towards (or away from) a value is determined strictly by the
psyche, even as it radiates to direct the human person. Wojtyła’s insight that the person is
conscious of this happening is what creates the space for the human person to choose, to
determine, the personal dynamism. The integration of the psyche is accomplished in that
conscious choice to accept or to reject the determination of the spontaneous efficacy.
Wojtyła asserts that the reason to accept or to reject the direction of spontaneous efficacy
is found in intellectual cognition, when he says: “The appropriate integration in this field thus
presupposes some reliance on the intellect and that relation to the objects of acting which is
based on the truth about the good presented in these objects.” 351 In other words, what is good for
the personal dynamism, perceived by the intellect, is not automatically equivalent to what the
psyche spontaneously determines to be good by the psyche. What is good or bad for the person
is not necessarily the same as what is attractive or repulsive for the psyche. Wojtyła further
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illustrates the point: “Indeed, self-determination…often require[s] that action be taken in the
name of bare truth about good, in the name of values that are not felt. It may even require that
action be taken against one’s actual feelings.” 352 The integration of the psyche is only possible if
the person is able to make the choice to change a psychical happening into a human action. The
ability to make that transition likewise means that action might reject the direction of
spontaneous efficacy.
The fact that the psychic dynamism can be rejected reveals something unique about the
maturation of the psychic dynamism. Comparing the psychic dynamism to the somatic
dynamism Wojtyła says:
The human organism determines almost entirely its own development, and only the
conditions of the development are established by man. The situation is the opposite in the
psychoemotive sphere, which itself establishes the conditions and, as it were, supplies the
material for its own development; consequently, the formation of this sphere mainly
depends on the human person. 353
In terms of somatic maturation, according to its own dynamism, the human person develops from
infancy to adulthood. But Wojtyła is asserting that the psyche does not mature on its own in the
same way. For example, a person does not cease to be afraid of the dark, according to the
activation of the psychic dynamism, which will persist in turning away from that experience until
presented with a reason to not fear. The maturation of the psychic dynamism occurs through
integration, which either affirms that the value which stimulates spontaneous efficacy
corresponds to a value that is consonant with personal efficacy or rejects that the value which
stimulates spontaneous efficacy corresponds to a value that is consonant with personal efficacy.
Part of the special task of integrating the psyche, on one hand, is that the psychic dynamism does
not develop and mature on its own. On the other hand, the integration of the psyche helps the
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human person to change more easily a passive experience of happening to the active experience
of human action and efficacy. Wojtyła writes: “the integrating process of developing and
improving the psyche gradually produces the result that the will…learns how by spontaneous
reference to emotion, by a spontaneous move of attraction or repulsion, to choose and to adopt
the real good; it also learns how to reject the real bad.” 354 As the psychic dynamism is integrated
into human action, the tension between spontaneous efficacy and personal efficacy is relieved,
and the two efficacies become united, fully integrated. Moreover, Wojtyła asserts that, in the
development of the human person, relieving the tension between spontaneous and personal
efficacy through integration is a “crucial moment of human personality and morality.” 355
In a way that further highlights the importance of the integration of the psyche, Wojtyła
describes disintegration in terms of the psychic dynamism. The person can be passive with
regard to spontaneous efficacy to varying degrees, reducing or removing personal responsibility.
Wojtyła describes this possibility: “The man who in his attitude to values would rely solely on
the way his feelings develop is confined to the orbit of what only happens in him and becomes
incapable of self-determination.” 356 Wojtyła comments on the extreme case of the absence of
responsibility:
Such are the situations when man loses his ability to act consciously and hence also to be
responsible, the situations when in his acting there is no real acting but only a special sort
of happening—something happening in and with him, something that he neither
determines nor fulfills. Neither can he be fully responsible for what is taking place,
though we may well ask what is his responsibility for the development of the situation in
which he can no longer have responsibilities. 357
If the will yields to the psyche, then emotivity determines the person. The disintegration of the
psychic dynamism can result in the disintegration of the psycho-somatic spiritual unity of the
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person. Wojtyła sees, in the case of the psychic dynamism because it is interwoven with the
soma and the spirit, that yielding to spontaneous efficacy, remaining passive, is especially
significant because it brings with it moral questions and the very development of the person, the
essential moment when passivity becomes activity. Disintegration leaves the person in an
experience of passivity.
Yet, integration can be difficult. The difficulty, however, is not meant to cause us to
reject psychic experience. Wojtyła names the Stoic school and Kant as embracing a perspective
that would see emotions as the cause of disintegration, as advancing a perspective that would
reject emotions. In contradistinction to this perspective he states: “The fact that with the
emergence of an emotion or passion man is prompted to seek some sort of integration and this
becomes a special task for him, does not signify in any way that they are in themselves a cause of
disintegration.” 358 Wojtyła own evaluation of emotions is decidedly positive. Sensitivity, he
says, “is itself a valuable endowment that greatly enriches human nature. The ability to sense, the
spontaneous ability to feel, values is the basis for many human talents.” 359 Despite his
embracing emotivity as an essential part of the human person, Wojtyła is realistic about the
tension posed by spontaneous efficacy in terms of personal efficacy. He is realistic about the
special task that the integration of the psyche presents for the person.
At this point, some final insights can be identified with regard to Wojtyła’s description of
the integration of the psyche in action, the transition of the psychic dynamism from “it happens”
to “I act.” Wojtyła fully embraces the role of emotions in the action of the human person. He
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says that emotions are not to be denied, even if “a certain detachment…from spontaneously
experienced values” is demanded in order to achieve personal efficacy. 360
Wojtyła underscores the vividness to personal efficacy that the integration of the psyche
brings to human experience. He says that even with the presence of spontaneous efficacy
“integration remains possible and then emotion adds special vividness to efficacy and with it to
the whole” person. 361 The experience of emotivity can be vivid, intense. The intensity of
emotivity leads some people to reject emotion as an integral part of the human dynamism, leads
them to equate control of emotions with suppression of emotions. While Wojtyła recognizes that
the human person may yield to the intensity of spontaneous efficacy remaining passive, if
emotivity is integrated into the personal dynamism, then that emotion adds vividness to personal
efficacy, creating an “affective attitude” 362 or an “emotional attitude” 363 of the person. In this
way, the integration of the psyche energizes the action of the human person, it concentrates
human experience by “running between corporality and spirituality.” 364 Integrated in the action,
an intense psychic dynamism colors the whole personal dynamism.
Each new stirring of the psychic dynamism presents a new opportunity, possibility, and
need for integration into human action. Each new stirring needs to be evaluated whether the
direction of spontaneous efficacy corresponds to the direction of personal efficacy, and is either
then rejected or accepted through integration, with the result that spontaneous efficacy is
gradually formed to be more aligned with personal efficacy. Of this constant renewal of
opportunity, of possibility, and of the need for integration, Wojtyła writes, “In this sphere the
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integration of the acting person is a task that lasts until the end of a man’s life.” 365 The
development of the psyche is a life-long task, given the infinite spectrum of the stimuli of
emotions.

3. Integration of the Psycho-Somatic Dynamism
Even though Wojtyła addresses the somatic and the psychic dynamisms separately, he
also asserts that they are experienced together, as the bodily dynamism, the psycho-somatic
dynamism. It is an experience that is characterized by passivity. 366 Integration is when the
psycho-somatic dynamism is aligned—accepted or rejected—by the will, when, Wojtyła says,
the two dynamisms “surrender to the direction and control of the will.” 367 With integration, the
psycho-somatic dynamism is brought to the level of the person. Wojtyła writes, “The integration
of the person in the action indicates…[an] introduction of somatic reactivity and psychical
emotivity into the unity of the action—into the unity with the transcendence of the person
expressed by efficacious self-determination that is simultaneously a conscious response to
values.” 368
Disintegration occurs when the experience of the psychosomatic dynamism remains
passive. 369 Disintegration is possible because of the tension between the “psychosomatic
subjectivity of man,” and the subjectivity of the human person. 370 Wojtyła acknowledges that
there are types of disintegration, defects in the capacity to act. There are instances of somatic
disintegration and instances of psychic disintegration. The personal effect of the moment of
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passivity may be superficial. In these cases, the person retains the capacity of self-possession,
self-determination, and efficacy. Disintegration in its most extreme form is the loss of the
capacity to act. Wojtyła says that the “essential trait of disintegration…consists in the
‘insubordinativeness’ or ‘unpossessibility’ of the subjective ego.” 371 Disintegration in this way
is the inability to integrate the psycho-somatic dynamism on the level of the person, resulting in
the inability to increase the unity of the body and the soul.
Ultimately, the experience of the integration of the psycho-somatic dynamism reveals the
presence of the spiritual element of the person. Wojtyła’s analysis of integration leads him back
to the complementary principle of transcendence, to the subjective ego of the level of the person.
Wojtyła writes, “While the body itself is the source of the reactive dynamism….and indirectly
also for the emotive dynamism…, the integration of these two dynamisms has to have a common
origin with the person’s transcendence.” 372 The difficulty for Wojtyła in identifying the origin of
integration as found on the level of the person is that the metaphysical relationship between the
body and the soul is not experienced by the person. There is a philosophical tension between the
complexity of the human person—the two basic levels: the psychosomatic level and the spiritual
level—and the unity of the person, which is a psycho-somatic spiritual unity. This tension is not
resolved in either the analysis of transcendence or in the analysis of integration, because these
are analyses of experience. Wojtyła asserts that the human person does not have a direct
experience of the soul. The soul as the principle of integration is a philosophical conclusion, but
not an experienced reality. He says:
Experience of the transcendence of the person in the action…is in no way equivalent to a
direct experience of the soul. Similarly, we have to assert that experience of
integration…cannot be identified with the experience—the direct discovering and
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experiencing—of the soul-body relation. Both the reality itself of the soul and that of the
soul’s relation to the body are in this sense transphenomenal and extraexperiential. 373
In other words, the tension between the unity and the complexity of the human person cannot be
resolved phenomenologically. He says that his analyses “indicate something like a boundary in
man, which sets a limit to the scope of the dynamism…of the body.” 374 This boundary
delineates the difference between the body and the soul, between the level of nature and the level
of the person. The absence of a direct experience of the soul leads Wojtyła to assert that the
reality of the soul and its relation to the body “needs a more comprehensive metaphysical
expression.” 375
Despite Wojtyła’s statement that metaphysics is necessary to fully address
hylomorphism, he ends his analysis with strong statements about the insight gained from
experience. That is to say, the called-for comprehensive expression has its basis in a
comprehensive experience. Wojtyła says: “Nevertheless, the total and comprehensive
experience of man shows the soul as real and as staying in relation to the body. They have been
both discovered and are continuously being discovered in the philosophical reflection resulting
from human experience.” 376 Through his description of transcendence and integration, Wojtyła
sees the revelation of “a capacity of a spiritual nature that seems to lie at the root of the person’s
transcendence, but also indirectly of the integration of the person in the action.” 377 Insofar as it
is true that experience reveals the distinction, the boundary, between the body and the soul, that
is not the full extent of what experience reveals. In fact, Wojtyła says that “Integration—
precisely because it is the complementary aspect of the transcendence of the person in the
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action—tells us that the soul-body relation cuts across all the boundaries we find in experience
and that it goes deeper and is more fundamental than they are.” 378 That is, though integration,
the unity of the body and soul is revealed more than any difference between them. Wojtyła
presents the deep unity of the body and the soul.
In sum, the human person is to be understood as a unity of diverse and distinct
dynamisms. The human person is a psycho-somatic spiritual unity, and is able to grow in this
unity through action. Increased structural unity, self-fulfillment, is achieved through passing
from passivity with regard to psycho-somatic dynamisms to action. The unity of the human
person may be a metaphysical fact. But experience reveals that personal unity can be diminished
through disintegration, and it can grow through action.

III. Intersubjectivity
In Person and Act, Wojtyła focuses on the human action of an individual. He is
concerned with developing a comprehensive understanding of the inner experience of an
individual human person. Wojtyła concludes Person and Act with a discussion of
intersubjectivity accomplished by participation. Recognizing that human persons are part of
communities, recognizing that an anthropology is inadequate without some treatment of
interpersonal relationship, Wojtyła begins such an analysis at the end of this text. He says, “We
will now investigate…the fact that actions can be performed by human individuals together with
others…to draw attention to the diverse communal or social relations.” 379 This acting together is
intersubjectivity.
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A. Intersubjectivity in Society
In developing the theme of intersubjectivity, Wojtyła engages concepts and terms of
socio-political theory and ideologies (e.g. Communism). But his interest is not to develop a
socio-political theory regarding the nature of society. Instead, he says, “our intention is to keep
to our initial approach and to confine ourselves to the acting person as the first aim and the pivot
of our investigations.” 380 Wojtyła evaluates various understandings of humans cooperating, of
acting together, some of which are more consonant than others regarding the philosophical
anthropology that is the focus of Person and Act. He asserts that the measure of a political
theory is the personalistic value. A social theory is judged according to whether there is
transcendence and integration in an individual’s action while that person is acting together with
others. Wojtyła says: “If we call this value ‘personalistic’ it is because the person performing the
action also fulfills himself in it.” 381 Individuals acting together while also achieving personal
fulfillment is participation. Wojtyła says: “participation…allows man, when he acts together
with other men, to realize…at once the authentically personalistic value—the performance of the
action and the fulfillment of himself in the action.” 382 Furthermore, participation creates the
possibility of increased personal fulfillment. 383 In other words, a person achieves fulfillment
through action and, a person can achieve fulfillment in acting with others through participation.
Participation is thus a relation with others, a relation that ensures personal fulfillment together
with others.
Two perspectives that fall short of the personalistic value are individualism and totalism.
Wojtyła describes them this way: “Individualism sees in the individual the supreme and
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fundamental good, to which all interests of the community or the society have to be
subordinated, while objective totalism relies on the opposite principle and unconditionally
subordinates the individual to the community or the society.” 384 The deficiency of individualism
is that it limits participation because it conceives of others as threats to the individual, not as
collaborators. Wojtyła says, “from the individualistic point of view an essentially constituent
human property that allows the person to fulfill himself in acting ‘together with others’ simply
does not exist.” 385 Totalism is contradictory to participation because it conceives of the
individual as a threat to the whole. Wojtyła offers his evaluation of totalism saying, “the
objective of totalism…is to protect a specific common good from the individual.” 386 In the end,
both individualism and totalism share a vision of the human person as incapable of participation.
They are both opposed to personalism. 387
Wojtyła also describes two other perspectives that are contrary to the personalistic value
and participation: conformism and noninvolvement. On one hand, it serves society and the
individual to act together with each other, to conform one’s actions to the whole. But, on the
other hand, there is a servile conformism which suppresses individuality. This servile
conformism Wojtyła sees as a nonauthentic attitude towards intersubjectivity. He says, “Thus
conformism consists primarily in an attitude of compliance or resignation, in a specific form of
passivity that makes the man-person to be but the subject of what happens instead of being the
actor or agent responsible for building his own attitudes and his own commitment in the
community.” 388 The experience of passivity is fundamentally contrary to participation.
Noninvolvement rises from a dissatisfaction with the community. Instead of confronting the
PA, 273.
PA, 274.
386
PA, 275.
387
cf. PA, 275.
388
PA, 289.
384
385

93

cause of dissatisfaction, the person simply withdraws from the community. Noninvolvement is a
renunciation of participation. Wojtyła sees conformism and noninvolvement as sharing the same
perspective of the human person. He says, “either attitude causes man to abandon his striving for
fulfillment in acting ‘together with others’; he is convinced of being deprived of his prerogatives
to be ‘himself’ by the community and thus tries to save it in isolation.” 389 In both the attitude of
conformism and the attitude of noninvolvement the result is the removal of participation.
Wojtyła notes the lack of participation saying, “Under certain conditions ‘acting’…may change
to denoting something that only ‘happens’ to a particular man under the influence of other
human beings.” 390 The nonauthentic attitudes juxtapose uniformity and unity. 391 Uniformity
does not engage the differences of individuals acting together. Unity cannot be achieved if an
individual is isolated from the community. Unity is only achieved through participation.
In contradistinction to individualism, totalism, conformism, and noninvolvement,
Wojtyła describes the characteristics of an authentic community, of a community constituted by
participation. He starts with a clarification. By speaking of the actions of the community, he
does not intend that the community be considered as a proper subject of acting. The action of the
community is comprised of the actions of the individual members. Wojtyła says, “Being and
acting ‘together with others’ does not constitute a new subject of acting but only introduces new
relations among the persons who are the real and actual subject of acting.” 392 Identification as a
member in a community may be determined by external criteria. But membership in a
community is authentic only if there is intersubjectivity by participation. 393 While a given
community may have a shared goal (e.g. constructing a building), the prior goal of an authentic
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community is intersubjectivity by participation. 394 No external goal can equivalent to the goal of
intersubjectivity.
Furthermore, not only does participation benefit the individual due to self-fulfillment,
participation also benefits the community. 395 Two attitudes that mark individuals in an authentic
community are solidarity and opposition. Solidarity is accepting and doing one’s responsibility
in a community. Wojtyła says, “In accepting the attitude of solidarity man does what he is
supposed to do not only because of his membership in the group, but because he has the ‘benefit
of the whole’ in view: he does it for the ‘common good.’” 396 The other authentic attitude that
Wojtyła describes is opposition as a particular manifestation of solidarity. Wojtyła says, “The
one who voices his opposition to the general or particular rules or regulations of the community
does not thereby reject his membership; he does not withdraw his readiness to act and to work
for the common good.” 397 Those who stand in opposition, Wojtyła continues, “seek for that
participation and that attitude to the common good which allow them a better, a fuller, and a
more effective share of the communal life.” 398 An authentic community welcomes opposition.
Wojtyła describes such a welcoming: “the structure, and beyond it the system of communities of
a given society must be such as to allow the opposition that emerges from the soil of solidarity
not only to express itself within the framework of the given community but also to operate for its
benefit.” 399 Solidarity and opposition, as a particular expression of solidarity, are significant
expressions of intersubjectivity.
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B. Shared Humanity
Given the fact that there is a spectrum of participation—including non-participation—of
members of a community, Wojtyła articulates a more fundamental way to identify the
individuals in interpersonal relationships: the neighbor. Wojtyła says that the notion of being a
neighbor “is thus more fundamental than the notion of membership in a community. Membership
of any community presupposes the fact that men are neighbors, but it neither constitutes nor may
abolish this fact.” 400 Prior to membership in any community, the term, neighbor, conveys the
reality that each human person shares in the humanness of every other human person. What it
means to be a neighbor then has implications for participation. Wojtyła says, “It is this ability to
participate in the humanness of every human being that all types of participation in a community
are rooted, and it is there that it receives its personal meaning.” 401 The fundamental notion of
neighbor leads Wojtyła to say of participation: “We may say this participation serves the
fulfillment of persons in any community in which they act and exist. The ability to share in the
humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the
personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’” 402 Participation is linked to
self-fulfillment in action and in helping others achieve self-fulfillment. Participation is the basis
of all intersubjectivity, and intersubjectivity is accomplished by participation. On the contrary,
Wojtyła notes that, “Any community detached from this fundamental community must
unavoidably lose its specifically human character.” 403
In the final section of Person and Act, Wojtyła comments on a principle that comes from
Christian revelation, the evangelical commandment of love. Wojtyła does not cite a chapter or
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verse of any Biblical text. The commandment is “You shall love your neighbor as yourself”
(Lev. 19:18, Matt. 22:39, Mk. 12:31, Lk. 10:27). 404 But Wojtyła never cites the commandment
as a whole. Rather, he only cites it in phrases (e.g. “You shall love.”). The exact reason why
Wojtyła includes in this philosophical text an evangelical principle is not stated. He calls it
“appropriate” to include it. 405 Perhaps the appropriateness is related to the fact that the
evangelical commandment of love is a most common phrase that is connected with the notion of
another person as my “neighbor” which has significance for his treatment of intersubjectivity.
As a command, a norm, it brings the conversation towards ethics, which Wojtyła notes is bound
up with the evaluation of socio-political theory judged according to their personalistic value.
But, in this section, Wojtyła does not turn to ethics. Moreover, Wojtyła never develops any
theological theme, even if he does not deny the connection with theology and opens the
conversation to possible theological development. In the end, Wojtyła treats the evangelical
commandment of love as a Gospel formulation that happens to coincide with the philosophical
themes that he has developed. Wojtyła says, “our aim is only to emphasize the confirmation it
contains for our claim that the reference system centered on ‘thy neighbor’ has a crucial
significance in any acting and existing ‘together with others.’” 406
The commandment of love corresponds to participation, and a disregard of the other as
“your neighbor” leads to alienation. Wojtyła says that alienation “stems from a disregard for, or
a neglect of, that depth of participation which is indicated in the term ‘neighbor’ and by the
neglect of the interrelations and intersubordinations of men in their humanness expressed by this
term, which indicates the most fundamental principle of any real community.” 407 Alienation
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creates a division between the person and the community. Ultimately, Wojtyła says, alienation
“leads to the disintegration of the community itself.” 408 The commandment of love contains
within it the principle that allows a human person to achieve self-fulfillment and a community to
grow in the personalistic value. Wojtyła concludes: “The commandment of love is also the
measure of the tasks and demands that have to be faced by all men—all persons and all
communities—if the whole good contained in the acting and being ‘together with others’ is to
become a reality.” 409
The treatment of the commandment of love is the last part of Wojtyła’s sketch of
intersubjectivity accomplished by participation. The outline of the sketch is that, based on
shared humanity, a human person should fulfill themselves when acting with other members of a
community. The community should not inhibit an individual’s personal fulfillment. Through
intersubjectivity by participation, both the community grows in its personalistic value and the
human person increases the possibility of greater personal fulfillment.

IV. Summary
Inner human experience is complex. There is a constant need to raise psychosomatic
dynamisms to the level of the person through integration. Interpersonal interactions are authentic
if each person does and is able to do integration.
Throughout Person and Act, Wojtyła maintains the distinction between philosophy and
theology. His inclusion of a biblical precept in Person and Act illustrates the consonance
between a philosophical anthropology and revelation, without admitting of a confusion between
the two. The consonance of the two is foundational to the Theology of the Body.
408
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Chapter 4
Karol Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology: Love and Responsibility
The Theology of the Body takes up questions of marriage ethics, as well as of
anthropology. Person and Act details much of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology. Person
and Act offers a description of the human acts of an individual. Love and Responsibility offers a
description of interpersonal relationship, especially the ethical implications of interpersonal
human action. Love and Responsibility details Wojtyła’s understanding of marriage ethics. 410
This chapter examines Love and Responsibility and Wojtyła’s treatment of the
personalistic norm.

I. Love and Responsibility
Love and Responsibility is primarily concerned with a philosophical treatment of the
ethics of sexuality, marriage, and parenthood, rather than anthropology. Love and Responsibility
is an earlier work than Person and Act. 411 Yet the philosophical anthropology of Love and
Responsibility is consistent with his later work, Person and Act, with regard to the analyses of
human experience, even if in his later work there is an increased precision in his technical
language. In this way, Love and Responsibility can be seen as a particular application of his
general philosophical anthropology—an application of action in the context of interpersonal
human love—as well as an analysis of action in terms of morality. Wojtyła justifies this
perspective in Person and Act when discussing the integration of the soma, he says: “The point
of view of ethics on the need for controlling the sexual drive was discussed more fully by the
author in another book, the theme of which is human love and the ensuing responsibilities, where
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also the purely somatic structures, whereby the instinct of sex manifests itself, are
considered.” 412 Furthermore, given that Person and Act ends by opening up to the question of
intersubjectivity, Love and Responsibility might be seen as an articulation of the analysis of
intersubjectivity, albeit in terms of the specific case of human sexuality. In Love and
Responsibility, Wojtyła draws the connection between philosophical anthropology, normative
ethical values, and interpersonal communion.
In terms of methodology, in Love and Responsibility Wojtyła acknowledges the role of
experience. In the text, certainly, there is an awareness of standards of sexual ethics, especially
from the Catholic Tradition. But Wojtyła does not appeal to them as the starting point of the
analysis. Instead, Love and Responsibility is the fruit of many years of Wojtyła’s pastoral work,
of persons sharing their experiences with their pastor and confidant. Through the experiences of
others, Wojtyła was able to reflect on and synthesize an understanding of love—love between
persons, between man and woman. 413 This synthesis is used to create a general understanding of
the love between man and woman rather than casuistically looking at the individual experiences
of men and women, “all of which,” Wojtyła says, “are in some way accommodated within the
general view.” 414 It is the synthesis of thought and experience that he presents as the basis of the
norms of Catholic sexual morality.

A. The Personalistic Norm: Responsibility and Love
The foundational insight and ethical reference point of Love and Responsibility is the
personalistic norm.
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1. Positive Formulation of the Personalistic Norm
Wojtyła offers both a negative and a positive formulation of the personalistic norm.
Negatively formulated, the norm is: the person “cannot be treated as an object of use.” 415
Positively formulated, it is: “the person is a good towards which the only proper and adequate
attitude is love.” 416 Wojtyła offers another version of the positive formulation, where he says: “a
person is an entity of a sort to which the only proper and adequate way to relate is love.” 417
The significant difference between these two positive formulations is the words “attitude”
and “relate.” Given that attitude and relation are not exactly the same thing, these two terms
amplify the positive formulations. This amplified understanding of the personalistic norm can be
captured with this reformulation: The only proper and adequate response to a person is love.
This reformulation introduces the term “response.” Admittedly, Wojtyła never uses the word
“response” in this context. He never uses a formulation of the personalistic norm that includes
“response,” despite the fact that the title of the work includes “responsibility.” This
reformulation is justified by the precision in language of his later anthropological work.
“Reaction,” or even “attitude,” does not adequately articulate the process of integrating psychosomatic dynamisms to the level of the person. “Response” is more consonant with his
anthropology to describe the action of a person than “reaction” is. Moreover, the description of
interpersonal relationship as response aligns with the analyses Wojtyła goes on to offer in Love
and Responsibility itself.
The personalistic norm identifies each individual as a person in the interpersonal
relationship. And each person has a subjective and objective reality. Wojtyła says: “We must,
then, be clear right from the start that every subject also exists as an object, an objective
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‘something’ or ‘somebody.’” 418 As a person, a subject has an inner life, a spiritual life. Wojtyła
says, “A person is, of course, among all the varied objects of the visible world, that unusual one
which is endowed with an inner self of its own, and is capable of an inner life.” 419 The dual
subjective and objective reality is true for both persons in an interpersonal relationship. In one
sense, the other person is an object. In another sense, the other person is a subject. The
personalistic norm acknowledges the subjectivity of the other. The other person is not simply an
object, a stimulus that stirs one’s psycho-somatic dynamism. The other person has both an
objective and a subjective reality, with the subjective reality being primary. Wojtyła says: “We
know already that the subject and the object of the action alike are persons.” 420 A subject
interacts with the world outside of themselves as objects, but some of those objects are subjects,
as well.
In the positive formulation of the personalistic norm, Wojtyła uses the words “proper”
and “adequate.” The subjectivity of the other conditions one’s response. It is appropriate
(proper) to respond in love to the other, and any other response to the person would be
inadequate. Love is the only proper and adequate response, when a subject is the object of one’s
action.

2. Love
Love is central to the positive formulation of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła offers an
analysis of love in Love and Responsibility. He recognizes that “love” can be applied to any
number of contexts. So he narrows the focus to interpersonal love between a man and a woman.
LR, 21.
LR, 114. Along the same lines he says, “A person is an objective entity, which as a definite subject has the closest
contacts with the whole (external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its inwardness,
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He begins his analysis of this sort of love with a metaphysical analysis. After describing
love as attraction (i.e. to like another, captured by the Latin philosophical phrase, amor
complacentia) and desire (i.e. to want and to need to be one with another, captured by the Latin
philosophical phrase, amor concupiscentia)—and offering a phenomenological description of
these experiences—Wojtyła considers love as goodwill (captured by the Latin philosophical
phrase, amor benevolentiae). He describes goodwill this way: “Good will is the same as
selflessness in love:…‘I long for that which is good for you’. The person of goodwill longs for
this with no selfish ulterior motive, no personal consideration.” 421 Love as goodwill has
metaphysical consequences. Wojtyła says: “Such love does more than any other to perfect the
person who experiences it, brings both the subject and the object of that love the greatest
fulfillment.” 422 He further describes love in this way: “love is the fullest realization of the
possibilities inherent in man. The potential inherent in the human person is most fully actualized
through love. The person finds in love the greatest possible fullness of being, of objective
existence.” 423 The appropriate response to a person is selfless goodwill, which, consequently,
results in the fulfillment of persons.
Wojtyła furthers his analysis of love with a psychological analysis. He acknowledges
that a subject perceives both the existence of and the value of objects. These perceptions take
place on the psychic level of the person, with a spectrum of experiences. Wojtyła says: “A sense
impression is a reaction to content, an emotion is a reaction to value.” 424 Specifically in terms of
love, Wojtyła says, “Thus there arises a sort of ‘external’ image of the other person. Is this image
merely a reflection of a ‘body’? No, it is a reflection of a ‘human being’, a human being of the

LR, 83.
LR, 84.
423
LR, 82.
424
LR, 103.
421
422

103

other sex.” 425 The subject’s perception of the other stirs up psychic reactions. And, this
perception, even of the sexual value of the other, is amoral. 426 Wojtyła calls one perception of
the sexual value of the other sensuality, and another he calls sentimentality. He says, “When this
emotion has as its object a sexual value residing in the ‘body’…it is a manifestation of
sensuality,” whereas a reaction to a “non-material value” of the other is sentimentality. 427
Neither sensuality, nor sentimentality, is the same as love. In the case of sensuality Wojtyła
says, “At the same time, we must recognize that when man and woman come together,
sensuality, as the natural reaction to a person of the other sex, is a sort of raw material for true,
conjugal love.” 428 As the basis of love, sensuality demands integration. Wojtyła says, “The
yearning for a sexual value connected with ‘the body’…demands integration: it must become an
integral part of a fully formed and mature attitude to the person, or else it is certainly not
love.” 429 Sentimentality likewise demands integration. 430 Wojtyła notes that integration requires
freedom. He says, “That which does not derive from freedom, that which bears the marks not of
free commitment, but of determination and compulsion, cannot be acknowledged as love, lacks
its essential character. Therefore, the process of psychological integration which accompanies
sexual love…involves not only commitment of the will, but unconditional commitment of the
will.” 431 But love as the integration in freedom of sensuality and sentimentality is a great drama.
Wojtyła says:
Love is certainly a drama in the sense that it is made up of happenings and of action (to
do, to act is the meaning of the Greek word ‘drao’, from which ‘drama’ comes). Thus, the
‘dramatis personae’ discover the plot of this drama in themselves, perceive their love as
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a psychological situation unique of its kind, and one of great and absorbing importance in
their inner lives. 432
Wojtyła’s psychological analysis of love reveals that there is much taking place in the inner life
of a person before there is a manifestation (proper and adequate) of love.
Wojtyła offers the details of this drama. The drama begins with the stirring of the sexual
urge. There is an immediate tension with freedom, which has moral significance. 433 Wojtyła
comments on this experienced inner conflict saying, “Man is by nature capable of rising above
instinct in his actions. …If it were otherwise, morality would have no meaning in this
context.” 434 The question of morality raises the question of responsibility. Wojtyła says, “Man
is not responsible for what happens to him in the sphere of sex since he is obviously not himself
not the cause of it, but he is entirely responsible for what he does in this sphere.” 435 In the drama
of love, in response to the other, the one must act. Wojtyła says: “For although love grows out of
the sexual urge and develops on that basis and in the conditions which the sexual urge creates in
the psycho-physiological lives of concrete people, it is none the less given its definitive shape by
acts of will at the level of the person.” 436 Once again, the only proper and adequate response to a
person is love.
In a summary statement of his analysis of love, Wojtyła says: “love develops on the basis
of the totally committed and fully responsible attitude of a person to a person, erotic experiences
are born spontaneously from sensual and emotional reactions.” 437 In terms of his later work, this
summary describes the psychosomatic dynamism and the levels of the person— the need to raise
the psychosomatic dynamism (e.g. emotivity) to the level of the person, to the level of action. In
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this way, love is the integration of the psycho-somatic spiritual unity of the person, specifically
with regard to sexual stirrings. 438

B. Use and the Negative Formulation of the Personalistic Norm
Wojtyła also offers an ethical analysis of love, which incorporates his presentations on
use and virtue, hinging on the negative formulation of the personalistic norm.
In the negative formulation of the personalistic norm, which states that the person cannot
be treated as an object of use, use is a central concept. Wojtyła defines use in this way: “To use
means to employ some object of action as a means to an end—the specific end which the subject
has in view…the means serves both the end and the subject.” 439 Use is when a person chooses to
not respect the subjectivity/personhood of the other, relating to them in an improper and
inadequate way. One moral problem, Wojtyła says, with subjecting the other person to the ends
of the subject is that it might not “allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should
have, distinct personal ends.” 440 To treat another person as a means to an end attempts to reduce
the other to an object, disregarding their subjectivity. The other is not treated as an equal but is
subservient to the one.
One particular way in which one may use the other of the opposite sex is enjoyment.
Wojtyła says, “man…can, in his actions, not only clearly distinguish pleasure from its opposite,
but can also isolate it, so to speak, and treat it as a distinct aim of his activity. His actions are
then shaped only with a view to the pleasure he wishes to obtain.” 441 Furthermore, Wojtyła says:
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“If actions involving a person of the opposite sex are shaped exclusively or primarily with this in
view, then that person will become only the means to an end—and ‘use’ in its second meaning
(=enjoy) represents, as we see, a particular variant of ‘use’ in its first meaning.” 442
Wojtyła takes for a fact that in a relationship between a man and a woman there is
pleasure. He notes “the particular richness, variety and intensity of those emotional-affective
experiences and states which occur when the object of activity is a person of the opposite
sex.” 443 The presence of pleasure is not immoral but making it a distinct aim of the relationship
is. A person uses the other when their own physical or psychological satisfaction, for instance, is
the aim of the interaction. On one hand, Wojtyła says, one may “attempt artificially to divorce
body and sex from the person, so that they are left alone as a ‘possible object of use’ or else,” on
the other hand, one may reduce the other in their perception “to a valuation of the person
exclusively as ‘body and sex’, as an object for use. In either case, we have something completely
incompatible with the value of the person as such.” 444 The separation or removal of the value of
the person can easily result in one person using the other. Wojtyła says regarding the absence of
the value of the person as such in a relationship of love: “This further means that sensuality by
itself is not love and may very easily become its opposite.” 445
Wojtyła offers a solution to the moral problem of using the other, of subjecting the other
to the one, by sharing a common good. 446 Wojtyła says, “When two different people consciously
choose a common aim this puts them on a footing of equality, and precludes the possibility that
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the one of them might be subordinated to the other.” 447 The other ceases to be a means to the
end or the one. Sharing a common good prevents use. To complete his analysis of use, Wojtyła
considers utilitarianism and its particular application to the question of love. 448 In this context,
Wojtyła names the utilitarian principle as the “greatest possible pleasure for each of the two
persons.” 449 In this instance, it might seem that there is a common good: the greatest possible
pleasure for both. But, in reality, Wojtyła says, “utilitarianism introduces into their relationship a
paradoxical pattern: each of the persons is mainly concerned with gratifying his or her own
egoism, but at the same time consents to serve someone else’s egoism, because this can provide
the opportunity for such gratification—and just as long as it does so.” 450 Wojtyła says that
choice is to replace the human person as the basis of ethical norms to using pleasure “as a
superlative value and the proper basis for a norm of behavior.” 451 Use and love are opposites.
Wojtyła continues his ethical analysis of love by speaking of love as a virtue. He says
that the proper and adequate response to a person is especially found in the “affirmation of the
value of the person.” 452 Love as a virtue is found in responding to the whole person, especially
primarily the level of the person. Wojtyła says, “The person as such must be the real object of
choice, not values associated with that person, irrelevant to his or her intrinsic value.” 453 The
non-intrinsic values of the other include his or her body, and the cause of physical and
psychological pleasure. While Wojtyła accounts for these non-intrinsic values having a proper
place in love, 454 these values, independent of the affirmation of the value of the person, do not
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form the basis of love. He says that sexual values, which act upon the senses and the emotions
as “the sole or the main motive for choosing a person…would be faulty and invalid, since it
would not conform to the full truth about the object of choice, the person. Such a choice is
inevitably the starting point for a love incapable of integration, a love that is defective and
invalid.” 455 Wojtyła continues: “True love, a love that is internally complete, is one in which we
choose the person for the sake of the person,—that in which a man chooses a woman or a woman
chooses a man not just as a sexual ‘partner’ but as the person on whom to bestow the gift of his
or her own life.” 456 The moral choice of love is found in not yielding to the stirrings on the
somatic and psychic levels. Wojtyła says, “The sexual instinct wants above all to take over, to
make use of another person, whereas love wants to give, to create a good, to bring happiness.” 457
At its core, in a relationship of love, a person can either affirm the value of the person or use the
other. A person can either follow the personalistic norm or not. Because of free will, because of
the possibility of virtue, the person is responsible for whether they grow in virtue or commit sin.
Wojtyła says, “Nowhere else in the whole book, perhaps, is its title, Love and Responsibility,
more to the point that it is here.” 458 Moral choices are his focus here.
Wojtyła ends his ethical analysis on love with the statement that it is a gift and a task.
The man and woman must choose to increase in the virtue of love. Wojtyła says, “Love should
be seen as something which in a sense never ‘is’ but is always only ‘becoming.’” 459 Love can
increase in a relationship. Choosing love and growing in love as a virtue is the responsibility of
the person.
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II. Application of the Personalistic Norm
In terms of Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, the difference between love and use is
the presence or absence of the integration of the psychosomatic sexual dynamism with the
personal dynamism. With his ethical considerations, Wojtyła expands the meaning of integration
and disintegration to include both the “integration of love ‘within’ the person and ‘between’
persons.” 460 Wojtyła says that failure to observe the personalistic norm results in “a love
incapable of integration,” incapable of being a relationship of love. 461 The possibility of
relationships that lack integration within and between the persons is significant. Wojtyła says,
“These reflections on love have, however, repeatedly reminded us that there is an insidious
possibility of disintegration in relationships between men and women.” 462 Moreover, Wojtyła
acknowledges that “the sexual relationship presents more opportunities than most other activities
for treating a person…as an object of use.” 463 Wojtyła uses the phrase “the value of the body
and sex” or “sexual values” to refer to both the visible aspects and the psychological aspects of
the other that are sexually attractive, the woman for the man, the man for the woman. 464 “The
value of the body and sex” or “sexual values” are what can bring physical or psychological
satisfaction. The “value of the person” refers to the inner life of the person that his anthropology
reveals. Wojtyła says, “We should not think of this manner of seeing and desiring as ‘a-sexual’,
as blind to the value of ‘the body and sex’; it is simply that this value must be correctly
integrated with love of the person—love in the proper and full sense of the word.” 465 The

LR, 140.
LR, 133.
462
LR, 140.
463
LR, 30.
464
He says: “So in every situation in which we experience the ‘sexual’ value of a person, love demands integration,
meaning the incorporation of that value in the value of the person, or indeed its subordination of the value of the
person” (LR, 123).
465
LR, 159.
460
461

110

integration of the sexual value with the value of the person is an ethical integration between the
persons. Use is the cause of disintegration.

A. Chastity
Integration between persons is often achieved through chastity. By recognizing that the
other is a subject, chastity ensures that a person acts on the personal level and not reacts. While
presenting chastity as a virtue, Wojtyła refers to Aquinas’ treatment of chastity as a virtue, where
chastity is subordinated “to the cardinal virtue of moderation.” 466 Wojtyła points out that central
to Aquinas’ understanding of chastity is that it is effective, “a matter of efficiency in controlling
the concupiscent impulses.” 467 Isolated cases of integration are not enough to be considered a
virtue. Wojtyła credits Aquinas’ treatment with revealing that chastity as virtue ensures that
effectively, habitually, integration is achieved. In the practice of chastity, Wojtyła acknowledges
that chastity is often understood as an “inhibition of sensuality and of physical impulses.” 468 As
an expression of the virtue of moderation, however, chastity can be seen as something more than
inhibition. Wojtyła says, “For by ‘moderating’ the feelings and actions connected with the
sexual values we serve the values of the person and of love.” 469 While Wojtyła associates
chastity with the virtue of moderation, he wants to underscore its association with the virtue of
love. 470 Love is the affirmation of the other. Wojtyła says, chastity “is above all the ‘yes’ of
which certain ‘no’s’ are the consequence. …The essence of chastity consists in quickness to
affirm the value of the person in every situation, and in raising to the personal level all reactions
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to the value of ‘the body and sex.’” 471 Rather than understanding chastity as inhibition of the
unclean, Wojtyła understands chastity as affirmation of the other. 472 He says: “Love must be so
to speak pellucid: through all the sensations, all the actions which originate in it we must always
be able to discern an attitude to a person of the opposite sex which derives from sincere
affirmation of the worth of that person.” 473
Wojtyła furthers his presentation on chastity with a phenomenological description of
some of the dynamics involved is exercising the virtue of chastity. He recognizes that there are
particular challenges to chastity—on the level of the soma and on the level of the psyche. Prior
to the moral choice to love or to use, is the stirring of sensuality, which is, in the words of
Wojtyła, the arousal of “sensual interest or even absorption in the sexual values connected ‘with
the body.’” 474 Usually, the body is the first sexual value encountered. Wojtyła says that sexual
values “impinge upon the subject, while concupiscence implies that the subject actively seeks the
value in question.” 475 The shift from arousal of interest to concupiscence is the shift from “it
happens” to “I act.” This seeking of the sexual value of the other is not yet the desire to possess
that value for the satisfaction of pleasure, which is the next step. The desire to possess the sexual
value of the other is a closely connected inner dynamism to sensual concupiscence. Wojtyła
says: “The obvious ease of transition from each stage to the next—from the arousal of interest to
sensual concupiscence, from sensual concupiscence to carnal desire—is the source of great
tensions in the inner life of the person.” 476 Carnal desire might then progress to the use of the
sexual value of the other for the satisfaction of pleasure. Wojtyła says, “Carnal concupiscence
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impels, very powerfully impels, people towards physical intimacy, towards sexual
intercourse.” 477 The temptation to use the other is not limited to physical satisfaction. A person
might also use another for their psychological satisfaction, as a distinct way in which
concupiscence can lead to use. Wojtyła says: “Let us add that emotional egoism can be the cause
of unchastity in a relationship between a man and a woman just as surely as sensual egoism,
though in a different way.” 478 Intimacy that is rooted in the desire for self-satisfaction is the
negation of love. 479

1. Aide to Chastity: Shame
The progression from attraction to use can be overcome through the virtue of chastity.
Wojtyła continues his phenomenological description of chastity by examining shame and
continence, as components of chastity. 480 A first aide to exercising the virtue of chastity is
shame. Different than a moral sense of being ashamed or guilty, Wojtyła defines shame this
way: “Shame is a tendency, uniquely characteristic of the human person, to conceal sexual
values sufficiently to prevent them from obscuring the value of the person as such.” 481 In this
way, shame covers over one’s own physical and psychical sexual values, so as not to be used, so
as to be responded to as a person. 482 Wojtyła further defines shame: “shame is a natural form of
self-defence for the person against the danger of descending or being pushed into the position of
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an object for sexual use.” 483 Shame keeps sexual values from overshadowing the value of the
person.

2. Aide to Chastity: Continence
A second aide to chastity is continence. If shame helps to prevent the stirring of
sensuality and sentimentality, then continence is what “contains” the stirrings when present.
Continence results in the absence of sexual intimacy. Continence is self-mastery, selfdetermination. When the happenings of sensuality and sentimentality are felt, continence raises
these psycho-somatic dynamisms to the level of the person and ensures that one responds to the
other. When physical intimacy would be an instance of use, continence ensures that the response
to the other does not include physical intimacy or sexual intercourse. Continence is not a denial
of sensuality and sensibility, but a placing of the value of the person above sexual values.
Wojtyła says: “There is no valid continence without recognition of the objective order of values:
the value of the person is higher than the values of sex.” 484 An act of continence is a human
action that is “contained” within the interiority of the person.
Wojtyła continues his phenomenological description of chastity by contradicting an
understanding of chastity, shame, and continence, which sees their ideal as seeking to eliminate
psychosomatic dynamisms because of the challenge that they pose. He says: “If we have a
realistic conception of man we must acknowledge that both sensual excitability and sentimental
susceptibility are natural to him, fundamentally consonant with his nature, and therefore do not
fundamentally contradict the realization of love in the world of persons, especially the love
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which unites the man and the woman.” 485 Wojtyła articulates this point more fully, when he
acknowledges the specific challenge that psychosomatic dynamisms can present to a response of
love. He comments on the dynamisms saying, “Indeed, every man must effectively deploy the
energies latent in his sensuality and his sentiments, so that they become allies in his striving for
authentic love, for they may, as we know, also be its foes.” 486 Wojtyła emphasizes that both
components of chastity, shame and continence, facilitate the response of love, recognizing the
other as a person, and not as an object of use. Wojtyła says, “The essence of chastity consists in
quickness to affirm the value of the person in every situation, and in raising to the personal level
all reactions to the value of ‘the body and sex.’” 487 Chastity—rather than a negation or
devaluing of physical and psychical happenings—is the affirmation of the value of the other
person and the raising of one’s own reactions to the level of action, as a response of love.
At several points during his treatment of chastity, Wojtyła points to the integration of
psychosomatic dynamisms into love, specifically the integration of sensuality and sentimentality
into married love. He says, “For the value of the person must be not merely understood by the
cold light of reason but felt.” 488 Through shame and continence, the person is affirmed. Wojtyła
says, the “affirmation of the person influences the emotions in such a way that the value of the
person is not just abstractly understood but deeply felt.” 489 The language here of the affirmation
of the person being deeply felt in love corresponds to the description of the integration of the
psychosomatic dynamisms in action. Wojtyła says: “This is the point at which love is
psychologically complete and sexual shame can be thoroughly absorbed.” 490 In the virtue of
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love, sensuality and sentimentality are integrated (i.e. “absorbed”) on the personal level as an
affirmation of the person.
Given the realities of the mutual relationship of love between a man and a woman,
Wojtyła offers further treatment of shame as it relates to love. Sensuality and sentimentality are
to be integrated and not rejected. Wojtyła says of these dynamisms:
Since it is particularly likely to become an object of use because of its sexual values, the
tendency to conceal them comes into being—but to conceal them only to a certain extent,
so that in combination with the value of the person they can still be a point of origin for
love. 491
Shame ensures the affirmation of the person. As each person is confident that one is making a
response in love to the other, then the covering over of the reactions can be uncovered. In a
response of love, Wojtyła says, “the man and the woman are no longer ashamed to be sharing
their experience of sexual values.” 492 That which was covered over, through shame and
continence, can be uncovered in a relationship of love. The virtue of love demands that each
new stirring of sensuality and sentimentality be a response in love, because each new stirring
presents the possibility of use. In this light, Wojtyła says, “The shared experience of sexual
values is always attended by circumstances which demand a measure of concealment.” 493 This
realistic understanding of the role of shame in love, however, does not negate the proper place
that sensuality and sentimentality have in married love.
Wojtyła ends his treatment of chastity with a description of tenderness. Wojtyła says:
“Tenderness is the ability to feel with and for the whole person, to feel even the most deeply
hidden spiritual tremors, and always to have in mind the true good of that person.” 494
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Tenderness is a particular expression of the integration of sensuality and sentimentality in love.
Tenderness is an integral part of the fruit of chastity that leads to love.

B. Marriage and Virginity
In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła diverges from his philosophical treatment in a way:
he makes a connection between his philosophical anthropology and some points from a theology
of marriage and of virginity.

1. Marriage Ethics
Wojtyła recognizes the personalistic norm as the foundation of monogamy and
indissolubility. He says that their mutual adherence to the personalistic norm is the framework
“which permits the full development of the sexual relationship [i.e. monogamy] while ensuring
the durability of their union [i.e. indissolubility].” 495 Since monogamy means that a person has
only one spouse (so long as that spouse is alive), Wojtyła asserts that having another sexual
relationship (e.g. extra-marital affair or divorce and remarriage), while a spouse is still living,
equates to using that spouse and is thus a violation of the personalistic norm. 496 Furthermore, he
says that the principle of strict monogamy and indissolubility “is a difficult principle to observe,
but an indispensable one if the life together of persons of different sex (and ultimately human life
at large, which is to such a great extent based on this relationship) are to be raised to level of the
person and accommodated within the bounds of love.” 497 In his analysis of sexology, where he
details some the physical and psychological aspects of sexual intercourse, details largely
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supplied by a medical, clinical view of sexual intercourse, Wojtyła asserts that the principles of
monogamy and indissolubility align with clinical sexology. 498
With these principles established, Wojtyła speaks of marriage as an institution, as having
a place in society. He says, “Marriage is in fact both an inter-personal and a social concern.” 499
But the institution of marriage is distinct from society. Wojtyła says, “Marriage does not possess
the structure of a society, but an inter-personal structure: it is union and a community of two
persons.” 500 Marriage is an independent, and prior, institution. Yet, the interpersonal
relationship of love is a relationship that requires societal recognition as it matures. As love
matures, it needs to be visible to others. Wojtyła says: “On the one hand, there is a need to keep
private the sexual relations deriving from love, and on the other a need for social recognition of
this love as a union of persons. Love demands this recognition, without which it does not feel
fully itself.” 501 The institution of marriage communicates to society, and the man and woman
themselves, that their relationship is fully following the demands of the personalistic norm.
Wojtyła says: “This then is the meaning of marriage as an institution. In a society which accepts
sound ethical principles and lives in accordance with them (without hypocrisy and prudery), this
institution is necessary to signify the maturity of the union between a man and a woman, to
testify that their love is a love on which a lasting union and community can be based.” 502 The
maturity in following the personalistic norm is signified both to the man and woman themselves,
as well as, to society as a whole.
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Wojtyła says of marriage: “It retains its distinct existence as an institution whose inner
structure is different from that of the family.” 503 With the birth of a child, the institution of
marriage becomes a society, a family. Wojtyła is concerned that procreation might be
understood as reproduction as can be found in the animal world. Avoiding a biologicallyrestricted understanding of procreation, Wojtyła writes: “Thus, in the sexual relationship
between man and woman two orders meet: the order of nature, which has as its object
reproduction, and the personal order, which finds its expression in the love of persons and aims
at the fullest realization of that love.” 504 These two orders cannot be separated, such that
Wojtyła says, “the marital relationship is therefore not just a union of persons, a reciprocal
relationship between a man and a woman, but is essentially a union of persons affected by the
possibility of procreation.” 505 Moreover, Wojtyła writes: “Sexual relations between a man and a
woman in marriage have their full value as a union of persons only when they go with conscious
acceptance of the possibility of parenthood.” 506 Following the personalistic norm means
accepting the inseparable connection of marriage and family. Accepting the connection between
marriage and family helps to ensure the following of the personalistic norm. Wojtyła says:
“Willing acceptance of parenthood serves to break down the reciprocal egoism…behind which
lurks the will to exploit the person.” 507
Wojtyła underscores the connection between marriage and family, by asserting the
connection between every sexual act and the possibility of parenthood. 508 The personalistic
norm demands that the acceptance of the possibility of parenthood must be present at each act of
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sexual relations. Of the possibility of procreation, Wojtyła says: “Sexual relations between a
man and a woman entail the possibility of conception and procreation, which are the natural
consequence of the marital relationship. It is not, however, an inevitable consequence.” 509
Significantly, the institution of marriage does not exclude the possibility of one spouse using the
other in any given instance of sexual intercourse. The acceptance of the possibility of
procreation helps to ensure the following of the personalistic norm. Procreation is a result of
love, even if it is not the result of each sexual act in marriage.
Wojtyła acknowledges that there are times when the spouses should avoid the possibility
of becoming parents. At these times, the appropriate response is continence—avoiding sexual
intercourse because it is essentially connected to the possibility of parenthood. Wojtyła further
acknowledges that continence can be difficult for a couple. He says: “Marital continence is so
much more difficult than continence outside marriage because the spouses grow accustomed to
intercourse, as befits the state which they have both consciously chosen.” 510 Sexual intercourse
is an important part of the institution of marriage. Wojtyła says: “Intercourse is necessary to
love, not just to procreation.” 511 A way that sexual intercourse can still be part of the marriage
relationship, while also avoiding parenthood, is periodic continence. Wojtyła offers a definition
of periodic continence: “a man and a woman time their periods of continence to coincide with
the…[woman’s cyclical] periods of fertility, and so have sexual intercourse only as and when
they expect procreation to be biologically impossible.” 512
An issue with this definition is that the behavior thus defined does not reveal the ethical
choice of the spouses. It is possible for the spouses to practice periodic continence to expressly

LR, 233.
LR, 237.
511
LR, 233.
512
LR, 240.
509
510

120

separate parenthood from sexual intercourse. In this case, Wojtyła says, they “deprive marital
intercourse of the value of love and leave it only the value of ‘enjoyment.’” 513 The acceptance of
the possibility of parenthood is what overcomes the possibility of use in periodic continence.
Wojtyła says: “This acceptance of the possibility of becoming a father or a mother must be
present in the mind and will even when the spouses do not want a pregnancy, and deliberately
choose to have intercourse at a period when it may be expected not to occur.” 514 In the case of
avoiding parenthood in a marriage, periodic continence is morally acceptable if it retains the
acceptance of the possibility of parenthood. Only in this way is periodic continence an
affirmation of the person.
Wojtyła also acknowledges that another answer to the question of how to continue sexual
intercourse. while also avoiding parenthood, is contraception. In his evaluation of sexology,
Wojtyła offers a rather detailed presentation on fertility and contraceptives, along with some
psychological implications of both, leading him to state that “the value of the person is distinct
and higher than any utilitarian value.” 515 Since Wojtyła affirms that the “very fact of
deliberately excluding the possibility of parenthood from marital intercourse makes ‘enjoyment’
the intention of the act,” contraception is contrary to love. 516

2. Virginity and Marriage
Included in his discussion of ethics within marriage, Wojtyła turns to the implications of
sexual ethics based on a relationship with a personal God. Wojtyła says, “the central theme of
our discussion so far…[is] what might be called ‘horizontal justice’. There still remains the
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separate problem of ‘vertical justice’: the justification of the whole sexual behavior of man in the
eyes of God.” 517

a. Justice to the Creator
Commenting on the rights of God, Wojtyła says: “if I want to be completely just to God
the Creator, I must offer him all that is in me, my whole being, for he has first claim on all of
it.” 518 The person’s relationship with God is most properly understood as one of love, rather
than of justice. For some, this love is expressed through spiritual virginity. Wojtyła says, the
essence of spiritual virginity is “conjugal love pledged to God Himself.” 519 Spiritual virginity
can be connected with physical virginity, which Wojtyła names as the “condition of one who
abstains completely from marriage and from sexual intercourse.” 520 As always for Wojtyła, the
interior life of the person is his focus. Wojtyła says, “It is possible to remain physically virginal
to the end of one’s days without this physical virginity ever becoming spiritual virginity.” 521
Although spiritual virginity is expressed through physical virginity, because of their distinction,
Wojtyła gives further clarification to what he understands spiritual virginity to be. He says,
“Spiritual virginity, in the perspective of eternal life, is…[a] movement towards final union
though love with a personal God…[anticipating] that final union in conditions of the physical
and temporal life of the human person.” 522 He asserts that a person’s need for interpersonal
communion only has its fulfillment and satisfaction in eternal existence. The need for a person
to give oneself finds its fulfillment in the unending relationship of love with a personal God. In
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other words, he says: “Spiritual virginity, the self-giving of a human person wedded to God
Himself, expressly anticipates this eternal union with God and points the way towards it.” 523
Although spiritual virginity has a special ability to point towards eternal union with God,
Wojtyła says that marriage is able to be a response of love to God, as well. Comparing the two
responses, Wojtyła says: “The movement towards final union though love with a personal God
is…[in spiritual virginity] more explicit than in marriage.” 524 Marriage is not to be understood
as a renunciation of God for a human person. Wojtyła says, “The union of person with person
here takes place in the physical and sexual sense, in accordance with man’s physical nature and
the natural effects of the sexual urge. Nevertheless, the need to give oneself to another person has
profounder origins than the sexual instinct, and is connected above all with the spiritual nature of
the human person.” 525 The anticipation of final union with God is more explicit in spiritual
virginity, yet nevertheless, is an integral part of marriage as well.
The personalistic view of spiritual virginity and marriage articulated by Wojtyła leads
him to address briefly the question of vocation, of a calling from God. He says: “the person
fulfills itself most effectively when it gives itself most fully…. Hence both virginity and
marriage understood in an uncompromisingly personalistic way, are vocations.” 526 He
continues saying that each is “a call to self-perfection through love.” 527

b. Spiritual Parenthood
If spiritual union with God can be found in spiritual virginity and marriage, then, Wojtyła
says, the union with God contains a call to spiritual parenthood, spiritual paternity and maternity.
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He says: “Spiritual parenthood as a sign of the inner maturity of a person is the goal which in
diverse ways all human beings, men and women alike, are called to seek, within or outside
matrimony.” 528 Within marriage only, however, is found physical paternity and maternity. 529
Wojtyła underscores that physical parenthood finds its fulfillment in spiritual parenthood, saying
“A father and mother who have given their children life in the merely biological sense must then
supplement physical parenthood by spiritual parenthood, taking whatever pains are necessary for
their education.” 530
In his theological considerations in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła introduces
statements that are other than the philosophical insights of this work, e.g., vocation a response to
God. Nevertheless, Wojtyła remains focused on his philosophical conclusions. He says: “Man
can only be just to God the Creator if he loves his fellows. This principle has a special relevance
to the conjugal and sexual life of men and women. …It is impossible for a man and a woman to
behave justly towards God the Creator if their treatment of each other falls short of the demands
of the personalistic norm.” 531 Even in context of a response to God, the demand of the
personalistic norm, Wojtyła says, is this: “Man must reconcile himself to his natural greatness.
…he must not forget that he is a person.” 532 The ethical norms that the human person must
follow have their foundation in a philosophical understanding of the human person. So, even as
Wojtyła introduces theological considerations in Love and Responsibility, he primarily considers
them in light of his key philosophical insights.
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C. Sexology and Ethics
Wojtyła says that sexology “can only furnish a supplementary view” to ethics. 533 He
says that sexology is “a view of man and woman and of love which approaches the whole
problem solely or mainly from the point of view of ‘the body and sex’…which deals with
problems of sexual life from the medical or physiological point of view.” 534 The limit of
sexology is that its view is restricted to biological and psychological details.
Wojtyła includes in his discussion of sexology the topics of sexual psychopathology and
therapy. With regard to sexual psychopathology, a list of illnesses exists. Rather than
considering the various illnesses individually, Wojtyła focuses on the causes of these illnesses in
general. While sexology may suggest that a lack of sexual intercourse is the cause of sexual
neuroses, Wojtyła says that “it is not continence, as such, that produces real diseases, but the lack
of it.” 535 The integration of psychosomatic sexual stirrings helps to avoid sexual
psychopathology. Wojtyła insists: “The sexual urge in man is a fact which he must recognize
and welcome as a source of natural energy—otherwise it may cause psychological
disturbances.” 536
Therapy, then, is the treatment for sexual psychopathology. Wojtyła articulates some
principles which should direct therapy for sexual psychopathology. 537 These principles are not
entirely distinct from the basic principles of the ethics that Wojtyła has developed in Love and
Responsibility. In general, the ethical principles guide education. He says, “all correct sex
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education, including that which must take the form of therapy, cannot take as its starting point
only the ‘natural’ plane of the sex instinct, but must proceed from the plane of the person, with
which the whole subject of ‘love and responsibility’ is bound up. And it appears in the last
analysis that there is no other cure and no other pedagogic remedy.” 538 In the case of therapy,
Wojtyła says: “The methods of treatment must therefore be more specific than those which we
use in ordinary sex education.” 539 In the end, except for differences in specificity, Wojtyła sees a
deep consonance between the communication of ethics and a therapy for sexual
psychopathology.
Wojtyła asserts that, given their difference as independent intellectual disciplines, the
primary relationship of sexology to ethics is to provide physiological and psychological details.
Wojtyła says: “The idea that procreation must base itself on love is not derivable from a
biological analysis of sex, but only from the metaphysical (i.e. ultra- and supernatural) fact of
being a person.” 540 The information supplied by sexology can easily be a complement to ethics,
offering further support to the philosophically-derived ethics. Wojtyła says: “Indirectly,
however, sexology itself consistently favours natural and marital morality, because it attaches so
much importance to the psychological and physical health of man and woman.” 541 Without the
philosophical reflection, however, sexology can contradict ethics. One example that Wojtyła
describes is when “there are times when the doctor’s advice is just what turns the patient into a
neurotic, in that it blatantly contradicts the real nature of man.” 542 Wojtyła asserts that sexology
must function within its limitations, remembering that “its immediate concern is with the sexual
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act as a limited physiological or at most psycho-physical process.” 543 While Wojtyła does
express the need for sexology to not go beyond its limits, he is quick to approve of its
phenomenological import. And, as a conclusion to the entire work of Love and Responsibility,
Wojtyła says: “A thorough knowledge of biological and physiological sexual processes is very
important, very fitting, very valuable, but it cannot, either in education or in sexual therapy,
achieve its proper end unless it is honestly grounded in an objective view of the person and the
natural (and supernatural) vocation of the person, which is love.” 544 For Wojtyła, sexology,
properly limited, does not contradict ethics, but is an aide to ethics.

III. Relationship and Responsibility
In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła uses the term, responsibility, in a number of
interconnected ways. He speaks of the responsibility of the person to grow in the virtue of love.
He speaks of the responsibility to receive—and to share—a proper sex education. He focuses on
the raising of psychosomatic stirrings to the level of the person: to respond and not to react, to
integrate love within the person. He insists that love is an affirmation of the personhood of the
other: the only proper response to the other is love. Love contains a sense of responsibility for
the other person, for their well-being. And Wojtyła develops a sense of integrating love between
persons, of responding to the other. Love is a mutual response.

A. Reciprocity
The personalistic norm does not apply to only one person in a relationship of love. Both
persons are obliged to respond in love to the other. Both individuals, self-possessed, being free
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of self-interest, and not yielding to the desire to use the other, make an act of self-donation. This
mutual gift of self is reciprocity. One-sided, unrequited love is not love in its fullest sense. The
reciprocal gift is love. Wojtyła says, “The fact is that a person who desires another as a good
desires above all that person’s love in return for his or her own love…reciprocity is in the very
nature of love, since the interpersonal character of love depends on it.” 545 As a result, the mutual
gift of self-donation creates a unification of persons. Wojtyła writes, “Numerically and
psychologically, there are two loves, but these two separate psychological facts combine to
create a single objective whole.” 546 This unification of loves implies both giving and receiving.
Wojtyła writes, “Betrothed love comprises on the one hand the gift of the person, and on the
other hand, acceptance of that gift.” 547 The mutual response of the persons must be the same on
the part of each. Each must both give and receive.
Wojtyła speaks of reciprocity as a mystery. He says, “in all this is the ‘mystery’ of
reciprocity: acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving.” 548 The mystery is that giving
is receiving. The philosophical impasse of how distinct actions are one, implied by the word,
mystery, is clarified (at least in part) by the recognition that after a gift of self, given in a
reciprocal act of love, the person is able to come to a new act of self-possession. Wojtyła writes:
“In giving ourselves we find clear proof that we possess ourselves.” 549 Wojtyła further
articulates the new experience of self-possession, in reciprocal love, through the “law of
ekstasis.” 550 He says, “The person no longer wishes to be its own exclusive property, but instead
to become the property of that other. This means the renunciation of its autonomy and its
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inalienability. Love proceeds by way of this renunciation, guided by the profound conviction that
it does not diminish and impoverish, but quite the contrary enlarges and enriches the existence of
the person.” 551 This is the law of ekstasis, according to Wojtyła: “The lover ‘goes outside’ the
self to find a fuller existence in another.” 552 Love is co-created through the mutual gift of self.
Reciprocity creates the opportunity for a new act of self-donation. Married love is experienced
and expressed through a free, mutual response to the beloved.

B. Masculinity and Femininity
In Love and Responsibly, Wojtyła restricted his focus to love between a man and woman.
The personalistic norm applies to the man and woman both equally. The increased selfpossession through reciprocity grows in both the man and the woman. All of the principles
articulated by Wojtyła about “love” and “responsibility” direct both the man and the woman.
Yet, Wojtyła describes the phenomenological fact that, in love, a man responds to a
woman, and a woman responds to a man. Wojtyła says: “the choice of a person of the other sex
as the object of betrothed love, and as the co-creator of that love by way of reciprocity, must
depend to a certain extent on sexual values.…Sexual values, as we know, are connected not just
with the impression made by ‘the body…’, but also with the total impression made by a ‘human
being of the other sex’—by the ‘womanliness’ or ‘manliness’ of that other person.” 553 Wojtyła
names the psychical characteristics of man and woman as masculinity and femininity,
respectively.
In love, a man is presented with both physical (bodily) and psychical characteristics
(femininity) of a woman. These stimuli stir psychosomatic reactions within the man, reactions
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which must be raised to the level of the person. Likewise, in love, a woman is presented with
both physical (bodily) and psychical characteristics (masculinity) of a man. These stimuli stir
psychosomatic reactions within the woman, reactions which must be raised to the level of the
person. While the need to raise both sensuality and sentimentality to the level of the person
remains for both the man and the woman, Wojtyła acknowledges that man and woman may each
experience the tasks with a different level of difficulty. He says, “It is pretty generally
recognized that woman is ‘by nature’ more sentimental, and man more sensual.” 554 By way of
illustration, Wojtyła would say that a challenge for man when presented with the body and sex of
woman is to overcome the possibility to use the woman for sensual satisfaction. A challenge for
woman when presented with the body and sex of man is to overcome the possibility to use the
man for sentimental satisfaction.
Wojtyła offers further meaning to the differences between man and woman. He says,
“Sexual attraction makes obvious the fact that the attributes of the two sexes are
complementary…Consequently, there exists for each of them not only the possibility of
supplementing his or her own attributes with those of a person of the other sex, but at times a
keenly felt need to do so.” 555 The keenly felt need can refer to the psychic intensity experienced
in love as well as a spiritual need for self-fulfillment. Wojtyła says, “A man therefore needs a
woman, so to say, to complete his own being, and woman needs man in the same way.” 556
In his treatment of love and of responsibility, Wojtyła consistently asserts that the
articulated principles need to apply to concrete relationships. The principles are equally valid for
both man and woman, even if the challenges are experienced differently for each person. And,
for some, there can be the challenge to see the difference between man and woman as differences
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of physiology simply. The importance of Wojtyła’s insistence on referring to masculinity and
femininity is that the psychical differences between man and woman not be overlooked—as an
aide to recognize the whole person, not just their body, not just their masculinity or femininity.

C. Sacred Scripture
Love and Responsibility is primarily a philosophical work. But given its connection to
Wojtyła’s pastoral work 557 and his academic work at the Catholic University of Lublin, 558 it is
not surprising that there are doctrinal and Scriptural references throughout the work. Rather than
using the Bible as an authority that dictates the content of his reflections, Wojtyła uses it as a
“frame of reference.” 559 Practically all of the biblical references are used as points of contact
with each topic. For example, when Wojtyła is speaking of desiring to use another as
satisfaction, he says: “This is precisely what Christ had in mind when He said (Matthew 5:28):
‘Whosoever looketh upon a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in
his heart.’” 560 Using citations simply serves to underline and illustrate the point that he is
making, especially since Wojtyła sometimes makes use of Scripture without specific mention of
which book of the Bible he is referencing. For example, with regard to self-donation, he writes:
“As we know already, it means disposing of one’s whole self, in the language of the Gospels,
‘giving one’s soul,’” without any citation 561 Throughout Love and Responsibility, the
development of the themes is done in a philosophical manner, with the Scriptural citations as
signaling to the reader connection between the philosophical point and a reference from the
Christian faith.
cf. LR, 15.
cf. LR, 9.
559
LR, 16.
560
LR, 81.
561
LR, 126.
557
558

131

In Love and Responsibility, the most significant point of contact with Scripture and
philosophy is with regard to the personalistic norm and the commandment to love “laid down in
the New Testament.” 562 Of their connection, Wojtyła says: “Strictly speaking the commandment
says: ‘Love persons’, and the personalistic norm,” which demands a response of love, provides
“…a justification for the New Testament commandment. And, so, if we take the commandment
together with this justification, we can say that it is the same as the personalistic norm.” 563
Wojtyła asserts a strict alignment with a key philosophical principle and the theological
commandment. Despite its deep connection with Christian Revelation, the personalistic norm
can be accepted through strict philosophical criteria. Wojtyła says, “believers and unbelievers
alike are capable of discovering in it the affirmation of a great human good, which can and must
be the portion of every person.” 564

IV. Summary of Wojtyła’s Philosophical Anthropology
The philosophical anthropology of Karol Wojtyła is most completely articulated in
Person and Act and Love and Responsibility. Taken together, these two works complete the
picture of Wojtyła’s philosophical understanding of the human person.
In Person and Act, Wojtyła describes the inner experience of a human person, as a
psycho-somatic spiritual unity, who must raise happenings to actions. A person fulfills oneself
through an act of self-determination. In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła articulates the
dynamics of raising passive experiences to the level of the person in action, within a relationship
of love. Love provides an unequaled opportunity for a person to act as a person, to respond.
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And, since love is between two persons, each person must be responding—giving and receiving
their very selves—in a way that is conditioned by the personalistic norm. A person fulfills
oneself through an act of self-donation. Personal fulfillment is found in an interpersonal
relationship, through participation and reciprocity.
A key insight in anthropology, however, is that the human person is incommunicable.
One’s own inner life is one’s own. It cannot be experienced by another, nor can it be exercised
by another. Wojtyła describes the incommunicable attribute of the human person:
The Latin of the philosophers defined it in the assertion that personality is
alteriincommunicabilis—not capable of transmission, not transferable. The point here is
not that a person is a unique and unrepeatable entity, for this can be said just as well of
any other entity—of an animal, a plant, a stone. The incommunicable, the inalienable, in
a person is intrinsic to that person’s inner self, to the power of self determination, free
will. …I am incommunicabilis. I am, and I must be, independent in my actions. All
human relationships are posited on this fact. 565
While a given, the incommunicability of the person is in direct philosophical conflict with an
anthropology that understands that the fulfillment of the human person is found in
intersubjectivity, in mutual self-donation. Wojtyła offers a resolution to this conflict. He says
that a person:
cannot be ceded to another or supplanted by another in another in any context where it
must exercise its will or make a commitment affecting its freedom. (It is alteri
incommunicabilis.) But love forcibly detaches the person, so to speak, from this natural
inviolability and inalienability. It makes the person want to do just that—surrender itself
to another, to the one it loves. 566
Through the interpersonal relationship of love and mutual self-donation a human person is able
to act with another. The phenomenological experience of the person is that incommunicability is
transcended and intersubjectivity created.
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Despite the tension between incommunicability and intersubjectivity, intersubjectivity is
experienced. The theoretical tension is resolved through experience. Wojtyła points to the
experience of intersubjectivity in his philosophical anthropology, even if his description is
anemic. With regard to his treatment of intersubjectivity in Person and Act, Wojtyła says: “The
present author is well aware that his attempt is incomplete, that it remains but a ‘sketch.’” 567 He
does not describe the inner experience of an interpersonal relationship. In Love and
Responsibility, Wojtyła does treat the theme of an interpersonal relationship. He acknowledges
that reciprocity creates a unification of persons. With the focus being on the personalistic norm,
however, the inner dynamics of reciprocity are not treated in detail. In neither work, individually
or together, does Wojtyła articulate the dynamics of intersubjectivity with the same level of
detail that he presents an individual’s inner experience in action.
Wojtyła’s resolution to the tension between incommunicability and intersubjectivity is
found in the integration of love between persons. The resolution is found “in the order of love
and in the moral sense.” 568 Physically and ontologically, two persons remain two persons.
Morally, though, they can become one. Wojtyła says, “Love is impossible for beings who are
mutually impenetrable—only spirituality and the ‘inwardness’ of persons create the conditions
for mutual interpenetration, which enables each to live in and by the other.” 569 Especially
through ethics, Wojtyła offers a resolution to the tension that an individual remains an individual,
yet, that same person can and must have interpersonal relationship. Furthermore, Wojtyła asserts
the importance of morality for anthropology, when he says, “The experience of morality is thus
an integral component in the experience of man. Without it no adequate theory of the acting
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person—of the person and the action—would indeed be possible.” 570 Intersubjectivity is
demanded by the personalistic norm, by the commandment to love. Intersubjectivity is made
possible and experienced by mutual self-donation in love.
For Wojtyła, an adequate anthropology is one that recognizes the human person as a
psycho-somatic spiritual unity in a relationship of mutual self-donation in love. In Person and
Act and in Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła offers a significant philosophical contribution
towards developing an adequate anthropology.
The interaction of anthropology and ethics at work in Wojtyła’s philosophical
anthropology is equally present in the Theology of the Body. The Catecheses likewise take up
the question of interpersonal relationship, under the heading of communio personarum. In
contradistinction to Person and Act and Love and Responsibility, the Theology of the Body
incorporates biblical revelation to develop its themes.
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Chapter 5
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: The Human Person Before the Fall
With regard to the overall content and purpose of the Theology of the Body, John Paul II
says, “one must find that biblical, theological sphere to which we allude when we speak about
the ‘redemption of the body and the sacramentality of marriage.’” 571 To achieve this purpose,
John Paul II divides his work into two major parts: “The Words of Christ” (TOB 1:1-86:7) and
“The Sacrament” (TOB 87:1-133:4). Based on the anthropology and ethics presented in the First
Part, John Paul II applies those conclusions specifically to a phenomenological, ethical, and
spiritual understanding of the sacrament of marriage in the Second Part. With the overall goal of
developing the Church’s understanding of the sacrament of marriage, the Theology of the Body is
a presentation of, a development of, and a companion to Catholic sexual ethics and sacramental
theology on marriage. John Paul II grounds the sacramental theology on a theological
anthropology. Following the model of John Paul II, I will draw out the anthropological insights
of the Theology of the Body in this chapter and the next. Another chapter will treat the
sacramental conclusions of the Catecheses.
In this chapter I focus on the anthropological conclusions that John Paul II makes based
on his interpretation of the first chapters of Genesis.

I. The Words of Christ
To develop his theological anthropology, John Paul II points to three Scripture passages
in which Christ speaks about marriage: Matt. 19:3-8 (when the Pharisees ask Jesus about the

TOB 133:4. Unless otherwise noted, Biblical citations are from the New American Bible Revised Edition
(NABRE).
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indissolubility of marriage); 572 Matt. 5:27-28 (when Jesus speaks about adultery in the heart
during the Sermon on the Mount); 573 and Matt. 22:24-30 (when Jesus speaks about no marriage
in the resurrection of the body). 574 John Paul II uses these three passages as a sort of triptych.
At their foundation is the biblical revelation that the human person is created in the image of
God, which is what leads John Paul II to describe this anthropology as a theological
anthropology. John Paul II articulates this anthropology through his interpretation of the words
of Christ.
John Paul II begins his Catecheses with the question of the indissolubility of marriage
that the Pharisees posed to Jesus (cf. Matt. 19:3-8). 575 In his response, Christ points to Genesis.
John Paul II says, “Twice during the dialogue with the Pharisees who questioned him about the
indissolubility of marriage, Jesus Christ appealed to the ‘beginning.’” 576 John Paul II asserts that
Christ’s response is addressed to our contemporary audience, who, like the Pharisees, ask
questions about sexual ethics and the theology of marriage. Not only does Christ speaks to his
own contemporaries, he also, as John Paul II says, addresses human beings “of a definite
moment in history, and…all human beings belonging to the same human history.” 577 So the
Theology of the Body is not simply an analysis of biblical texts in their own contexts but is an
address to a contemporary audience. The Catecheses are meant to articulate Christ’s response to
the questions of contemporary humanity.
TOB 1:2.
TOB 25:1
574
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A. Christ Appeals to the “Beginning”
The first part of the triptych that John Paul II considers is the dialogue between Jesus and
the Pharisees concerning the indissolubility of marriage, where Christ references the beginning.
John Paul II notes that Jesus is referring to Gen. 1:27 (“God created mankind in his image; in the
image of God he created them; male and female he created them.”) and Gen. 2:24 (“That is why
a man leaves his father and mother and clings to his wife, and the two of them become one
body.”). 578 Thus, after having acknowledged the starting point as the dialogue with Christ, John
Paul II turns his attention to the accounts of creation contained in these verses of the first
chapters of Genesis.

1. Two Creation Accounts
John Paul II highlights some essential elements of the two creation accounts for a
theology of the body. 579
With regard to the first creation account (cf. Gen. 1:1-2:4), John Paul II identifies some of
the significant theological content of Gen. 1:27. He asserts that in the context of the seven days
of Creation, the human person is declared to not be equivalent to the rest of creation (which
especially includes animals). Concerning the contradistinction of the human person to the rest of
creation, John Paul II says: “Already in the light of the Bible’s first sentences, man can neither
be understood nor explained in his full depth with the categories taken from the ‘world,’ that is,

TOB 1:3.
John Paul II acknowledges the view held by modern biblical scholars that the two Creation accounts have
different authors, cf. TOB 2:2. Nevertheless, in his interpretation of these passages, John Paul II integrates the two
accounts to form a unified theological anthropology.
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from the visible totality of bodies.” 580 John Paul II continues, saying: “the biblical narrative does
not speak of his [the human person’s] likeness with the rest of creation, but only with God.” 581
Even though the human person has a body, like the rest of the visible creation, the human person
alone is in the image of God.
In this one verse, the first creation account contains a theology that is concise and
developed. John Paul II unpacks the theological meaning of this verse throughout the course of
the rest of the Theology of the Body. But for the time being he writes that “the first chapter of
Genesis has formed an incontrovertible point of reference and solid basis of a metaphysics and
also for an anthropology and an ethics…Of course, all this has its own significance for theology
as well, and above all for the theology of the body.” 582
Comparing the two creation accounts, John Paul II says that “the first account…is much
more mature both with regard to the image of God and in the formulation of the essential truths
about man.” 583 In this way, the first creation account has a more precise theology and
theological anthropology, which is both objective and cosmological. But since Gen. 2 is more
subjective and phenomenological, it reveals more fully the inner life of the human person. John
Paul II says: “Chapter 2 of Genesis constitutes in some way the oldest description and record of
man’s self-understanding and…is the first witness of human consciousness.” 584 Because Gen. 2
uses ancient and stylized language, John Paul II devotes some time to articulate the inner life of
the human person as revealed in these verses, especially in the verses of Gen. 2:5-25. 585 Overall,

TOB 2:4. Here John Paul II notes that the Hebrew ‘adam means “human being” and not necessarily a “male.”
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the subjectivity revealed in Gen. 2 complements and completes the cosmological statement of
Gen. 1:27. John Paul II says, “this subjectivity corresponds to the objective reality of man
created ‘in the image of God.’ And, also, this fact is—in another way—important for the
theology of the body.” 586 The two accounts taken together are significant for a theological
anthropology.
With the focus on the inner experience of the human person, John Paul II adds a gloss
about the importance of experience for theology. He notes: “we must reach the conviction that
in this case, our human experience is in some way a legitimate means for theological
interpretation and that, in a certain sense, it is an indispensable point of reference to which we
must appeal in the interpretation of the ‘beginning.’” 587 A theological anthropology, i.e. a
theology of the body, needs to take experience into account.
John Paul II also notes that the inner human experience of the beginning to which Christ
appeals, and which is described in Gen. 2:5-25, is beyond the threshold of the Fall (cf. Gen. 3:17). He says: “we have every right to be convinced that this ‘historical’ experience of ours must
in some way stop at the threshold of man’s original innocence, because it remains inadequate to
it.” 588 John Paul II acknowledges the tension between the fact that the inner human experience
before the Fall is beyond our direct human experience and that our human experience is an
“indispensable point of reference.” 589 Gen. 2 is significant because it describes the inner human
experience that is no longer directly accessible to us. But Gen. 2 is also significant because it
describes the roots of human experience, which are accessible. John Paul II writes: “The
important thing, therefore, is not that these experiences belong to man’s prehistory (to his
TOB 3:4.
TOB 4:4.
588
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‘theological prehistory’), but that they are always at the root of every human experience.” 590
Further justification for turning to the original situation is found in Christ’s dialogue with the
Pharisees. John Paul II says: “Christ’s words, which appeal to the ‘beginning,’ allow us to find
an essential continuity in man and a link between these two different states or dimensions of the
human being.” 591

2. Original Human Experiences
Having established a connection between “historical” human experience and the prelapsidary experience of the human person, having established the continuity of the interiority of
the human person before and after the Fall, John Paul II articulates the characteristics of that
original situation.
John Paul II analysis of the state of the human person before the Fall includes original
solitude, original unity, and original nakedness. John Paul II adds these original experiences as
complements to the theological principles of original innocence and original sin.

a. Original Solitude
In Gen. 2 the human person is described as being alone. On one hand, the solitude of the
human person is a declaration made by God (Gen. 2:18 reads, “The LORD God said: It is not
good for the man to be alone.”). 592 On the other hand, the human person discovers its own
solitude (Gen. 2:20 reads, “none proved to be a helper suited to the man.”). 593 The declaration
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and the discovery come from the fact that, despite being surrounded by the rest of creation, the
human person is alone. The verses of Gen. 2:18 and Gen. 2:20 precede the creation of woman,
which is a separate act of creation in Gen. 2. The declaration (i.e. the status of solitude is not
good) and the discovery (i.e. there is the absence of a helper) give a negative connotation to
solitude in this context.
For John Paul II, the negative reading of solitude in Gen. 2 does not fully reveal the
meaning of original solitude. Its limitation is that the negative reading could seem to apply only
to the male, which has limited value for an anthropology. 594 A more complete understanding of
the biblical revelation on original solitude has a more positive meaning and can be applied to
every human person, male and female. John Paul II comments: “Man is alone because he is
‘different’ from the visible world, from the world of living beings.” 595 Original solitude reveals
the uniqueness of the human person among the rest of the visible world: it alone is a person. As
a person, the human person has its own subjectivity, with self-consciousness and the power of
self-determination. 596 Original solitude reveals this essential structure of the human person. The
positive meaning of original solitude (applicable to every human person) derives, as John Paul II
notes, from “man’s very nature.” 597
In addition to revealing human subjectivity, original solitude also reveals a meaning of
the human body. John Paul II highlights that the meaning of original solitude is discovered by
the human person in Gen. 2 through the body. Even though the body is the source of an
identification of the human person with the rest of the visible world, in none of the other bodies,
including the animals, did the human person recognize another person—another being with an
594
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inner subjectivity with self-consciousness and the power of self-determination. 598 Only in the
woman did the man recognize a person like himself (cf. Gen. 2:23)
John Paul II identifies another way that the human body reveals original solitude:
specifically human activity. Gen. 2 distinguishes the human person from the rest of creation.
With regards to the discovery of this uniqueness, John Paul II says: “The premise of this selfdistinction on man’s part is the fact that only he is able to ‘cultivate the earth’ (see Gen 2:5) and
to ‘subdue it’ (see Gen 1:28).” 599 But for John Paul II the anthropological meaning of the ability
to cultivate and to subdue the earth is not most deeply found in a superiority of the human person
with regard to the rest of creation. The anthropological meaning of the biblical reference to
specifically human actions is that the body is part of the human person’s subjectivity. A human
person is only a human person if the person has a body. John Paul II underscores: “The structure
of this body is such that it permits him to be the author of genuinely human activity.” 600 Put
simply, John Paul II says, “the body expresses the person.” 601 Through original solitude, the
human person discovers the structure of human nature as a simultaneous inner subjectivity and a
bodily expression.
John Paul II further identifies a meaning of original solitude with regard to the
relationship of the human person and God. Alone among the rest of creation, the human person
is in a relationship with God, a partner of God. John Paul II says: The human person “is
manifested in the second account as a subject of the covenant…constituted according to the

cf. Gen. 2:19-20, which reads: “So the LORD God formed out of the ground all the wild animals and all the birds
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measure of ‘partner of the Absolute,’ inasmuch as he must consciously discern and choose
between good and evil, between life and death.” 602 This unique partnership with God reveals a
similarity to God. John Paul II says that this revelation in Gen. 2 “in its own way approaches the
theological definition of man that we find in the first creation account (‘Let us make man in our
image and our likeness,’ Gen 1:26).” 603 The similarity and partnership with God is revealed
through original solitude. But original solitude also reveals that, unlike God, the human person
has a body and has the potential to experience death. 604

b. Original Unity
Original unity is based on both the somatic homogeneity and the somatic heterogeneity of
the human person created as male and female.
In the creation account, when the man sees the woman, he exclaims: “This one, at last, is
bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh” (Gen. 2:23). John Paul II emphasizes that the language
in this passage reveals a discovery of the somatic homogeneity of the man and the woman. 605
They are both human persons. When the man recognizes through the body (i.e., flesh and bone),
that this is a helper for him, he is recognizing the whole person of the woman. As a continuation
and a consequence of original solitude, the one discovers in the other a similarity, a unity, a
homogeneity. Original unity responds to the negative connotation of original solitude, insofar as
the man discovers in the woman (and vice versa) one who overcomes the status that it is not
good to be alone. John Paul II says that original unity “expresses itself as an overcoming of the
frontier of solitude and at the same time as an affirmation—for both human beings—of
TOB 6:2. To this point, John Paul II cites Gen. 2:16-17.
TOB 6:2. Despite their distinct language and origins, John Paul II unites the two creation accounts in his biblical
interpretation.
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everything in solitude that constitutes ‘man.’” 606 The man and the woman are both the same in
having a body and an interiority. They recognize in one another a unity among themselves.
They both share in original solitude. Said another way, John Paul II writes: “man and woman
come forth from the mystery of creation first of all as brother and sister in the same
humanity.” 607
Gen. 2 also reveals that between the man and the woman there is a somatic heterogeneity:
God created the human person as male and female. Acknowledging this sexual difference, John
Paul II says that original unity “is based on masculinity and femininity, which are…two ways in
which the same human being, created ‘in the image of God’ (Gen 1:27), ‘is a body.’” 608 Somatic
homogeneity is complemented by somatic heterogeneity, by the fact that God created the human
person with sexual difference. The overcoming of original solitude by original unity is further
made possible by somatic heterogeneity. John Paul II writes, “The unity about which Genesis
2:24 speaks (‘and the two will be one flesh’) is without doubt the unity that is expressed and
realized in the conjugal act.” 609 In the future tense of “will be” of Gen. 2:24, John Paul II
recognizes that the “one flesh” is a union of persons. Original unity is established by mutual
self-gift, mutual acts of self-determination. John Paul II continues: “The formulation of Gen.
2:24 itself indicates not only that human beings, created as man and woman, have been created
for unity, but also that precisely this unity, through which they become ‘one flesh,’ has from the
beginning the character of a union that derives from a choice.” 610 Original unity overcomes
original solitude through a mutual self-gift.
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John Paul II points out that in Gen. 2 the human person discovers an absence of someone
to which to give oneself. That is, the discovery of original solitude included a discovery that the
human person was created to give oneself to another. Original solitude revealed an openness to
another who is absent. Gen. 2:18 (“I will make a helper suited to him.”) and 2:20 (“none proved
to be a helper suited to the man.”) define the other person as a help. John Paul II says that
original unity is found in “precisely the ‘help’ that derives in some way from the very fact
of…existence of the person ‘for’ the person.” 611 The man and the woman find in each other a
help to overcome their solitude by discovering a being in the visible world that shares somatic
homogeneity and somatic heterogeneity.
In his discussion of original unity, John Paul II thematically introduces the concept of the
communion of persons, communio personarum. The mutual self-gift between the man and the
woman, which involves the whole person, is more than sexual intercourse. Original unity is
more than the conjugal act. John Paul II says: “the communion of persons could form itself only
on the basis of a ‘double solitude’ of the man and the woman, or as an encounter in their
‘distinction’ from the world of living beings (animalia), which gave to both the possibility of
being and existing in a particular reciprocity.” 612 As a communion of persons, unity involves the
whole person of both the man and the woman. As a communion of persons, unity is a
relationship of a reciprocal self-gift.
One implication of original unity is that it connects the procreation of children with the
conjugal act. Original unity, John Paul II says, “allows them, when they become one flesh, to
place their whole humanity at the same time under the blessing of fruitfulness.” 613 Another
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implication of original unity is that it is open to a moral evaluation. 614 Moreover, it is a task for
the human person. 615
Original unity also has specific significance for a theological anthropology. Using the
language of Gen. 1, John Paul II says that “we can deduce that man became the image of God not
only through his own humanity, but also through the communion of persons.” 616 Human beings
image God in our choosing a mutual self-gift.
Throughout his discussion of original unity, John Paul II speaks about the mystery of
creation. Specifically, God’s choice to create the human person as male and female is a mystery.
Nevertheless, in the image of God, God created the human person as male and female. The
mystery of creation is found in the homogeneity and heterogeneity of the human person. John
Paul II articulates that the heterogeneity is not simply a difference of bodily structure. He says
that masculinity and femininity being “‘constitutive for the person’ (not only ‘an attribute of the
person’), shows how deeply man…is constituted by the body as ‘he’ or ‘she.’” 617 The
differences of masculinity and femininity affect every level of the person. The man “embodies”
masculinity, and the woman “embodies” femininity. At the same time, John Paul II asserts
strongly that the difference and complementarity between male and female does not erase
homogeneity. He says:
Bodiliness and sexuality are not simply identical. Although in its normal constitution, the
human body carries within itself the signs of sex and is by its nature male or female, the
fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs more deeply to the structure of the personal subject
than the fact that in his somatic constitution he is also male or female. 618
Somatic heterogeneity complements somatic homogeneity.
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c. Original Nakedness
Based on Gen. 2:25, which reads, “The man and his wife were both naked, yet they felt
no shame,” John Paul II adds original nakedness to original solitude and original unity as the
third essential element of the “biblical sketch of anthropology,” 619 of the “beginning.”
Given that Gen. 2 mentions shame, John Paul II notes that the reader is taken directly into
the subjectivity of the human person before the Fall. With the Fall, shame enters into human
experience. There is a shift in human experience. A boundary is crossed, which is captured by
the word “shame.” John Paul II identifies the shift as “a radical change in the meaning of the
original nakedness of the woman before the man and of the man before the woman…[and a
change in] the experience of the meaning of one’s own body before the Creator and
creatures.” 620 With the entrance of shame, there is a shift in one’s experience of the body and in
the experience of the other. 621
Even though the biblical account describes an experience that is across the threshold of
shame entering human experience (cf. Gen. 2:25), John Paul II undertakes to “in some way
reconstruct the original meaning of nakedness” in the relationship between the man and the
woman. 622 He immediately notes that the phrase, without shame, does not denote shamelessness
or a lack of shame, which may be found in the case of individuals lacking full self-consciousness
(e.g. a child). In the case of original nakedness, John Paul II says that the words of Gen. 2:25
“indicate a particular fullness of consciousness and experience, above all the fullness of
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understanding the meaning of the body.” 623 That full consciousness of oneself and of the other,
the full consciousness of the bodies of the man and the woman experienced without shame is
achieved through both the external vision of eyesight and the vision of the interior gaze. John
Paul II says: “They see and know each other, in fact, with all the peace of the interior gaze,
which creates precisely the fullness of the intimacy of persons.” 624 Original nakedness reveals
the mutual communication between the man and the woman that creates the communio
personarum that is free from the experience of shame. John Paul II says that shame “carries it
with it a specific limitation of vision through the eyes of the body.” 625 It is a limitation that is
caused by the presence of the fear of threat in the face of the other. Original nakedness allowed
the man and woman to know the fullness of the meaning of the body and to share “the fullness of
humanity, which shows itself in them as reciprocal complementarity…a mutual gift.” 626 To be
without shame is to be on the other side of that threshold of the experience of the meaning of the
body in the human person’s subjectivity, to be on the other side of the threshold of the fullness of
the communio personarum. John Paul II says: “The original meaning of nakedness corresponds
to the simplicity and fullness of vision in which their understanding of the meaning of the body
is born from…their community-communion.” 627

II. Spousal Meaning of the Body
Throughout the Theology of the Body, John Paul II expresses the need for an “adequate
anthropology.” 628 He sees the original human experiences as forming a basis of such an
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adequate anthropology. 629 John Paul II calls the meaning of the body, as revealed in the original
human experiences, the spousal meaning of the body. 630 His development of the spousal
meaning of the body employs the concept of the gift, as a key concept in John Paul II’s
theological anthropology.

A. Hermeneutics of the Gift
In his dialogue with the Pharisees, Jesus refers to the beginning of creation (Matt. 19:3,
“He said in reply, ‘Have you not read that from the beginning the Creator “made them male and
female”). In the same passage God is referred to as the Creator. In his continued analysis of
“the beginning” referred to by Jesus, John Paul II takes up the theme of Creator and creation.
John Paul II asserts that creation is a gift of God. The status of the gift is not simply that God
created out of nothing, but that God created out of love. John Paul II says: “As an action of God,
creation thus means not only calling from nothing to existence…but, according to the first
account…it also signifies gift; a fundamental and ‘radical’ gift, that is, an act of giving in which
the gift comes into being precisely from nothing.” 631 In Gen. 1, we see the mystery of creation.
We see, as John Paul II says, “the beginning of the world by the will of God, who is omnipotence
and love.” 632

1. Creation as Gift
In his introduction of the concept of gift, John Paul II underscores its significance. He
speaks of creation as a gift:
cf. TOB 13:2.
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We should now turn anew to those fundamental words that Christ used, that is, to the
word “created” and to the subject, “Creator,” introducing into the considerations carried
out so far a new dimension, a new criterion of understanding and of interpretation that
we will call “hermeneutics of the gift.” The dimension of gift is decisive for the essential
truth and depth of the meaning of original solitude-unity-nakedness. It stands also at the
very heart of the mystery of creation, which allows us to build the theology of the body
“from the beginning,” but at the same time demands that we build it in precisely this
way. 633
The hermeneutics of the gift is a key for interpreting human experience, is key for John Paul II’s
theological anthropology. The essential elements of the concept of the gift are giver, receiver,
and the relationship between the two. 634 In the creation of the human person as a gift, God is the
giver, and the receiver is the human person.
Since only the human person, in all of creation, is created in the image of God, the
creation of the human person is unique. John Paul II says: “In the account of creation of the
visible world, giving has meaning only in relation to man. In the whole work of creation, it is
only about him that one can say, a gift has been granted.” 635 John Paul II finds language that
resonates with the understanding of creation as a gift in Gaudium et Spes 24:3. Paraphrasing, he
says, “We recall here the text of the most recent Council in which it declares that man is the only
creature in the visible world that God willed ‘for its own sake,’ adding that this man cannot ‘fully
find himself except through a sincere gift of self.’” 636 The gift of creation is God’s willing of the
human person, for its own sake. The human person is the receiver of the gift. In this
anthropological statement, the Council affirms that every human person is a gift. God wills the
human person for its own sake. The human person receives the gift. And the human person is
called to give oneself as a gift, which is indicative of the relation between God and the human
person. Both the giving and the receiving are essential to anthropology as articulated by the
TOB 13:2.
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hermeneutics of the gift. In addition to the elements of the giver and of the receiver, the third
element of the hermeneutics of the gift is the relation between the giver and the receiver. John
Paul II seems to refer to this relation as “living the world as a gift.” 637 At this point, John Paul II
does not take up the theme of the relation between the human person and God, in terms of the
hermeneutics of the gift. Instead, he turns to the communio personarum of the man and the
woman and their mutual gift and relation. He turns to their communion, which is created in the
image of God, as a specific gift in the mystery of creation.

2. Mutual Gift of Self
Besides helping to articulate the relation of the human person to God, the hermeneutics of
the gift is also key to John Paul II’s theological anthropology with regard to the communion of
persons of the man and the woman.
Considered separately, the individual (man or woman) is the giver. In terms of Gaudium
et Spes, the gift is the individual himself (or herself) in a disinterested gift of self to the other.
John Paul II articulates that the disinterested gift is one that is made in freedom. Connected to
original nakedness and the original absence of shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), the freedom, which is the
basis of the gift, is self-mastery. John Paul II says, “Here we mean freedom above all as selfmastery (self-dominion). Under this aspect, self-mastery is indispensable in order for man to be
able to ‘give himself,’ in order for him to become a gift.” 638 The disinterested gift is the freedom
of the gift of self. The hermeneutics of the gift demands that the giver in giving himself or
herself is not constrained, especially interiorly, and is in possession of oneself.
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The negative connotation of original solitude reveals that it was not good that the man
was alone (cf. Gen. 2:18). The man was lacking someone to which he could give himself as a
gift (cf. Gen. 2:20). John Paul II underscores that though his body, the man in Gen. 2 recognized
that he was created to give himself to another human person. Until the creation of woman, he
was alone. John Paul II says that the essence of the human person is revealed by “existing ‘for
someone.’” 639 The human person is for another, and the other receives that gift. Gen. 2 also
illustrates the act of receiving the gift. John Paul II says of the man of Gen 2., “he welcomes her
within himself…, welcomes her as she is willed ‘for her own sake’ by the Creator, as she is
constituted in the mystery of the image of God through her femininity.” 640 The receiving of the
other for their own sake John Paul II speaks of as welcoming the gift and affirmation of the
person. Receiving is defined by John Paul II as a “power and deep availability for the
‘affirmation of the person,’ that is, literally, the power to live the fact that the other—the woman
for the man and the man for the woman—is…someone willed by the Creator ‘for his own
sake’…someone chosen by eternal Love.” 641 In an interpersonal human relationship, the one
who receives the gift receives the other for the other’s own sake. The hermeneutics of the gift
and original nakedness indicate that the receiver is free, with the same freedom possessed by the
giver.
The relationship established between the man and the woman is the communion of
persons. The communio personarum requires mutuality, a reciprocal giving and receiving of the
self. In Gen. 2, the human person realizes the need for mutuality through the recognition of the
specific nature of the creation of the human person for its own sake. John Paul II says that,
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though the body (cf. Gen. 2:20), the human person recognizes that “none of these beings
(animalia), in fact, offers man the basic conditions that make it possible to exist in a relation of
reciprocal gift.” 642 In the original situation the man and the woman both gave themselves to
each other and received the gift of the other, at the same time. Of this communion of persons,
John Paul II says: “Communion of persons means living in a reciprocal ‘for,’ in a relationship of
reciprocal gift. And, this relationship is precisely the fulfillment of ‘man’s’ original solitude.” 643
The hermeneutics of the gift underscores the spousal meaning of the body. In Gen. 2, the
discovery that the somatic structure of each, the male body and the female body, reveals that the
human person is created to be in a mutual relation of gift. This discovery is what John Paul II
calls the spousal meaning of the body. 644 The human person is created to be a gift for another.
In the original situation (cf. Gen. 2:25), the spousal meaning of the body was fully understood
and lived. And the spousal meaning of the body perdures even after the Fall. John Paul II
asserts that every human person can discover the meaning to live in mutual relation, even if the
gift is not fully lived. He says: “In fact, in the whole perspective of his own ‘history,’ man will
not fail to confer a spousal meaning on his own body. Even if this meaning does undergo and
will undergo many distortions, it will always remain the deepest level…as a sign of the ‘image of
God.’” 645
At the foundation of the spousal meaning of the body is the discovery of the mystery of
the human person created male and female (cf. Gen. 1:27). This discovery is more than a
recognition of the somatic difference between male and female. The communio personarum is
established by masculinity and femininity, which are characteristics of the human person beyond

TOB 14:1.
TOB 14:2.
644
cf. TOB 15:5.
645
TOB 15:5.
642
643

154

simply the somatic level. John Paul II says, “The body, which expresses femininity ‘for’
masculinity and vice versa, masculinity ‘for’ femininity, manifests the reciprocity and the
communion of persons.” 646 The human body reveals more than the male and female sexes, it
reveals masculinity and femininity. Masculinity is a characteristic of the whole male human
person, femininity is a characteristic of the whole female human person. John Paul II further
says of the spousal meaning of the body:
The human body with…its masculinity and femininity… is not only a source of
fruitfulness and of procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains ‘from the
beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is, the power to express love: precisely that love in
which the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the very meaning
of his being and existence. 647
The mutual gift of self of the communion of persons is only possible through freedom, the
freedom to give and the freedom to receive. The danger is that the spousal meaning of the body,
which includes procreation, can be understood in an animal way. Original nakedness reveals that
the man and the woman were free (cf. Gen. 2:25). John Paul II says, “both are ‘naked,’ because
they are free with the very freedom of the gift.” 648 They were able to give a sincere gift of self.
John Paul II names this relationship as love, saying, “One can define this ‘beginning’ also as the
original and beatifying immunity from shame as the result of love.” 649 The communion of
persons, John Paul II says, which includes the body and procreation (cf. Gen. 1:28 and Gen.
2:24), is “in both accounts (though in each in a different way) also raised in some way to the
level of the ‘image of God’ and to the level of the person.” 650 It is only the free, mutual gift of
self—of the communion of persons—that is love that is in the image of God.
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The human person is in the image of God, not only individually, but as a communion of
persons. Based on Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 2:24). the assertion that the mutual exchange of the gift of
self is in the image of God is an essential element of John Paul II’s theological anthropology.

B. Communio Personarum as Task and Sign
After establishing the mutual exchange of the gift in a communio personarum as an
integral part of an adequate anthropology, John Paul II further articulates the dynamics of the
mutual exchange of the gift as a corollary to the spousal meaning of the body, while at the same
time introducing a moral evaluation of the exchange of the gift of self.
The man and the woman in the original situation are described as being in a state of
original innocence (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). John Paul II comments that innocence is a moral term,
saying that “Innocence ‘of heart’—and, as a consequence, innocence of experience—signifies a
moral participation in the eternal and permanent act of God’s will,” God, who wills the man and
the woman each for their own sake. 651 In the original situation, the moral choices of the man and
the woman were contained in the mutual exchange of the gift in freedom. That is, the man and
woman recognized the spousal meaning of the body and, according to their conscience,
responded simply according to the “ethos of the gift.” 652 The ethical demands of the spousal
meaning of the body were not erased with original sin, even if they are no longer simply
followed. John Paul II says, the spousal meaning of the body “was to remain as a task given to
man by the ethos of the gift, inscribed in the depth of the human heart as a distant echo…of
original innocence.” 653 For the man and the woman—and for everyone since—the moral
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demand of the mutual exchange of the gift is that the exchange be innocent. Even though
original innocence was lost after original sin, the ethical obligation to live the mutual exchange
of the gift remains.
John Paul II describes the mutual exchange of the gift in the original situation of original
innocence as free from shame, that is, a gift given in freedom and free from reducing the other to
an object. From the perspective of the man in Gen. 2, the sincere gift of self without shame is a
gift that is given free from any internal constraint. The receiving of the woman’s gift of self is
the acceptance of her for her own sake. Commenting on receiving the other through its negation
John Paul II says: “The contrary of such ‘welcoming’ or ‘acceptance’ of the other human being
as a gift would be a loss of the gift itself and thus a transmutation and even reduction of the other
to an ‘object for myself’ (object of concupiscence, of ‘undue appropriation,’ etc.).” 654 With
original innocence (cf. Gen. 2:23-25), the reception of the other is for their own sake—and not
for one’s own sake. Giving and receiving, in their deepest meaning, are not directed towards
self-fulfillment. Even though one finds oneself through self-donation, the mutual exchange of
the gift must remain a mutual disinterested gift of self, and receiving of the other, for the sake of
the other.
The moral demand of the gift is confirmed by the continuation of the mutual exchange of
the gift. The mutual exchange of the gift is not a single, reciprocal encounter between the man
and woman. The encounter continually repeats itself. Gaudium et Spes 24 says that the human
person finds oneself through a sincere gift of self. John Paul II says that “this finding of oneself
in one’s own gift becomes the source of a new gift of self.” 655 A result of self-donation is that the
person “finds himself” (cf. Gaudium et Spes 24), achieves self-fulfillment. John Paul II
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describes this self-fulfillment as “an enrichment…[where the person] reaches the innermost
depth of ‘self-possession.’” 656 John Paul II furthermore says, “The exchange is reciprocal, and
the mutual effects of the ‘sincere gift’ and of ‘finding oneself’ reveal themselves and grow in that
exchange.” 657 With the reciprocal gift of self, the individual is then able to discover oneself once
again, able to receive oneself more fully, and with greater self-possession more able to give once
again in self-donation. Each mutual self-gift creates the possibility of a new mutual selfdonation. This continuing mutual self-gift must continue in freedom for the communio
personarum to continue.
In light of the description of the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the gift, John Paul II
comments on the distinct actions of giving and receiving. He says: “These two functions of the
mutual exchange are deeply connected in the whole process of the ‘gift of self’: giving and
accepting the gift interpenetrate in such a way that the very act of giving becomes acceptance,
and acceptance transforms itself into giving.” 658 In the communio personarum, there is a deep
coherence between giving and receiving. Even though the two actions can be considered
separately, the experience in innocence removes the distinction.
The mutual gift of self includes the body. In Gen. 2:24, the union of the man and woman
is described as a union of “one body.” Conjugal union is acknowledged in Gen. 4:1, which
states, “The man had intercourse with his wife Eve, and she conceived and gave birth.” 659 John
Paul II notes that the literal biblical term used, in Gen. 4:1, for “intercourse” is “to know.” 660
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Even though “knowledge” is not used in a modern context to refer to conjugal union, John Paul
II notes that in the ancient text “knowledge” underscores that fact that bodily union of the man
and the woman was the result of human choice. He says: “Thus, the term ‘knowledge’ used in
Gen. 4:1-2 and often in the Bible, raises the conjugal relation of man and woman…and brings it
into the specific dimension of the persons.” 661 John Paul II further notes that “knowledge” in
Gen. 4:1 refers to the consciousness of the meaning of the body, especially with regard to
procreation. The connection between Gen. 4:1 and Gen. 2:24 makes clear the inseparable
connection of union and procreation in the communio personarum of the man and the woman.
John Paul II says: “Consequently, ‘knowledge’ in the biblical sense signifies that man’s
‘biological’ determination, on the part of his body…reaches a level and content specific to selfconscious and self-determining persons…[and] a particular consciousness of the meaning of the
human body bound to fatherhood and motherhood.” 662

III. The Human Person as the Image of God
The inclusion of the body in the communio personarum and the connection of union and
procreation has further implication for the image of God. The communion of persons, which
includes conjugal union and parenthood, is in the image of God. John Paul II says, “biblical
‘knowledge’ seems to take on a still greater dimension…the first account of the creation of man,
concerning ‘male’ and ‘female’ made ‘in the image of God.’” 663
The body is a sign. John Paul II says: “The body, in fact, and only the body, is capable of
making visible what is invisible: the spiritual and the divine.” 664 In the original situation (cf.
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Gen. 2:23-25), the communion of the man and the woman—as created and as a result of inner
moral choice—is communicated through the body, through conjugal union and procreation.
John Paul II says: “the exchange of the gift, in which their whole humanity, soul and body,
femininity and masculinity, participates, is realized by preserving the inner characteristic…of
self-donation and of the acceptance of the other as a gift.” 665 This theology of the body
culminates in the understanding of the body as a sign of the moral union of the man and the
woman and as a sign of the image of God.
John Paul II’s anthropological and ethical conclusions about the communio personarum
are rooted in his interpretation of the revelation concerning the creation of the human person
found in Gen. 1 and Gen. 2. In contemporary experience, the human person is called to follow
the moral demands of the “beginning” (cf. Matt. 19:4), while at the same time being situated on
this side of the threshold of original sin. This reality results in a tension within the human
person. In the next chapter, I present John Paul II’s consideration of this inner tension.
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Chapter 6
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: The Historical Experience of the Human Person
John Paul II continues his theological anthropology by focusing on the post-lapsidary
state of the human person (cf. Gen. 3), the “historical man,” every human person, who must
struggle to live the moral demands of the disinterested gift of self. 666
In this chapter, I present John Paul II’s discussion of the inner tension of the human
person and its resolution through the experience of the resurrection in this life.

I. Christ Appeals to the Human Heart
This second part of the triptych of the words of Christ, which includes Matt. 19:3-8 and
Matt. 22:24-30, is based on Christ’s words in the Sermon on the Mount, Matt. 5:27-28: “You
have heard that it was said, ‘You shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you, everyone who
looks at a woman with lust has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”

A. Sermon on the Mount
Since Matt. 5:27-28 references an Old Testament commandment (“You shall not commit
adultery,” Ex. 20:14, Dt. 5:18), questions of morality immediately come into focus. John Paul II
says that this statement of Christ “confirms the principle of human morality contained in the
commandment ‘You shall not commit adultery,’ and, at the same time, it shows…the condition
for its adequate ‘fulfillment.’” 667 The pope also says that, even though Christ addresses a man,
the moral content equally applies to the woman. 668 After making these initial comments, John
Paul II postpones further ethical analysis of Christ’s words. Instead, at this point, he turns to a
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description of the inner human experiences, in the state after original sin. He turns to the “heart”
that Christ mentions in Matt. 5:28 and the anthropological ramifications of Christ’s words.

1. Shame and Concupiscence
If the original situation of the human person was without shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), then the
historical situation is affected by the experience of shame (cf. Gen. 3:7). John Paul II identifies
concupiscence as a mark of the entry of shame into the experience of the human person, and as
an effect of original sin. John Paul II presents 1 John 2:16 as a biblical passage that sheds light
on the experience of concupiscence. 669 This passage names a threefold concupiscence: “the
concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life” (cf. 1 John
2:16). 670 The pope does not enter into an analysis of this Johannine text but presents it as
offering a biblical articulation of the inner experience of the human person.
To continue the analysis of shame and concupiscence, John Paul II returns to a reading of
the second creation account, especially Gen. 3. He sees in this biblical account a description of
sin as casting doubt on the gift that was received from God. In yielding to the temptation to be
“like God” (cf. Gen. 3:5), the man and the woman violate their status as creatures. John Paul II
says: “By casting doubt in his heart on the deepest meaning of the gift, that is, on love as the
specific motive of creation and of the original covenant (see Gen 3:5), man turns his back on
God-Love, on the ‘Father.’” 671 The effect of sin is that there was a change in the human person’s
relationship with God, the beginning of a doubt of God’s love. Moreover, there was a break in
the completeness of that original communion with God, a loss of the gift. The pope says,
TOB 26:1.
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referring to Gen. 3:9-11, “In reality, what shows itself through ‘nakedness’ is man deprived of
participation in the Gift, man alienated from the Love that was the source of the original gift.” 672
Concomitant with the break in the communion with God, an inner division is experienced
by the human person, an effect on one’s relationship with oneself. John Paul II says that the
story in Gen. 3 reveals “a certain constitutive fracture in the human person’s interior, a breakup,
as it were, of man’s original spiritual and somatic unity.” 673 The pope continues: “The
concupiscence of the body is a specific threat to the structure of self-possession and selfdominion, through which the human person forms itself. …In any case, the man of
concupiscence does not rule his own body in the same way, with the same simplicity…as the man
of original innocence.” 674 The break in the spiritual and somatic unity makes it difficult to
receive simply the gift of one’s own self.
In addition to the rupture in relationship with God and a rupture of inner unity, the human
interpersonal communio personarum is likewise injured through original sin. This rupture is
indicated biblically by the covering of themselves with fig leaves (cf. Gen. 3:7). The pope says:
“That reciprocal communion in humanity itself through the body and through its masculinity and
femininity…is overturned at this moment, as if the body in its masculinity and femininity ceased
to be ‘free from suspicion’…as if its original function were ‘called into doubt.’” 675 After
original sin, the ability to live the gift is replaced with desire. Pointing to Gen. 3:16 (“your urge
shall be for your husband, and he shall rule over you”), the pope says, “the communion of
persons—which consists in the spiritual unity of the two subjects who gave themselves to each
TOB 27:2. Gen. 3:9-11 reads: “The LORD God then called to the man and asked him: Where are you? He
answered, ‘I heard you in the garden; but I was afraid, because I was naked, so I hid.’ Then God asked: Who told
you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the tree of which I had forbidden you to eat?” John Paul II also notes
that in this biblical passage is a change in the relation of the human person to the rest of the non-human creation.
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other—is replaced by a different mutual relationship, namely, by a relationship of possession of
the other as an object of one’s own desire.” 676 John Paul II restates this change in the
relationship in terms of the gift: he says, “The relationship of the gift changes into a relationship
of appropriation.” 677 The change in the relationship between the man and the woman was a loss
of the freedom of the gift. Doubt is cast on the disinterested gift of self. Doubt is cast on the
ability to receive the other as a gift. The pope says: “Concupiscence as such is not able to
promote union as a communion of persons.” 678 The presence of concupiscence casts doubt on
the mutual self-gift. The change in the relationship with original sin, in the pope’s words, is
described by the experience of the human person “as male or female—before then it was rather
male and female.” 679 He describes this change as introducing an insatiability into the
relationship between the man and the woman, introducing a “failure to satisfy the aspiration” to
establish a full communion of persons. 680 The man and woman are still in a relationship, but can
never cross back over the threshold into the original experience without shame. They can never
satisfy the desire to return to the original situation.
With original sin, the recognition and acceptance of the spousal meaning of the body was
also changed. Rather than conjugal union being an expression of a disinterested mutual self-gift,
it becomes something other. The pope describes concupiscence “as a limitation, violation, or
complete deformation of the spousal meaning of the body.” 681 This change is revealed in the
shift in meaning of the other person as “mine,” the shift away from the original meaning of the
other as “my flesh and bone” (cf. Gen. 2:23). Instead of the communio personarum of the
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original situation, where there is a “reciprocal belonging of persons…the reciprocity of
giving…the equilibrium of the gift,” 682 with original sin the other person becomes “a material
object-thing.” 683 John Paul II further says: “Concupiscence…attacks precisely this ‘sincere gift’:
it deprives man…of the dignity of the gift…and in some sense ‘depersonalizes’ man, making him
an object ‘for the other.’” 684 One effect of concupiscence is that the human person has
“difficulty in identifying oneself with one’s own body, not only in the sphere of one’s own
subjectivity, but even more so in regard to the subjectivity of the other human being, of woman
for man and man for woman.” 685 This relationship of possession makes the other an object of
use. The pope describes the effect of a relationship of possession saying: “the object I possess
gains a certain significance for me inasmuch as it is at my disposal and I put it to my service, I
use it.” 686 The change in the meaning of the body is that the body is treated separately from the
person, with regard to the self and the other.
The man and the woman covering themselves with loincloths (cf. Gen. 3:7) indicates that
the body becomes the means by which one uses the other, instead of being part of the expression
of the communion of persons. 687 They hide what had been the basis of their communion. The
presence of shame in the relationship between the man and the woman marks the entrance of a
fear of being used by the other in their relationship. The covering-up reveals the self-recognition
of the value of one’s own being, one’s own dignity, one’s own need for affirmation and
acceptance. Concerning this value of the human person, John Paul II says: “Shame has a twofold
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meaning: it indicates the threat to the value and at the same time it preserves this value.” 688 The
pope expounds on the positive role of shame. He says that “through shame, man and woman
almost remain in the state of original innocence. In fact, they continually become conscious of
the spousal meaning of the body and intend to protect it, so to speak, from concupiscence.” 689
Shame thus corresponds to the effects of sin and concupiscence, opening avenues to establishing
a disinterested mutual gift of self. Shame ensures that the mutual self-donation is disinterested.
Because of shame, the relationship of possession does not totally replace the original communio
personarum. The pope says: “The spousal meaning of the body has not become totally foreign
to that heart: it has not been totally suffocated in it by concupiscence, but only habitually
threatened. The ‘heart’ has become a battlefield between love and concupiscence.” 690 An
authentic communio personarum remains possible.

2. Fulfillment of Commandment
Complementing the above anthropological statements, John Paul II turns to some ethical
considerations based on Matt. 5:27-28.
Christ is revising how to fulfill an Old Testament command. 691 So John Paul II examines
biblical evidence of how the commandment against adultery would have been heard by the
original audience of the Sermon on the Mount, who the pope describes as those who were
“educated in the tradition of the Old Testament, that is, in the tradition of the legislative texts, as
well as Prophetic and Wisdom literature.” 692 As is revealed by the conversation with the
Pharisees concerning divorce (cf. Matt. 19:3-9), the heritage of the Old Testament is colored by
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living the hardness of the heart. The pope says: “‘The hardness of heart’ indicates that which,
according to the ethos of the people of the Old Testament, had given rise to the situation
contrary to the original design…according to Genesis 2:24.” 693
In the example of the biblical Patriarchs, John Paul II points out that conjugal union with
another man’s wife is considered adultery. In the same context, however, polygamy is not
considered adultery. Adultery can only be committed with a married woman, who is not one’s
own wife. John Paul II explains: “The whole tradition of the Old Covenant indicates that the
effective necessity of monogamy as an essential and indispensable implication of the
commandment ‘You shall not commit adultery’ never reached the consciousness and ethos of the
later generations of the Chosen People.” 694
In the books of the Prophets, John Paul II sees a morality that is closer to Christ’s
command. As the prophets align idolatry and adultery in terms of Israel’s relationship with God,
there an analogy in human interpersonal relationships and an intended exclusivity in
monogamy. 695 But the pope also points out that this analogy does not get a legal status, saying,
“In the texts of the prophets, the background of effective and legalized polygamy does not
change the ethical meaning of adultery.” 696 The Law does not prohibit polygamy. Moreover,
the Law is focused on procreation. The pope says, “Taken in its entirety, the marriage law of the
Old Testament places the procreative end of marriage in the foreground.” 697 The prophets,
through analogy, reveal a sense of adultery that is a violation of a personal covenant between the
man and the woman. 698
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In the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament (e.g. Proverbs, Sirach, Ecclesiastes), John
Paul II identifies moral perspectives that also come close to Christ’s command. They present a
moral psychology, an evaluation of desire. 699 The pope says: “The authors of these books use
their knowledge of human interiority to teach morals within the limits of the ethos that prevailed
in their historical period.” 700 The pope says that the Wisdom literature reveals that desire,
“springing from carnal concupiscence, suffocates the deepest voice of conscience in the
‘heart’…the man whose will is occupied with satisfying the senses does not find rest nor does he
find himself.” 701 Even here, since it is largely pedagogical, it does not become a moral norm. 702
Christ fulfills the Law. The Old Testament Law is not equal to the original beginning.
The new ethos of the Gospel fulfills the Law. The pope references Matt. 5:20, where Christ says
that he wants justice that exceeds that of the scribes and Pharisees. 703 On the mountain as the
new lawgiver (cf. Matt. 5:1), Christ gives a new commandment. The Sixth and Ninth
Commandments focus the moral norms on actions with one who is not one’s wife, e.g. Ex.
20:14, “You shall not commit adultery” and Ex. 20:17, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s
wife.” In the case of adultery, John Paul II notes that the law is fulfilled by adhering to the
commandment literally (e.g. not committing adultery) and by “fulfilling the justice that should
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‘superabound’ in man himself, that is, that should reach its specific fullness in him.” 704 The new
commandment of Matt. 5:28 (“But I say to you, everyone who looks at a woman with lust has
already committed adultery with her in his heart.”) shifts the moral focus to a look with desire.
The pope says that Christ stops at the threshold of the look. Christ points to desire as an action
that “has not yet transformed itself into an external act, it has not yet become an ‘act of the
body’; it is still an interior act of the heart: it expresses itself in the look.” 705
Adultery in the heart is committed by looking with desire at a woman who is not one’s
wife. A look of desire is a reduction of the full meaning of the other, a negation of the spousal
meaning of the body. 706 It reduces sexual attraction to a desire to use the other. Looking with
desire is a moral choice, an intentional choice to make the other an object. 707 Such a choice,
constrained by the sexual urge, results in a loss of the freedom of the gift. 708
The fulfillment of the Law, the abounding of the Law, that Christ teaches in Matt. 5:2728 is that adultery in the heart can be committed against any woman, even one’s own wife. The
pope says that adultery in the heart “is not committed only because the man ‘looks’ in this way at
[to desire] a woman who is not his wife, but precisely because he looks in this way at a woman.
Even if he were to look in this way at the woman who is his wife, he would commit the same
adultery ‘in the heart.’” 709 A look with desire can be committed by a man or a woman. 710
Since the moral norms concerning adultery involving bodily action do not apply in the
case of a married couple, the moral norm of Matt. 5:27-28 illustrate that the violation or the
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fulfillment of the new law is primarily a question of the heart. The pope says that this study
“makes us, at one and the same time, enter into the depth of the norm itself and descend into the
interior of man, the subject of morality.” 711

3. The Human Heart
The new norm of Christ concerning adultery in the heart points to purity of heart (cf.
Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the clean of heart, for they will see God”) as a basis for a communion of
persons. 712 The reality of concupiscence creates a conflict between desire and communion, in
the heart of the human person. John Paul II examines some perspectives that purport to resolve
that internal conflict. Through his evaluation of these perspective, the pope is answering the
question if the human heart is defined by desire or by communion.
One answer is Manichaeism. This answer is advanced by the original and later
perspectives that view the human body and the conjugal act as bad, as a source of evil. 713 To this
answer John Paul II responds that the body is good, and, in the case of adultery in the heart, the
body is a value that is underappreciated. The pope says: “‘Adultery committed in the heart’ can
and should be understood as a ‘devaluation’ or impoverishment of an authentic value, as an
intentional privation of that dignity to which the integral value…[of the other] corresponds.” 714
The body is not a source of evil, but is a value to be appreciated. The human heart is called to
not yield to concupiscence, but to recognize the spousal meaning of the body. 715
Another answer to the question of internal conflict comes from modern psychology. John
Paul II accepts a name applied to these psychologists (e.g. Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche) as the
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“masters of suspicion.” 716 This perspective corresponds to the threefold concupiscence, and
defines the human person by one or more of the expressions of concupiscence named in 1 John
2:16 (“the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life”). 717
John Paul II says that Nietzsche’s perspective corresponds to the pride of life, that Marx’s
perspective corresponds to the concupiscence of the eyes, and that Freud’s perspective
corresponds to the concupiscence of the flesh. 718
To the answer given by the masters of suspicion, John Paul II responds that this
perspective is an inadequate anthropology. He says: “Man cannot stop at casting the heart into a
state of continual and irreversible suspicion due to the manifestations of the concupiscence of the
flesh.” 719 Instead, the pope says, “Man must feel himself called to rediscover, or even better, to
realize, the spousal meaning of the body and to express in this way the interior freedom of the
gift, that is, the freedom of that spiritual state and power that derive from mastery over the
concupiscence of the flesh.” 720
Another answer to the question of internal conflict comes from the philosophical
language of eros. Primarily the language of eros is used to describe the sexual attraction of the
man and the woman, one to the other. 721 Eros can correspond to the biblical ethics of Matt. 5:2728, if, in the words of the pope, eros “implies the upward impulse of the human spirit toward
what is true, good, and beautiful, so that what is ‘erotic’ also becomes true, good, and
beautiful.” 722 Moreover, concerning the sexual attraction that spontaneously manifests itself, the
pope says: “the inner man is called by Christ to reach a more mature and complete evaluation
TOB 46:1. In this passage, John Paul II attributes Ricoeur with coining the title for these thinkers.
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that allows him to distinguish and judge the various movements of his own heart.” 723 Eros
would remain on the level of concupiscence, without an elevation of sexual attraction to the
freedom of the gift.
John Paul II asserts that the words of Matt. 5:27-28 offer a resolution to the internal
conflict in the heart of the human person. The human heart is not just accused by the Gospel, it
is also called. 724 The human person is capable of and is made capable of overcoming desire, of
living the communio personarum. This perspective leads John Paul II to speak of the human
person as living in the “status naturae lapsae simul ac redemptae [the state of fallen and at the
same time redeemed nature].” 725

4. Purity of Heart
The internal conflict of the human person can be resolved through a purity of heart (cf.
Matt. 5:8, “Blessed are the clean of heart”). 726 John Paul II summarizes his presentation on the
purity of heart with these words:
If this “purity of heart” discussed by us is understood according to the thought of St. Paul
as “life according to the Spirit,” then the Pauline context offers us a complete image of
the content of the words Christ spoke in the Sermon on the Mount. These words contain a
truth of an ethical nature, warning us to guard against evil and pointing out the moral
good of human behavior; indeed, they direct the listeners to avoid the evil of
concupiscence and to acquire purity of heart. 727
The pope recognizes in St. Paul the contrast between “life according to the flesh” (cf. Rom. 8:5)
and “life according to the Spirit” (Rom. 8:5, Gal. 5:16) as language that captures the contrast
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between concupiscence in the heart and purity of heart. 728 Purity of heart is realized in a life
according to the Spirit. St. Paul explicitly takes up the theme of purity in 1 Thess. 4. The pope
says: “The purity about which Paul speaks in 1 Thessalonians (see 1 Thess 4:3-5, 7-8) shows
itself in the fact that man ‘knows how to keep his own body with holiness and reverence, not as
the object of lustful passions.’” 729 The pope explains that self-mastery, as abstinence from
lustful passion, is overcoming that which is “born spontaneously [in the human person]…in the
sphere of the senses…[and] in the affective-emotive sphere.” 730 Identifying another significant
term from the passage of 1 Thess. 4, the pope comments on reverence: “from shame is born
‘reverence’ for one’s own body.” 731 Reverence is expressed through temperance and modesty.
The pope says: “Christ shows clearly that the way to attain this goal must be the way of
temperance and of mastery of desires.” 732
Life according to the Spirit involves both the work of the Holy Spirit and the human
spirit, as St. Paul indicates in Gal. 5:16-17 733 and Gal. 5:22-23. 734 John Paul II says: “If mastery
in the sphere of ethos manifests itself as ‘love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity,
faithfulness, gentleness, and self-mastery’—as we read in Galatians—then behind each of
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these…moral virtues, stands a specific choice, that is, an effort of the will, a fruit of the human
spirit permeated by the Spirit of God.” 735 Purity is a human virtue and a divine gift.
The pope further draws on Pauline language to discuss the purity of heart and the life
according to the Spirit. Life according to the Spirit is possible because of the redemption of the
body, cf. Romans 8:23, “We ourselves, who have the firstfruits of the Spirit, we also groan
within ourselves as we wait for adoption, the redemption of our bodies.” 736 The redemption of
the body is what allows the human person to live the ethical requirements of the hermeneutics of
the gift, even after losing original innocence. It allows the human person to experience, as the
pope says, “the gradual victory over this ‘disunion in the body,’” 737 the disunion connected to the
experience of shame. The grace given to the human person, fallen and redeemed, is what makes
the human person able to live the purity of heart. The human person is able to fulfill the
commandment of Matt. 5:27-28 because of Jesus Christ. The pope says: “It is precisely in this
man, in his ‘heart’ and thus in all his behavior, that the redemption of Christ bears fruit, thanks to
the powers of the Spirit that bring about ‘justification,’ that is, that cause justice to ‘abound’ in
man, as the Sermon on the Mount insistently teaches (Mt 5:20), that is, to ‘abound’ in the
measure God himself wills and expects.” 738 He continues, “The fruit of redemption is indeed the
Holy Spirit, who dwells in man and his body as in a temple. In this Gift, which makes every
human being holy, the Christian receives himself anew as a gift from God.” 739 Interwoven,
especially, with insights based on his interpretation of Gen. 2-3, John Paul II articulates his
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conviction that the human person, through the experience of redemption (cf. Rom. 8:23), is
capable of inner freedom. 740

II. Christ Appeals to the Resurrection
John Paul II continues the Theology of the Body by focusing on a third state of the human
person—life in the Resurrection. In the Gospel, Matt. 22:24-30, Christ speaks of this dimension
of the human person, the reunion of body and soul after their separation in death. 741 In his
treatment of the third part of the triptych (the other two passages of the triptych being Matt. 19:38 and Matt. 5:27-28), John Paul II examines both words from Christ in the Gospel and words
from St. Paul, which together reveal insights into both marriage and celibacy.

A. Christ and St. Paul on the Resurrection of the Body
John Paul II employs Matt. 22:24-32 and 1 Cor. 15:42-49 to convey a biblical
understanding of the resurrected body.

1. Divinization
In a dialogue with the Sadducees, they present to Christ a question about a woman who,
upon the death of an older brother to whom she was married, marries a younger brother, thus in

cf. TOB 58:5.
TOB 64:1. In TOB 64:4, John Paul II also notes that the same dialogue is reported in Mark 12:18-27 and in Luke
20:27-40. Matt. 22:24-32 reads: “On that day Sadducees approached him, saying that there is no resurrection. They
put this question to him, saying, ‘Teacher, Moses said, “If a man dies without children, his brother shall marry his
wife and raise up descendants for his brother.” Now there were seven brothers among us. The first married and died
and, having no descendants, left his wife to his brother. The same happened with the second and the third, through
all seven. Finally the woman died. Now at the resurrection, of the seven, whose wife will she be? For they all had
been married to her.’ Jesus said to them in reply, ‘You are misled because you do not know the scriptures or the
power of God. At the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage but are like the angels in heaven.
And concerning the resurrection of the dead, have you not read what was said to you by God, ‘I am the God of
Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob’? He is not the God of the dead but of the living.’”
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consequence marrying seven brothers (cf. Matt. 22:24-28). They present this situation as a
counterexample to a belief in the resurrection of the body. 742 In response, Christ asserts the
reality of the resurrection of the human body (cf. Matt. 22:29-30). He says to the Sadducees that
God is God of the living (cf. Matt. 22:31-32). John Paul II says:
The full meaning of this testimony, to which Jesus appeals in his dialogue with the
Sadducees, could be gathered (still in the light of the Old Testament alone) in the
following way. He who is—he who lives and is Life—constitutes the inexhaustible
fountain of existence and of life…. Although, due to sin, bodily death has become man’s
lot…when the living God enters his covenant with man (Abraham, the patriarchs, Moses,
Israel)…in some way opens up again the access to the tree of Life. 743
God is alive and gives life. By missing this interpretation of the Old Testament covenant, Jesus
says to the Sadducees that they are in error. In the words of John Paul II: “Jesus first shows them
a mistake in their method: they do not know the Scriptures; and then an error of substance: they
do not accept what is revealed by the Scriptures—since they do not know the power of God.” 744
In this dialogue Christ is revealing in what way the body will take on a new meaning in
the resurrection. John Paul II comments on the human person’s relationship with God in the
resurrection as part of this new meaning. Based especially on Luke’s version of the dialogue,
where Christ asserts that the human person will be of God (cf. Luke 20:36, “They can no longer
die, for they are like angels; and they are the children of God because they are the ones who will
rise”), John Paul II comments on the divinization of the human person. In the resurrection, God
will give himself to the human person in a new way. The pope says that this gift will be “God’s
self-communication in his very divinity, not only to the soul, but to the whole of man’s
psychosomatic subjectivity.” 745 In receiving the gift of God himself, the human person will
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respond by one’s one self-donation—living a mutual interpersonal exchange of the human
person with God. 746

2. Spiritualization
John Paul II adds to his theological anthropology of the human person in the
eschatological state with comments on this new state of the human person. In this new state, the
internal conflict of concupiscence will be definitively resolved in a spiritualization of the human
person. The pope says: “‘Spiritualization’ signifies not only that the spirit will master the body,
but…that it will also fully permeate the body and the powers of the spirit will permeate the
energies of the body.” 747 The pope further explains spiritualization: “The resurrection…will
consist in the perfect realization of what is personal in man.” 748 The inner disunion experienced
by the human person will be perfectly overcome, achieving perfect self-possession and selfdonation. John Paul II further notes that, in the resurrection of the body, the body retains its
original psychosomatic character, its masculinity or femininity, albeit with a new meaning. The
pope says: “The words ‘take neither wife nor husband’ seem to affirm, at one and the same time,
that human bodies, which are recovered and also renewed in the resurrection, will preserve their
specific masculine or feminine character and that the meaning of being male or female in the
body will be constituted and understood differently.” 749 In the resurrection, there is a new
meaning to the spousal meaning of the body.
Given the centrality of marriage for the Theology of the Body and for the human person in
the historical state, John Paul II emphasizes its relative state, with regard to the resurrection. He
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says, “marriage…belongs exclusively ‘to this world.’ Marriage and procreation do not constitute
man’s eschatological future.” 750 But, again, the spousal meaning of the body is retained in the
resurrection. The pope says, “It is thus evident that the meaning of being…male or female in the
‘future world’ should be sought outside of marriage and procreation, but there is no reason to
seek it outside of that which…derives from the very mystery of creation.” 751 The mystery of
creation reveals that the human person is created to be in a communio personarum. In the
resurrection, through the perfect spiritualization and divinization of all human persons, a
communion of persons is established between every human person. John Paul II says that we
should think of the resurrection “in the categories of the rediscovery of a new, perfect
subjectivity of each person and at the same time of the rediscovery of a new, perfect
intersubjectivity of all. In this way this reality means the true and definitive fulfillment of the
‘spousal’ meaning of the body.” 752 With regard to interpersonal human relationships in the
resurrection, in this state will be the full realization of the communio personarum, with each
person able to make a mutual, total, and disinterested gift of self to the other. 753
The above analyses take into account Christ’s response to the Sadducees in terms of its
meaning at the time of its delivery—before Christ’s own Resurrection, and in the terms of his
adversaries who denied a resurrection. In 1 Cor. 15:42-49, John Paul II finds a passage that
articulates a biblical understanding of the state of the human person in the resurrection in light of
Christ’s own resurrection. 754 This passage from St. Paul adds a perspective that is not found in
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Matt. 22:24-30. St. Paul writes after Christ’s own resurrection. John Paul II says that Christ’s
resurrection “is the answer by the God of life to the historical inevitability of death.” 755 1 Cor.
15:42-49 asserts the continuity of the human person in the three states that John Paul II has
described. The pope says:
The humanity of the “first Adam,” the “man of earth,” carries within itself…a particular
potentiality (which is capacity and readiness) for receiving all that the “second Adam”
became, the heavenly Man, namely Christ…. It is the same humanity, which…is
“perishable”—since it is fleshly—while being burdened with the heritage of sin, and yet
carries in itself at the same time the potentiality of “incorruptibility.” 756
The potentiality of the human person to experience the resurrected body is realized in Christ.
The pope says concerning St. Paul’s treatment of the resurrected body: “in his authentic
bodiliness, ‘spiritual body’ should signify precisely the perfect sensitivity of the senses, their
perfect harmonization with the activity of the human spirit in truth and freedom. The ‘natural
body’…by contrast indicates sensuality as a force that often undermines man inasmuch as…he is
often urged…toward evil.” 757 In this way, the basic content of St. Paul’s treatment of the state of
the human person is the same as the content articulated from the dialogue with the Sadducees.
John Paul II, however, sees in 1 Cor. 15:42-49 a more explicit description of the psychosomatic
constitution of the human person in the state of the resurrection. 758 The detail supplied in this
passage from St. Paul takes into account the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit for a
theological anthropology concerning the resurrection of the body.
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2. Christ and St. Paul on Celibacy
John Paul II employs Matt. 19:11-12 and 1 Cor. 7 to describe a biblical understanding of
celibacy

a. Celibacy as Union with God
Connected to Christ’s words on marriage (cf. Matt. 19:3-9) and on the resurrection (Matt.
22:24-30) is Christ’s statement in Matt. 19:11-12, concerning celibacy. The text reads:
Not all can accept [this] word, but only those to whom that is granted. Some are
incapable of marriage because they were born so; some, because they were made so by
others; some, because they have renounced marriage for the sake of the kingdom of
heaven. Whoever can accept this ought to accept it (Matt. 19:11-12).
The passage of Matt. 19:11-12 speaks about three kinds of eunuchs: two are based on
physical defect and one is based on choice. 759 John Paul II notes that the consideration of
celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven was an option that is foreign to the Old
Testament and Covenant, which recognized marriage as “a religiously privileged state.” 760
Thus, the primary reference point for the disciples to understand celibacy for the sake of the
kingdom of heaven would have been Christ’s own example. 761
John Paul II further articulates an understanding of celibacy as a choice made in light of
the future reality of the resurrection. He says: “Continence ‘for’ the kingdom of heaven is
certainly related to the revelation of the fact that ‘in’ the kingdom of heaven ‘they take neither
wife nor husband’ (Mt 22:30). It is a charismatic sign. … This way of existing as a human being
(male and female) points out the eschatological ‘virginity’ of the risen man.” 762 Moreover, the
pope says, “The one who consciously chooses such continence chooses in some sense a
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particular participation in the mystery of the redemption (of the body).” 763 One who chooses
celibacy chooses it as a way of anticipating the state of the human person in the resurrection.
Such a choice means a renunciation of marriage and procreation. The renunciation of marriage
is not a commandment by Christ to be followed by all. 764 John Paul II notes that the choice of
celibacy involves sacrifice. For those who make the voluntary choice of celibacy for the
kingdom of heaven, it involves “spiritual effort” 765 and travail. The pope says that Christ “does
not even attempt to hide the travail that such a decision and its long-lasting consequences can
have for man, for the normal (and also noble) inclinations of his nature.” 766 Moreover, this
vocation is born from human choice and divine grace. 767 John Paul II says:
continence “for the kingdom of heaven,” the choice of virginity or celibacy for one’s
whole life, has become in the experience of the disciples and followers of Christ the act
of a particular response to the love of the Divine Bridegroom, and therefore acquired the
meaning of an act of spousal love, that is, of a spousal gif of self with the end of
answering in a particular way the Redeemer’s spousal love; a gift of self understood as a
renunciation, but realized above all out of love. 768
In love, Christ gives himself to the man or woman who chooses celibacy, and that same person
responds in love to Christ. Celibacy is only lived out by communion with the divine Persons,
which is the gift and grace needed to make the choice.
Understanding celibacy for the sake of the kingdom of heaven deepens the understanding
of the spousal meaning of the body. On one hand, the spousal meaning of the body is understood
as the human person called to a communio personarum of male and female, which is a union of
one flesh and is open to procreation. 769 And, this spousal meaning is fully lived by a free gift of
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self. On the other hand, the full freedom of the gift of self can be lived without creating an
exclusive communio personarum of male and female. The gift of self in celibacy does not
include marriage and procreation. Both marriage and celibacy are based on freedom. Both are
based on, as the pope says, “subordinating the sinfulness of his own humanity to the powers that
flow from the mystery of the redemption of the body.” 770 John Paul II notes that understanding
the human person as not distinct from the rest of creation, as having a sexual instinct exactly like
the animals, obscures the spousal meaning of the body. He says, “the application of the concept
of ‘sexual instinct’ to man—given the dual nature in which he exists as male and female—
nevertheless greatly limits and in some sense ‘diminishes’ what the same masculinity-femininity
is in the personal dimension of human subjectivity.” 771 The spousal meaning of the body leads a
person to give oneself in freedom—either in marriage or in celibacy. Self-possession allows the
person to give themselves in marriage or not. In the case of celibacy, as a free choice (assisted
by grace), the person does not give themselves in marriage, but still gives themselves fully, thus
living the spousal meaning of the body. 772 Holding these divergent expressions of self-donation
in tension, succinctly, John Paul II says: “this body possesses a full ‘spousal’ meaning.” 773 And
celibacy bears spiritual fruit. The pope says: “Only little by little did it consciously take root that
for ‘the kingdom of heaven’ a special significance attaches to man’s spiritual and supernatural
fruitfulness—which comes from the Holy Spirit…and which…is served precisely by
continence.” 774
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In 1 Cor. 7, St. Paul speaks about celibacy. John Paul II points to this chapter as further
articulation of the understanding of marriage and celibacy, as offering an answer to “a question
that troubled the minds of the first generation of the confessors of Christ.” 775
As with Christ’s words about that unfamiliar state of life, here St. Paul asserts that
virginity is a counsel, not a commandment, 776 and is the result of a free choice. 777 Although St.
Paul does speak of marriage as having difficulties, 778 he does not disvalue marriage in relation to
celibacy. Instead, he focuses on the value of celibacy. St. Paul says, “I should like you to be
free of anxieties. An unmarried man is anxious about the things of the Lord, how he may please
the Lord” (1 Cor. 7:32). The concern of the unmarried person is the kingdom of Jesus Christ,
and all that contributes to its growth. 779 The unmarried person is concerned with their
relationship with Jesus Christ. 780 The pope says that the unmarried person is “characterized by
an inner integration, by a unification that would allow him to devote himself completely to the
service of the kingdom of God.” 781 The person who devotes themselves to “pleasing the Lord,”
as a synonym of “love,” is able to love God undistractedly. The pope says: “The spousal
character of ‘continence for the kingdom of God’ becomes in some way apparent here. Man
always tries to please the person he loves.” 782 As with Christ’s words on celibacy, St. Paul is
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describing celibacy as a relationship with God in which the person is living the spousal meaning
of the body.

b. Marriage and Celibacy
John Paul II further comments on the relationship between marriage and celibacy. At its
root, celibacy is an affirmation of marriage. John Paul II says that celibacy for the sake of the
kingdom of heaven is “a particular form of affirmation of the value from which the unmarried
person consistently abstains by following the evangelical counsel.” 783 A celibate renounces
marriage for the kingdom of heaven—for a different value—not because of a disvaluing of the
good of marriage and procreation. Moreover, the pope says, “these two fundamental situations,
or…‘states,’ in some sense explain or complete each other with respect to the existence and
(Christian) life of this community, which as a whole and in all its members is realized in the
dimension of the kingdom of God and has an eschatological orientation proper to that
kingdom.” 784 In the Christian community, celibacy and marriage help the individuals living
whichever state to understand and live a communion of persons 785 and the fruitfulness of
parenthood. 786
John Paul II also notes that 1 Cor. 7 shows the deep connection and complementarity of
marriage and celibacy. Like with celibacy, marriage is blessed by God. St. Paul indicates in 1
Cor. 7:7 that those who are married receive grace from God, when he says, “But each has his
own gift from God.” 787 John Paul II says: “The gift received by persons who live in marriage is
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different from the one received by persons who live in virginity…nevertheless it is a true ‘gift
from God.’” 788 The gift given to both counters concupiscence. The pope says: “In fact, in one
as well as the other…vocation—the ‘gift’ is at work that each one receives from God, that is,
grace, which brings it about that the body is ‘a temple of the Holy Spirit’ and remains such in
virginity (continence) as well as in marriage.” 789 John Paul II asserts that marriage and celibacy
“provide a full answer to one of man’s underlying questions: namely, the question about the
meaning of ‘being a body,’ that is, the meaning of masculinity and femininity.” 790 The
connection and complementarity of marriage and celibacy is found in the inner life of the human
person.

III. Synthesis of the Triptych
John Paul II summarizes his theological anthropology in light of the “redemption of the
body” (cf. Rom. 8:23):
In his everyday life, man must draw from the mystery of the redemption of the body the
inspiration and strength to overcome the evil that is dormant in him in the form of the
threefold concupiscence. Man and woman, bound in marriage, must daily undertake the
task of the indissoluble union of the covenant they made with each other. In addition,
men and women who have voluntarily chosen continence for the kingdom of heaven
must give a daily living witness of faithfulness to such a choice, listening to Christ’s
directives in the Gospel and those of the Apostle Paul in 1 Corinthians. In any case, what
is at stake is the hope of the everyday, which in the measure of normal tasks and
difficulties of human life helps to overcome “evil with good” (Rom 12:21). In fact, “in
hope we have been saved”: the hope of everyday shows its power in human works and
even in the very movements of the human heart, clearing a path in some sense for the
great eschatological hope tied to the redemption of the body. 791
In fact, the text of this entire Audience (TOB 86:1-8) offers a summary of the triptych of the
words of Christ that he treated in the Theology of the Body.
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One of the expressed purposes of the Catecheses is to establish an adequate anthropology.
At this point, the contours of John Paul II’s theological anthropology are clear. They are these:
In terms of the biblical beginning, the human person, including as a communion of persons of
man and woman, is in the image of God. In terms of Vatican II, Christ reveals the human person
to itself (Gaudium et Spes 22), the human person who is called to establish a communion of
persons through a disinterested self-donation (Gaudium et Spes 24). And, especially in light of
the virginal reality of the resurrection, the human person should not be thought of simply in
terms of marriage and procreation. In light of redemption and resurrection, the inner activity,
and inner struggle, of the human person is where Christ’s victory over sin and death is
experienced.
In his interpretation of the triptych of the words of Christ (i.e., Matt. 19:3-8, Matt. 5:2728, Matt. 22:24-30), John Paul II articulates his key anthropological and moral insights. The
human person is created for communion (cf. Gen. 1-2), and, while struggling with concupiscence
(cf. Gen. 3), is also capable of living a mutual exchange of the gift of self with the help of God’s
grace (cf. Rom. 8:23).
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Chapter 7
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: The Sacrament of Marriage
John Paul II’s theological anthropology is rooted in biblical revelation and Magisterial
teaching (e.g. Gaudium et Spes). His application of this theological anthropology to a theology
of marriage is likewise based on biblical revelation and Magisterial teaching, specifically Paul
VI’s Letter, Humanae Vitae.
In this chapter, I present John Paul II’s analysis of Eph.5:21-33 and Humanae Vitae as
they pertain to a theology of marriage and to marriage ethics.

I. The Sacrament
For John Paul II, his previous analyses in the Catecheses lead him to an evaluation of
Christian marriage. And the Catholic teaching of marriage as a sacrament, thus, leads him to
unite theological anthropology and sacramental theology. John Paul II identifies two main
aspects of the sacrament of marriage: the dimension of grace and the dimension of sign.
To complete his evaluation of the sacrament of marriage, rooted in an interpretation of
Eph. 5, John Paul II also identifies some other Scriptural passages that help to reveal the
Church’s teaching of marriage as a sacrament, namely Tobit and Song of Songs.

A. Ephesians 5 and the Dimension of Grace
At the nexus of both theological anthropology and sacramental theology of marriage,
John Paul II identifies the passage from Eph. 5:21-33. 792 The text reads:

In a Footnote of TOB 87:3, John Paul II recognizes the debate about Pauline authorship of Ephesians. He was
careful to say “Ephesians” and not “Paul.” Nevertheless, John Paul II will refer to the letter as “Pauline,” at times,
recognizing its place in the Pauline corpus.
792
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Be subordinate to one another out of reverence for Christ. Wives should be subordinate to
their husbands as to the Lord. For the husband is head of his wife just as Christ is head of
the church, he himself the savior of the body. As the church is subordinate to Christ, so
wives should be subordinate to their husbands in everything. Husbands, love your wives,
even as Christ loved the church and handed himself over for her to sanctify her, cleansing
her by the bath of water with the word, that he might present to himself the church in
splendor, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that she might be holy and without
blemish. So [also] husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves
his wife loves himself. For no one hates his own flesh but rather nourishes and cherishes
it, even as Christ does the church, because we are members of his body. ‘For this reason a
man shall leave [his] father and [his] mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall
become one flesh.’ This is a great mystery, but I speak in reference to Christ and the
church. In any case, each one of you should love his wife as himself, and the wife should
respect her husband (Eph. 5:21-33).
This passage from Eph. 5, throughout, connects the mystery of Christ to the union of husband
and wife in marriage. 793 As commentary on the context of this passage within the Letter as a
whole, John Paul II writes, “the essential content of this ‘classical’ text appears at the
intersection of the two main guiding lines of the whole letter to the Ephesians: the first is the
mystery of Christ…; the second is the Christian vocation as the model of life of baptized persons
and particular communities,” e.g. the family. 794 At this intersection, John Paul II asserts that
Eph. 5:21-33 “focuses…on the spouses and on marriage, while points regarding the family in
the wider sense are found nearby.” 795
John Paul II takes up the mystery of Christ, the analogy of Christ’s love, as it is expressed
throughout Eph. 5:21-33. This passage from Ephesians speaks of Christ’s love in two ways: as
Head (cf. Eph. 5:23) 796 and as Bridegroom (cf. Eph. 5:22-25). 797 On one hand, as Head, Christ’s
love does not find an imitation in what marriage should be. As Creator, as superior to the Body,
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this is a relationship that is one-sided. 798 As Creator, John Paul II says, “The first dimension of
love and election, as a mystery hidden from ages in God, is a fatherly dimension and not a
‘conjugal’ one.” 799 The unsolicited grace of God is captured by the analogy of Christ as the
Head. Despite cultural (historical and contemporary) expressions of marriage, where a
submission of the wife to the husband can be expressed in a one-sided manner, Ephesians says
that the relationship between husband and wife should be otherwise. Ephesians says that
Christian marriage is characterized by mutual submission (“Be subordinate to one another out of
reverence for Christ” Eph. 5:21). John Paul II, commenting on the words, “Husbands, love your
wives” (Eph. 5:25), says: “Love excludes every kind of submission by which the wife would
become a servant or slave of the husband, an object of one-sided submission. Love makes the
husband simultaneously subject to the wife.” 800 The pope continues, “Reciprocal submission ‘in
the fear of Christ’…always forms the deep and firm supporting structure of the community of the
spouses.” 801
On one hand, the analogy of Christ as the Head-Creator does not find imitation in
marriage. On the other hand, Christ as the Head is a somatic analogy: in a human person the
head and body are one. John Paul II says: “If the author of Ephesians sees the analogy of the
union of the head with its body also in marriage, this analogy…regards above all marriage itself
as that union through which ‘the two will form one flesh’ (Eph 5:31; cf. Gen 2:24).” 802 Even
though the head and the body can be considered separately, the analogy in Ephesians points to

cf. TOB 90:5.
TOB 95:5.
800
TOB 89:4.
801
TOB 89:6.
802
TOB 91:3.
798
799

189

the somatic unity of the human person, head and body. The husband and wife, though distinct
human persons, form a somatic union, one flesh in marriage. 803
There is a continuity between the ancient Covenant of God and humanity (the work of
creation) and the new covenant of Christ and the Church (the work of redemption). The pope
says, “This continuity of God’s salvific initiative constitutes the essential basis of the great
analogy contained in Ephesians.” 804 The grace of God is given in both creation and redemption.
Eph. 5:21-33 speaks of the saving gift of Christ in specifically spousal terms. The analogy of
Christ’s love as Bridegroom is spousal. Through his interpretation of this Eph. 5:21-33, the pope
says that Christ’s “saving love, which consists in his gift of self for the Church, is a spousal love
by which he marries the Church and makes her his own Body.” 805 In this dimension, the
dimension of grace, the mystery of Christ is the grace given to the husband and the wife—which
brings about the redemption of their bodies, the grace needed to overcome concupiscence. The
pope says: “Redemption means, in fact, a ‘new creation,’ as it were, it means taking up all that is
created to express in creation the fullness of justice, equity, and holiness planned for it by God
and to express that fullness above all in man, created male and female ‘in the image of God.’” 806
In imitation of Christ, the husband and wife should give themselves to each other in the freedom
of the gift. 807 In the sacrament of marriage, the husband and the wife receive the grace of the
mystery of Christ.
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B. The Dimension of Sign
John Paul II cites the traditional understanding of the sacraments as “signs instituted by
Christ and administered in the Church, which express and confer divine grace on the person who
receives [them].” 808 Marriage is a sacrament of the Church. The pope says: “In his dialogue
with the Pharisees (see Mt 19), Christ not only confirms the existence of marriage instituted from
the beginning by the Creator, but he declares also that it is an integral part of the new
sacramental economy.” 809
In the dimension of sign, a sacrament makes visible the grace of God. In understanding
marriage as a sacrament, the dimension of sign must be added to the dimension of grace.

1. Ephesians 5 and the Dimension of Sign
Eph. 5:21-33 acknowledges the sacraments of the Church: namely, Baptism 810 and
Eucharist. 811 Ephesians speaks of these sacraments as sacraments, even if in an undeveloped
way. John Paul II does not see Eph. 5:21-33, especially Eph. 5:32 (“This is a great mystery”), as
a simple affirmation that marriage is a sacrament.
Ephesians speaks of marriage in terms of a “great mystery” (cf. Eph. 5:32), in terms of
the mystery of Christ’s love. John Paul II comments on understanding marriage as a sacrament
in light of the great mystery. On one hand, Ephesians does not speak of marriage as a sacrament.
The pope says: “‘Sacrament’ is not synonymous with ‘mystery.’ … The sacrament consists in
‘manifesting’ that mystery in a sign.” 812 By calling it a mystery, Ephesians is speaking of
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marriage in broader terms that strictly as a sacrament of the Church. On the other hand,
Ephesians, in the words of the pope, “confirms and deeply explains the sacramentality of
marriage.” 813 Marriage is a sign of God, who is Creator, and of Jesus Christ, who is Redeemer.
John Paul II says:
the Mystery hidden from all eternity in God—a mystery that in the beginning in the
sacrament of creation became a visible reality through the union of the first man and the
first woman in the perspective of marriage—becomes in the sacrament of redemption a
visible reality in the indissoluble union of Christ with the Church…as the spousal union
of the two, husband and wife. 814
Marriage is a sign of the “great mystery,” that is, a sign of a two-fold sense of mystery: creation
and redemption.
Based on Eph. 5:21-33, John Paul II speaks of marriage as both the sacrament of
creation—which he interchangeably calls the primordial sacrament—and the sacrament of
redemption. He says: “On the basis of the sacrament of creation one must understand the
original sacramentality of marriage (the primordial sacrament). In a further step, on the basis of
the sacrament of redemption, one can understand the sacramentality of [marriage as]…a real
renewal…of what constituted the salvific content…of the primordial sacrament.” 815 The pope
continues, the sacrament of marriage “is presupposed as the sacrament of the human ‘beginning,’
united with the mystery of creation. It is rediscovered, by contrast, as the fruit of the spousal love
of Christ and the Church, linked with the mystery of redemption.” 816 The theological
anthropology of the human person before original sin is inferred in the concept of the primordial
sacrament. Even though the experience or original innocence is lost, the sacrament of marriage
is still able to be a sign of it, especially with the grace of the mystery of redemption. Marriage as
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a great mystery is that it is a sign of all that was contained in the original situation, and at the
same time, is a sign of Christ’s love for the Church. Eph. 5:21-33 both acknowledges marriage
as a sacrament of the church, and as something other. The pope says, “we have to conclude that
all the sacraments of the New Covenant find their prototype in some way in marriage as the
primordial sacrament.” 817 Eph. 5:21-33 presents marriage as a sacrament of redemption, over
and above Baptism and Eucharist. Ephesians speaks of Baptism and the Eucharist as acquiring
their efficacy because of the great mystery of Christ’s redemptive, spousal love, but it does not
speak of either as a great mystery. 818 In a special way, marriage manifests the grace of the New
Covenant.
With this perspective of the dimension of sign, John Paul II is able to more fully
articulate the dimension of grace in the sacrament of marriage. He says:
As a sacramental expression of that saving power, marriage is also an exhortation to
gain mastery over concupiscence (as Christ speaks about in the Sermon on the Mount). A
fruit of this mastery is the unity and indissolubility of marriage and, in addition, the
deepened sense of the woman’s dignity in the man’s heart (as also the man’s dignity in
the woman’s heart), in conjugal life together and in every other sphere of reciprocal
relations. 819
Further commenting on the grace of the sacrament of marriage, the pope says: “Through
marriage as a sacrament (as one of the sacraments of the Church), both of these dimensions of
love, the spousal and the redemptive, penetrate together with the grace of the sacrament into the
life of the spouses. The spousal meaning of the body in its masculinity and femininity…is
united…with the redemptive meaning.” 820 Especially in the bodily union of the husband and the
wife, the communion of persons in freedom, marriage is a sign of the “great mystery” (Eph.
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5:32) is an efficacious sign of the grace of redemption. 821 And the language of the liturgy is
modeled on the words of Ephesians. 822

2. The Language of the Body
As a sacrament of the Church, the beginning of marriage follows a ritual. John Paul II
comments on this ritual. At the heart of the ritual is the exchange of vows. 823 The words of the
vows express the total commitment of the husband and wife to each other. The pope says that
the vows are “an intentional expression on the level of intellect and will, of consciousness and
the heart.” 824 These words are an expression that points both to the covenant of the life-long
union of the spouses and of humanity’s covenant with God in Christ. 825 In terms of traditional
sacramental theology, every sacrament has matter and form. In the case of marriage, the form is
the exchange of vows. The matter of the sacrament of marriage is the husband and wife
themselves. The matter is the bodies of the husband and wife. 826 The bodies of the husband and
wife are taken up into the dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage. The words of the
vows assert the commitment of the mutual total gift of self. The words of the vows have a bodily
expression, consummation, where the husband and wife become one flesh (cf. Gen. 2:24). In
consummation, the body speaks the language of the vows. The husband and wife not only
embody the vows in consummation, at the beginning of marriage. Throughout their married,
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conjugal life they minister the sacrament of marriage until death. 827 The vows in the liturgical
ritual, and then the consummation of the vows, also point to a possible future procreation. 828
The language of the exchange of vows demands that the bodies of the husband and wife
speak the same words. The words of love require bodily expression. 829 Conjugal union, as an
embodiment of the vows spoken in freedom, takes on the dimension of sign in the sacrament of
marriage—a sign of the grace of the sacrament. 830 But, bodily actions, as external actions, are
ambiguous. Borrowing from the tradition of the prophets, 831 the pope says that the body speaks
“with the mysterious language of the personal gift…both in the language of faithfulness, that is,
of love, and in the language of conjugal unfaithfulness, that is, of ‘adultery.’” 832 The pope adds,
“the body tells the truth through faithfulness and conjugal love, and, when it commits ‘adultery’
it tells a lie, it commits falsehood.” 833 The body expresses the person, so the intentions of the
husband and wife are embodied in their individual actions.
The words of the spouses in the exchange of vows are a sign that points to a total, mutual
self-donation. The pope says that the body speaks a language that it is not the author: there are
human authors in the spouses, 834 and God is the divine author. 835 Conjugal union is a sign that
points to a meaning that has been defined from Genesis (cf. Gen. 2:24). The one and the same
action of conjugal union can speak a language—can tell a truth or a lie—depending on a human
author’s intention. John Paul II explains:
If the human being—male and female—in marriage (and indirectly also in all spheres of
mutual life together) gives to his behavior a meaning in conformity with the fundamental
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truth of the language of the body, then he too ‘is in the truth.’ In the opposite case, he
commits lies and falsifies the language of the body. 836
The ambiguity of the language of the body is that the one and the same action can be an
expression of truth and freedom or of a falsity and concupiscence.
Concupiscence does not determine and define the relationship of marriage. The language
of the body can be spoken in truth, because the human person is not only fallen, but also
redeemed. The pope says that the “‘hermeneutics of the sacrament’ allows us to draw the
conclusion that man is always essentially ‘called’ and not merely ‘accused,’ even inasmuch as he
is precisely the ‘man of concupiscence.’” 837 The pope says that “there is always the possibility
of passing from ‘error’ to the ‘truth’ as well as the possibility of return, or of conversion, from
sin to chastity as an expression of life according to the Spirit (see Gal 5:16).” 838 A divine grace
of the sacrament is the ever-present possibility of speaking the truth in the spoken word and in
the language of the body. 839 Married love—from the exchange of vows and consummation,
daily throughout married life, until death—the language of the body can be spoken in truth,
through faithfulness, integrity, tenderness, and union. 840.
The dimension of sign and the language of the body, speaking the truth of the sign,
implies ethics. The pope says: “Through marriage as a sacrament of the Church, man and
woman are explicitly called to bear witness—by correctly using the ‘language of the body’—to
spousal and procreative love.” 841 The communion of persons that is established in marriage is a
reality and an obligation. 842 The pope says: “Precisely to this man of concupiscence there is
given in marriage the sacrament of redemption as grace and sign of the covenant with God—and
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it is assigned to him as an ethos.” 843 The ethos of redemption presents the possibility of the
language of the body to be spoken in truth. The ethical obligation to speak the language of the
body in truth can be demanded because of the grace of the sacrament of marriage.

3. Song of Songs
John Paul II sees in the Song of Songs a detailed biblical articulation of the inner
experiences of the human person. This articulation corresponds to the language of the body
speaking the truth. It is a biblical articulation of the mutual gift of self in the communio
personarum of marriage.
John Paul II notes that the language of the Song of Songs is poetic, e.g., in the analogies
used to describe the beauty of the bride (Song 4:3, “Like pomegranate halves, your cheeks
behind your veil”). The pope notes the limitation of poetic language. 844 At the same time, he
praises the poetic language of the Song of Songs, when it describes spousal love. The pope says,
“The language of metaphors—poetic language—seems to be especially appropriate and precise
in this sphere.” 845 Poetry expresses a beautiful truth in beautiful language. 846
Quite early in the Catecheses, John Paul II comments on the exclamation that the man
makes when he sees the woman for the first time (cf. Gen. 2:23). The pope says: “In this way,
for the first time, the man (male) shows joy and even exultation for which he had no reason
before, due to the lack of a being similar to himself.” 847 The pope then describes the words from
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Gen. 2:23 as a “biblical prototype of the Song of Songs.” 848 Without a clear intertextual
justification, John Paul II connects the biblical encounter of the man and the woman and Genesis
with the bridegroom and bride in Song of Songs through an understanding of inner
experience. 849 The pope describes the import of the Song of Songs: “What was barely expressed
in the second chapter of Genesis (vv. 23-25) in just a few simple and essential words is
developed here in a full dialogue.” 850 The dialogue and the duet of the bride and bridegroom is
expressed throughout the entire biblical poem. 851 In the duet of the bride and bridegroom of the
Song of Songs is a fuller articulation of the fascination succinctly expressed in Genesis (cf. Gen.
2:23). The pope adds: “The point of departure as well as the point of arrival for this
fascination—reciprocal wonder and admiration—are in fact the bride’s femininity and the
bridegroom’s masculinity, in the direct experience of their visibility.” 852 As in Genesis, in the
Song of Songs there is a fascination with the visibility of the beauty of the other—with the
body—but it is a look that also sees the interiority of the person. 853
The language of the bridegroom confirms its coherence with the language of Gen. 2. The
bridegroom refers to the bride as “friend” (Song 4:7) and “sister” (Song 4:9). 854 John Paul II
comments on each of these terms. He says: “The term ‘friend’ indicates what is always essential
for love, which puts the second ‘I’ beside one’s own ‘I.’ ‘Friendship’…signifies in the Song a
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particular movement near each other, felt and experienced as an interiorly unifying power.” 855
The term, friend, indicates that the two are equal, sharing in the same humanity, and sharing in a
mutual attraction. Regarding the next term, sister, the pope says: “The expression ‘sister’ speaks
of union in humanity and at the same time of the feminine diversity and originality of the same
humanity.” 856 “Sister” speaks of both somatic homogeneity (as does “friend”) and somatic
heterogeneity.
The dissimilarity between Genesis and the Song of Songs is that the bride and groom of
the Song of Songs are in the state of concupiscence. The pope adds a further comment about the
term “sister.” He says: “The ‘sister’ in some sense helps the man to define and conceive himself,
becoming a kind of challenge in this direction.” 857 The man is challenged to overcome
concupiscence, to maintain a vision of the femininity of the woman, which sees her equality with
himself. For this reason, the Song of Songs brings together the terms, bride and sister, e.g. “How
beautiful is your love,/my sister, my bride” (Song 4:10). 858
In his continued analysis of the text, John Paul II highlights the dynamics of the mutual
exchange of the gift as found in the Song of Songs. In possession of himself, the bridegroom
acknowledges his bride as “A garden enclosed, my sister, my bride,/a garden enclosed, a
fountain sealed!” (Song 4:12). Of that declaration, the pope says: “The ‘sister bride’ is for the
man the master of her own mystery as a ‘garden closed’ and a ‘fountain sealed.’” 859 John Paul
II find her response to the bridegroom as Song 2:16, “My lover belongs to me and I to him.” 860
In possession of herself, the pope says, “The bride answers him with the words of the gift, that is,
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of entrusting herself. …The freedom of the gift is the response to the deep consciousness of the
gift expressed by the bridegroom’s words. Through this truth and freedom, the love is built up
that one must call authentic love.” 861 They share a mutual, disinterested self-donation.
Nevertheless, the sincere gift is not devoid of mutual fascination. The pope says: “The truth of
the increasing closeness of the spouses through love develops in the subjective dimension ‘of the
heart,’ of affection and sentiment.” 862 Their repeated, reciprocal self-gifts lead up to spousal
union, the union of the persons that is expressed in conjugal union. At the threshold of the
culmination of their union, John Paul II notes: “The bride…goes to meet him with the readiness
of the gift of self (see Song 7:8-13) because the love that unites them is of a spiritual and sensual
nature together.” 863 It is a love that is ecstatic and peaceful. Commenting on the mention of
peace in Song 8:10, 864 the pope describes the “disinterested tenderness [as]…above all the peace
of the encounter in humanity as the image of God—and the encounter by means of a reciprocal
and disinterested gift.” 865
Despite the bridegroom and bride speaking the language of the body in truth, they are still
in the state of concupiscence. The pope comments that, “In the Song of Songs, human eros
reveals the face of love ever in search and, as it were, never satisfied.” 866 On one hand, the
insatiability of their love ensures that the relationship between the man and the woman will be a
constant, mutual self-gift, without the one ever appropriating the other. 867 This love reaches
ever-deeper into the interiorities of the man and the woman, in ever-deeper freedom. On the
other hand, the pope comments further on the insatiability, saying, “One has the impression that
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in encountering each other, reaching each other, experiencing closeness to each other, they
ceaselessly continue to tend toward something.” 868
Song of Songs describes a love that is insatiable. As eros, their love is self-contained.
John Paul II says that the horizon of human eros is “opened further, through Paul’s words, to
another horizon of love that speaks another language…and which calls, invites, to another
communion. This love has been called ‘agape,’ and agape brings eros to fulfillment while
purifying it.” 869 The fulfillment of their love, of eros, is found in Christ, in agape (cf. 1 Cor.
13:4-8). 870 The love described in the Song of Songs stops at the threshold of a horizon that is
beyond the state of concupiscence, beyond even ideal human love (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). It is
unable to attain the fulfillment of love that is found in Christ (cf. Matt. 5:28).

4. Tobit
John Paul II continues discussing the dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage,
commenting on the story of the marriage of Tobias and Sarah found in the book of Tobit (cf.
Tob. 7:9-8:21). His central focus is on the prayer found in Tob. 8:5-8. 871
This passage from Tobit contains a biblical articulation of aspects of married life that are
not found in the Song of Songs. In the case of Tobias and Sarah, they are literally facing a lifeor-death situation, where seven of Sarah’s previous husbands died on their wedding night, killed
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by a demon (cf. Tob. 6:14). 872 While the circumstances of their situation are quite unique, John
Paul II identifies a reality that is present in every marriage. Tobit helps to reveal that there is a
fight between good and evil in marriage. 873 This is a struggle that can be both external and
experienced internally by the man or the woman. Tobias and Sarah are able to overcome death
and evil through their love. It is a love that is expressed through moral choices and through
prayer (cf. Tob. 8:5-8). 874 John Paul II says that their “love supported by prayer is revealed as
stronger than death.” 875
The passage from Tobit reveals the elements of the prayer that conquer sin and death:
praise (e.g., “Blessed are you, O God” (Tob. 8:5), thanks (Tob. 8:6 expresses gratitude for the
creation of the union of the husband and the wife, referencing both Gen. 1:27 and Gen. 2:18),
and petition (“Send down your mercy on me and on her” (Tob. 8:7). 876 The prayer of Tobias and
Sarah reveal how they understand their union. The pope says: “Their conjugal covenant is in
fact the image—and the primordial sacrament of the covenant of God with man, with the human
race—of the covenant that draws its origin from eternal Love.” 877 They understood their
marriage as a sign of God’s covenant with humanity. That understanding directed their actions
and their prayer.
John Paul II comments further on the comparison between Tobit and the Song of Songs.
In both cases, the man acknowledges the woman as sister or kinswoman (Song 4:9 and Tob. 8:7),
who is an equal in personhood and in the moral responsibility of speaking the language of the
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body in truth. 878 In the case of the prayer in Tobit, the man and woman are not engaged in a
duet, instead, Tobias and Sarah are speaking in unison in prayer to God (cf. Tob. 8:5). Their
words are not colored by their emotive experience, but of their awareness of the dimension of
sign of their spousal union. 879 In this way, they reveal the spiritual unity that is the foundation
and the fruit of spousal union. Beginning their marriage with prayer, Tobias and Sarah speak the
language of the ministers of the sacrament of marriage. John Paul II says that “the ‘language of
the body’ becomes the language of the ministers of the sacrament, who are aware that in the
conjugal covenant the mystery, which has its source in God himself, is expressed and brought
into being.” 880 The language of the liturgy captures the language of the body, which speaks, in
the words of the pope, of spousal love “both in the subjective dimension of the truth of human
hearts and in the objective dimension of the truth of living in communion.” 881
In the Song of Songs and Tobit, John Paul II identifies two Old Testament expressions,
which describe spouses who live the anthropology and ethos of the primordial sacrament. While
they are in the state of concupiscence, they live the ideal, the moral norm declared in the Sermon
on the Mount (Matt. 5:27-28), but was not demanded in the Law. Their unions open up to the
fulfillment, the abounding, of the Law in Christ in the New Covenant.

John Paul II completes his reflection on the dimension of the sign of marriage with a final
comment on the language of the body. With a fuller description from Song of Songs of the
mutual fascination between the man and the woman, John Paul II comments once again on
chastity, as a virtue and a gift. He says, “the reciprocal fascination of masculinity and
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femininity matures spiritually through the virtue and even more so though the gift (‘life
according to the Spirit’).” 882 Speaking the language of the body in truth is the result of moral
choice and of divine grace. The inner experiences of the struggle with concupiscence and the
receiving of grace, the mutual fascination experienced in emotion and eros is contained in the
prayer and liturgy of marriage. John Paul II says:
through the “language of the body,” man and woman encounter the great ‘mysterium’ in
order to transfer the light of this mystery, a light of truth and of beauty expressed in
liturgical language, into the “language of the body,” that is, into the language of the
praxis of love, of faithfulness, and of conjugal integrity, or into the ethos rooted in the
“redemption of the body” (see Rom 8:23). On this road, conjugal life in some sense
becomes liturgy. 883
Marriage is a sign of God’s covenant in creation and of Christ’s covenant in redemption,
everyday. Daily, the husband and the wife in marriage are an efficacious sign of God’s grace
efficacious in their visibility to others and in their inner experiences. Daily, the husband and the
wife receive God’s grace through the sacrament of marriage.

III. Contemporary Ethics
The Theology of the Body culminates in a discussion of Humanae Vitae, which was
written by Paul VI. 884 In this final series of Audiences, John Paul II comments on some aspects
of the daily living of the sacrament of marriage, in both the dimensions of sign and of grace. The
turn to Humanae Vitae is meant to address the questions of a contemporary audience 885 and to
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offer a specific application of the previous Audiences to the area of marriage and family
ethics. 886
John Paul II lends his voice to the pastoral concerns expressed by the Magisterium for the
people of today, at the same time by affirming the teachings on faith and morals. 887 John Paul II
contextualizes the pastoral concern in this way: “Pastoral concern means seeking the true good
of man, promoting the values impressed by God in the human person…in the certainty that the
one and only true good of the human person consists in putting this divine plan into practice.” 888
John Paul II develops a pastoral response to the concerns of husbands and wives, in light of a
theological anthropology rooted in the true good of the human person.

A. The Spousal Meaning of Conjugal Union
The central focus of John Paul II’s analysis of Humanae Vitae is on the passage that
names the unitive and procreative meanings of the conjugal act. 889 In light of speaking the
language of the body in truth, John Paul II notes: “What is at stake here is the truth, first in the
ontological dimension…and then…in the subjective and psychological dimension.” 890 John Paul
II underscores, as a moral norm and ontological truth, “the ‘inseparable connection’ between the
transmission of life and authentic conjugal love from the point of view of the ‘two meanings of
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the conjugal act.’” 891 This is expressed by Paul VI in the statement that each and every conjugal
act must remain open to conception (cf. Humanae Vitae 11). The unitive and procreative
meanings of the conjugal act, together, constitute the spousal meaning of the conjugal act. 892
The inseparable connection is affirmed by the act itself, through reason, and from God’s
plan, through divine revelation. 893 In the lived experience of the husband and wife, they can find
it difficult, subjectively and psychologically, and in the state of concupiscence, to ensure that
every conjugal act is open to the transmission of life. Attention to this difficulty is the focus of
the Magisterium concerning the spousal meaning of the conjugal act. 894

B. Responsible Parenthood
One expression of the difficulty of following the Church’s teaching on the spousal
meaning of the conjugal act is that it seems to imply that every conjugal act should be done with
the intention to conceive. While the teaching does insist that regulating births should have a
good reason, it also asserts that it is morally right (more than simply licit) to regulate births. 895
Husbands and wives are called to responsible parenthood, which ultimately relieves any tension
experienced by attempting to maintain the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meanings
of the conjugal act. 896
Responsible parenthood does concern the regulation of births. But for John Paul II, the
primary ethical question here is not the method of the regulation of births, but the ethical attitude
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of the husband and wife. 897 The ethical evaluation of responsible parenthood requires attention
to the inner experiences of the human person. This responsibility is expressed through
continence. 898 The method of periodic continence is the limiting of the conjugal act to infertile
periods. The method of periodic continence is morally licit because it respects the spousal
meaning of the conjugal act, by not doing anything to separate the unity of the unitive and
procreative meanings of the conjugal act. 899 However, the moral evaluation of the method does
not yet address the moral evaluation of the specific act by the husband and wife. Addressing this
evaluation, John Paul II write: “In the case of a morally right regulation of fertility brought about
by periodic continence, the point is clearly to practice conjugal chastity, that is, a certain ethical
attitude.” 900 The virtue called for by responsible parenthood is not seen most clearly by periodic
continence, which is simply a method, but in continence, as a virtue.
John Paul II describes the inner experience of conjugal chastity. He says that in
interpersonal relations, between masculinity and femininity, arises within “the psycho-emotive
subject…a reaction…‘arousal’…[and] another reaction…‘emotion.’” 901 Using broad strokes,
arousal is bodily, 902 and emotion is affective. 903 The virtue of chastity is the mastery of these
reactions. It is the mastery over concupiscence. 904 This mastery requires inner freedom. John
Paul II says that this interior freedom “presupposes that one is able to direct sensual and emotive
reactions in order to allow the gift of self…on the basis of the mature possession of one’s own ‘I’
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in its bodily and emotive subjectivity.” 905 Self-possession is the foundation of either selfdonation in the conjugal act or of continence.
Moreover, John Paul II underscores that self-mastery is not only about abstaining from
the conjugal act. But that, as the ability to direct sensual and emotive reactions, self-mastery
intensifies the conjugal act. He says: “In the conjugal act, the intimate union should bring with
itself a particular intensification of emotion, even more, the deep emotional stirring, of the other
person.” 906 The communion of persons is deepened by mutual self-donation in the freedom of
self-mastery, which includes the sensual and emotive dimensions of mutual attraction. This
reality contradicts the perspective that the use of contraception ensures the emotional connection
of the spouses by expressing the unitive meaning singularly, absent the procreative meaning. 907
Contraceptives are also used to regulate births. Paul VI, however, identifies
contraception as a morally illicit method for regulating births, even in the case where the
regulation of births is morally right. John Paul II notes that the difference between the practice
of periodic continence and the use of contraception “concerns their intrinsic ethical
qualification.” 908
With contraception, the spousal meaning of the conjugal act is divided. It is the removal
of the procreative meaning from the conjugal act. Contraception is the violation of the unitive
meaning, as well. John Paul II asserts that “when the conjugal act is deprived of its inner truth
because it is deprived artificially of its procreative capacity, it also ceases to be an act of
love.” 909 The pope asserts this because, with a contracepted conjugal act, “one can speak neither
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of the truth of the reciprocal gift of self nor of the reciprocal acceptance of oneself by the
person.” 910 Contraception treats a person (a subject) as an object. John Paul II says: “This
extension of the sphere of the means of ‘the domination…of the forces of nature’ threatens the
human person for whom the method of ‘self-mastery’ is and remains specific. It…breaks the
constitutive dimension of the person, deprives man of the subjectivity proper to him, and turns
him into an object of manipulation.” 911 By not directing the sensual and emotive reaction in
freedom, the use of contraception reduces both the husband and the wife to an object. The truth
of the human person is found in its subjectivity, that is, in self-mastery and self-donation, in
freedom. 912 For John Paul II, rooted in his theological anthropology he says, “a violation of the
inner order of conjugal communion…constitutes the essential evil of the contraceptive act.” 913
Responsible parenthood allows for the regulation of births. The method of contraception
is a morally illicit method of regulating births, while the method of periodic continence is
morally licit. However, John Paul II addresses the fact that periodic continence can also be used
with a contraceptive mentality, by not having good reason to regulate births, 914 or with the
intention of separating the unitive from the procreative meanings of the conjugal act. 915 John
Paul II calls such moral acts “abuses” 916 Even though he does not explicitly make the
connection, the moral evaluation of a contraceptive mentality is at least tangentially related to the
moral evaluations made in the context of “adultery in the heart” (cf. Matt. 5:27-28). 917
Responsible parenthood means exercising the knowledge of and dominion over
biological and psychological processes according to the truth of the spousal act, which may mean
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either limiting or increasing the size of the family. 918 The source of the moral norms of
responsible parenthood comes from reason and from God. John Paul II says, “the virtuous
character of the attitude expressing itself in the ‘natural’ regulation of fertility is determined…by
faithfulness…to the personal Creator, the source and Lord of the order that is shown in this
law.” 919 In Humanae Vitae, an appeal is made to the nature of the human person and to natural
law. John Paul II defines nature and natural law in this way: “The qualifier ‘natural,’ which is
attributed to the morally right regulation of fertility…, is to be explained by the fact that the way
of behaving in question corresponds to the truth of the person and thus to the person’s
dignity.” 920 John Paul II underscores that the norms, rooted in philosophical and theological
anthropology, aide the development as a person and as the communion of persons of the husband
and wife. 921 John Paul II notes, “The relevant principle of conjugal morality is thus faithfulness
to the divine plan manifested in the ‘innermost structure of the conjugal act.’” 922

C. Sacramental Conjugal Spirituality
To live out the spousal meaning of the body, and to overcome concupiscence, is not easy.
To assist, the grace of God is given in marriage. 923 That grace is given through God’s love.
John Paul II says: “While the powers of concupiscence tend to detach the ‘language of the body’
from the truth…the power of love, by contrast, strengthens it ever anew in that truth, so that the
mystery of the redemption of the body can bear fruit in it.” 924

cf. TOB 121:5.
TOB 124:6.
920
TOB 125:1.
921
TOB 130:5.
922
TOB 121:6.
923
cf. TOB 126:1. In this paragraph, John Paul II quotes Humanae Vitae 25.
924
TOB 127:1.
918
919

210

The grace of God, the power of love, to overcome concupiscence is given through the
gifts of the Holy Spirit. John Paul II says: “At the center of conjugal spirituality, therefore,
stands chastity, not only as a moral virtue…but equally as a virtue connected with the gifts of the
Holy Spirit—above all with the gift of reverence for what comes from God (‘donum
pietatis’).” 925 He adds that the gift of reverence “sustains and develops in the spouses a singular
sensibility for all that in their vocation and shared life carries the sign of the mystery of creation
and redemption…particularly…the two inseparable meanings of the conjugal act.” 926 The Holy
Spirit gives to the husband and wife the gift of reverence for each other and for the spousal act,
with the gifts of unity and of procreation. John Paul II adds: “This gift brings with it a deep and
all-encompassing attention to the person in her or her masculinity or femininity, thus creating the
interior climate suitable for personal communion,” 927 which ensures the direction of sensuality
and emotion into a sincere self-gift. 928
The sacramental life of the Church is a special way that husbands and wives receive
God’s grace. John Paul II names their own participation in the sacraments of marriage, 929 the
Eucharist, and Penance 930 as offering grace to the spouses. The grace of the sacraments
penetrates every aspect of the communio personarum. John Paul II says of the sacraments:
“With their help, that essential and spiritually creative ‘power’ of love reaches human hearts and,
at the same time, human bodies in their subjective masculinity and femininity.” 931 It is a grace
that does more than overcome concupiscence in any particular spousal act. It is a grace that
increases the love of the spouses. John Paul II says that the gift of conjugal chastity “reveals
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itself as a singular ability to perceive, love, and realize those meanings of the ‘language of the
body’ that remain completely unknown to concupiscence itself and progressively enrich the
spousal dialogue of the couple by purifying, deepening, and at the same time simplifying it.” 932
This constantly deepening love is the true good of the person and of the communion of persons
in marriage.
The gift of the Holy Spirit gives to the husband and wife the inner strength needed for a
mutual self-gift on their wedding day, throughout their married life, and in each and every
spousal act. The dimension of the sign of the sacrament of marriage is sustained by the
dimension of grace.

IV. Conclusion
Despite the detailed analysis of the communion of persons, presented over a number of
years, John Paul II also acknowledges that the anthropology of the Theology of the Body is not an
all-encompassing anthropology: there are details and applications missing. He says: “One must
immediately observe, in fact, that the term ‘theology of the body’ goes far beyond the content of
the reflections presented here. These reflections do not include many problems belonging, with
regard to their object, to the theology of the body (e.g., the problem of suffering and death…).
One must say this clearly.” 933
Despite this stated limitation, a complete picture emerges from the Catecheses.
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A. John Paul II’s Summary of the Theology of the Body
Several of the Audiences serve as summaries of the content of the Catecheses (e.g. TOB
23, 58, 86, 133). In some of these, more than simply summarizing content, John Paul II presents
a broader vision of the context and application of the content. In two such instances, he speaks
to theologians and comments on pedagogy.
Recognizing the need for continued analysis and development of a theological
anthropology, especially to address the lived experienced of individuals, John Paul II states the
need that theologians take up anthropological, ethical, and sacramental questions and answers
based on an adequate anthropology. 934 The Theology of the Body is a contribution to the work
asked of theologians: grounding the Church’s teachings, in this case, of marriage and family
ethics and sacramental theology, on their biblical and personalistic aspects. 935 John Paul II
presents the biblical roots to the Church’s teachings and underscores what constitutes the
authentic development of the human person. The biblical analysis presents the history of the
struggle with concupiscence. John Paul II says that it “is a history of good and evil…, and, at the
same time, it is the history of salvation whose word is the Gospel and whose power is the Holy
Spirit.” 936
A theology of the body, then, is not only a revelation of an understanding of the human
person. It is also a method by which to help a human person live an authentic communion of
persons. It is a pedagogy. John Paul II asserts: “The theology of the body is not merely a theory,
but rather a specific evangelical, Christian pedagogy of the body.” 937 He explains further the
nature of this pedagogy:
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And, this theology of the body is the basis of the most appropriate method of the
pedagogy of the body, that is, of man’s education…. This takes on particular importance
for contemporary man, whose science…is very advanced. Yet, this science deals with
man under a certain “aspect” and is thus partial rather than comprehensive. …in and of
itself such science does not yet develop the consciousness of the body as a sign of the
person, as a manifestation of the spirit. … When one uses such one-sided knowledge of
the body’s functions as an organism, it is not difficult to reach the point of treating the
body…as an object of manipulations; in this case, man no longer identifies himself
subjectively…with his own body, because it is deprived of the meaning and dignity that
stem from the fact that this body is proper to the person. 938
As pedagogy, the Theology of the Body is intended to speak to the lived experience of the human
person. It invites living according to a certain ethics, rooted in the truth of the human person and
by the fruit of the grace of a reverence for God as Creator and Redeemer.

B. The Foundation of an Adequate Anthropology
The driving focus of the Theology of the Body is understanding the communion of
persons of the husband and wife in anthropological and ethical terms. In the Catecheses, John
Paul II presented a number of Scriptural passages that helped to detail this focus in light of God’s
plan and grace for humanity. With this vision he developed the foundation of an adequate
anthropology, which is a theological anthropology.

1. Elements of John Paul’s Theological Anthropology
In the Theology of the Body, John Paul II articulates the foundations of an adequate
anthropology. He presents his own adequate anthropology. These are some of the key elements.
John Paul II presents the human person as having physical, psychological, and spiritual
levels. The methodology he uses is reading the selected biblical passages together with the inner
experience of the human person, which involves all of the levels of the person. This detailed
938
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phenomenological description of the person marks some of John Paul II’s unique insights. He
also weds this perspective with a more general one. Acknowledging a more general
understanding of the person as body and soul and commenting on the basic relationship between
body and soul, he says, “the Creator has assigned the body to man as a task, the body in its
masculinity and femininity.” 939 Specifically, this task is found in the human person mastering
concupiscence. The body is not just a task, it is integral to personal development. He says that
the body expresses the person. 940 The fruit of the body mastered by the spirit, as an expression
of the whole person, can be seen in the beatifying beginning of the man and the woman in
Genesis 941—and in the mutual fascination of the bride and bridegroom in the Song of Songs. 942
Especially the inner experience of the human person reveals that the body has a spousal meaning,
is meant for another. It is the power to express love. 943 This revelation is especially clear when
concupiscence is mastered. Presenting a theological anthropology, rooted in his methodology,
John Paul II also comments that the person, through the body, is in the image of God, is a sign of
God.
Another mark of John Paul II’s theological anthropology is that he fully takes into
account the dynamics of interpersonal communion. He says, “in masculinity and femininity he
[God] assigned to him [the human person] in some way his own humanity as a task, that is, the
dignity of the person and also the transparent sign of interpersonal ‘communion’ in which man
realizes himself though the authentic gift of self.” 944 The deepest truth of the meaning and ethics
of the bodily union of persons is that it is a sign of God, as a communion of persons. John Paul
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II says: “While setting before man the requirements that correspond to the task entrusted to him,
the Creator at the same time points out to man—male and female—the ways that lead to
accepting and carrying them out.” 945 In this context, John Paul II references Gaudium et Spes
22, which states that Christ reveals the human person to itself. God does not only reveal the truth
of the human person, God gives the grace to live the ideal. The ability to be a sign of God is
because of God’s grace, God’s divine initiative in creation and redemption. It is especially
marriage where the ethics and the grace of God allows the man and the woman to be sign of
God. 946
Another unique part of John Paul II’s theological anthropology is that, based on divine
revelation, he incorporates the reality of the human person as male and female, as an essential
part of an adequate anthropology. 947 While fully confirming an anthropology and ethics that
would speak of “the human person,” intending every human person irrespective of masculinity or
femininity, John Paul II notes the significance of the difference between male and female. 948
Addressing one or the other separately, he comments on some ethical considerations that would
apply to only one or the other. For instance, John Paul II notes that shame affects the man and
the woman differently. 949 Moreover, he mentions responsibilities of a man or a woman,
responsibilities particular to each. 950 Especially key to the incorporation of the diversity of male
and female into an anthropology is that the diversity is not simply somatic. It is part of every
level of the person, body, soul, and spirit. 951 John Paul II notes that masculinity is characteristic
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of the whole male person, and femininity is characteristic of the whole female person. In other
words, this diversity is a spiritual reality that has a somatic expression. This diversity, however,
does not contradict the equality of male and female, their homogeneity. Their obligation to find
themselves through a sincere gift of themselves. It is their union as a communio personarum,
which requires their diversity and complementarity, that is in the image of God. The inclusion of
the difference between male and female into an anthropology defies a philosophical
anthropology. Thus, there is a certain mystery of creation, a certain mystery of God having
created the human person as male and female. For this reason, Gen. 2:24 can be seen as the
foundational scriptural passage for the Theology of the Body, even in a theoretical way over and
above the obvious citations of that verse in the other passages considered (e.g. Matt. 19, Matt.
22, Eph. 5, Tobit). 952 In emphasizing the inner experiences which express the exchange of the
gift and the ethics required, John Paul II asserts that these truths and requirements apply equally
to a man or a woman. However, in the mystery of creation, there is a heterogeneity between the
man and the woman. Only in a non-thematic way does John Paul II ever comment on the
differences. But, one point seems significant, if only, at most, implied in the Theology of the
Body: masculinity embodies giving and femininity embodies receiving. 953 A basic revelation
from God about what it means to be a person—male and female (cf. Gen. 1:27)—is seen visibly
through the body, which expresses the person. The spousal meaning of the body is seen through
the heterogeneity of the man and the woman—even if every human person is called to give and
to receive.

952
953

cf. TOB 93:1. John Paul II’s comments on Gen. 2:24 presuppose its inseparable connection to Gen. 1:27.
cf. TOB 9:5.

217

2. The Human Person as Gift
A single word that captures John Paul II’s theological anthropology is “gift.”
John Paul II names the hermeneutics of the gift as “a new criterion of understanding and
of interpretation,” 954 calling the dimension of the gift the foundation upon which a theology of
the body is built. Intimately connected with understanding the human person a gift is Gaudium et
Spes 24. 955 This conciliar definition of the human person states that the human person—male or
female—reaches human fulfillment through a communion of persons. It states that a human
person is given to oneself, and that a human person must give oneself. Two essential moments
for a human person, for an adequate anthropology, then, are giving and receiving. In a
communion of persons, each must give oneself to the other, and each must receive the gift of the
other. These two moments are the foundation of the dynamics of a constantly-deepening, mutual
self-gift. These two moments are the foundation of the ethics found in the Theology of the Body,
as well. In a communion of persons, especially the communio personarum of the husband and
wife, a mutual self-gift is necessary. John Paul II does not develop what an ethical receiving of
the gift of the other might be. Especially by underscoring the struggle with concupiscence, and
the moral need to do so, John Paul II does detail what an ethical self-donation is. The human
person is called to be a gift. By underscoring the redemption of the body, and the dimension of
grace in marriage, John Paul II makes clear that the power to live according to these ethics, the
ethos of the body, is found in receiving the gift of grace from God, by receiving the gift of the
Holy Spirit.
Moreover, John Paul II comments on the relationship between the act of giving and the
act of receiving. Regarding giving and receiving, John Paul II says: “These two functions of the
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mutual exchange are deeply connected in the whole process of the ‘gift of self’: giving and
accepting the gift interpenetrate in such a way that the very act of giving becomes acceptance,
and acceptance transforms itself into giving.” 956 In the dynamics of the mutual exchange of the
gift, the spiritual stance of giving is the same as that of receiving. That stance expressed through
the body, is what establishes and maintains the communion of persons, and is the stance that
ethics requires. The communion of persons is created through the freedom of the gift, the postlapsidary access to the state without shame. John Paul II says of the man and woman in Gen. 2,
“the exchange of the gift, in which their whole humanity, soul and body, femininity and
masculinity, participates, is realized by preserving the inner characteristic (that is, precisely
innocence) of self-donation and of the acceptance of the other as a gift.” 957 In the mystery of
creation and of redemption, the man and the woman preserve and maintain the mutual selfdonation in freedom. Reverence given to God is expressed by accepting the sacredness of the
image of God found in the person and in the communion of persons.

An adequate anthropology is one that understands the human person as a gift. An
adequate anthropology can only be lived with the grace of God if it is a theological
anthropology. An adequate anthropology understands what it means to be a person and to grow
as a person, within the mystery of creation and of redemption. As a consequence of an adequate
anthropology, for John Paul II, marriage, as a true communio personarum, is a privileged place—
if not the privileged place—where the mystery of creation is fulfilled in the mystery of
redemption.
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In his presentation on the sacrament of marriage, John Paul II applies the key insight of
his theological anthropology, which is to say that, with God’s help to overcome concupiscence,
the husband and wife are capable of living a full, mutual communio personarum (cf. Eph 5:2133).
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Chapter 8
Concluding Remarks
The Theology of the Body is often associated with marriage and family ethics. And it is a
work that expounds on Catholic moral principles. The Catecheses, however, should not be
limited to their ethical content. In them, John Paul II also presents a developed vision of the
human person.
This chapter shows some of the contours of John Paul II’s theological anthropology. Its
definition is deepened by the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. And it is an understanding
of the human person that is rooted in Scripture.

I. The Role of Pontiff
A guiding question in my analyses is in what way to consider the Theology of the Body as
a work of Wojtyła.
Throughout his life, John Paul II lived many roles. Of the role of a play actor (in the
Rhapsodic Theater), Wojtyła writes, “The actor is a rhapsodist. … The rhapsodic actor does not
become a character but carries a problem.” 958 The actor takes on the material presented in the
play as their own. John Paul II accepted this responsibility of an actor, even as he accepted other
roles.
Throughout his life, as Wojtyła’s roles changed, what he wrote and how he wrote
changed. The role as an artist was largely diminished as Wojtyła accepted his vocation to the
priesthood and his life as a professor. His published work primarily became pastoral and
academic. Nevertheless, Wojtyła consistently published poems and plays in the years prior to
and during his time as priest, bishop, and cardinal. The work of the artist, while reduced and
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changed, never ceased. He wrote his final plays while bishop and archbishop. After 1967, the
number of poems he published was noticeably reduced, and he wrote no more plays. In 2003,
John Paul II published a series of poems, Roman Triptych, underscoring the fact that the role of
artist remained a role that he accepted. 959 Rice comments that, in the Rhapsodic Theater,
“Kotlarczyk taught Wojtyła not so much to entertain an audience, as to transmit to it the truth of
life.” 960 Rice further notes about Wojtyła’s involvement in the Rhapsodic Theater, “The project
became energized by a powerful asceticism, which would resonate, in Wojtyła's life, with the
new perspective that he was just then beginning to discover in the poetic works of John of the
Cross.” 961 St. John of the Cross wrote and commented on poetry, as part of his transmission of
the truths of life. Wojtyła wrote poetry and plays and commented on poetry, including that of St.
John of the Cross, as part of his transmission of the truths of life.
Rice offers a comment on Wojtyła’s philosophical work: “Wojtyła's methodological
approach to philosophy is arguably based on a notion of Philosophy itself as an actus personae.
Put another way, minds don't do Philosophy, persons do, and the person, for Wojtyła, is
fundamentally a subject of morality, relatively autonomous, that is, autonomous only in truth.” 962
Doing philosophy is a human act. It is not dissimilar to the role of an artist. Rice says: “Perhaps
what is most characteristic of the vision that he brings from poetry to philosophy is that it is
primarily a vision not of analysis and posterior synthesis, but of synopsis.” 963 More than
Wojtyła exercising simultaneous roles of philosopher and artist, Wojtyła exercised the same role
in these two expressions.
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At his papal election, John Paul II took on the role of pope. In choosing his name John
Paul II expressed continuity with his predecessors and their papal ministry. 964 With regard to the
Catecheses, Luke Timothy Johnson says: “It is appropriate, then, to treat John Paul II’s words as
those of a theologian and to test them for their intellectual adequacy, especially since his
approach is in some ways characteristic of others who are seeking a ‘theology’ of the body.” 965
While Johnson is justified in engaging the Theology of the Body as a theological text, the role of
catechist should be considered as primary. His primary role was catechist, not theologian. In the
case of the Theology of the Body, the role of pontiff is expressed as the role of catechist. The
Theology of the Body, as an exposition of the complex inner experiences of the human person, of
every human person, has a universal audience.
In presenting the Catecheses, John Paul II is not exercising the role of philosopher or
theologian. In any case, extending Rice’s comment, the work of a catechist is a human act, an
actus personae. The delivery of the Catecheses was done during his pontificate, which suggests
that they should be considered as the work of John Paul II.

II. John Paul II’s Use of Scripture in the Catecheses
Understood as distinct from Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, the theological
anthropology of the Catecheses has Scripture as its point of departure. In fact, John Paul II uses
many Scriptural texts in developing the themes of the Theology of the Body. 966
However, some authors have commented on his use of Scripture.
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A. John Paul II’s Use of the Historical-Critical Method
Luke Timothy Johnson critiques the use of Scripture in the Theology of the Body.
Johnson challenges how John Paul II treated specific passages, especially Matt. 19 and 1 Cor.
6. 967 Johnson offers a commentary on 1 Cor., which presents the complexities that Johnson does
not find in John Paul II’s evaluation of the same text, and which then serve to advance his own
theological anthropology. 968 In general, this evaluation of John Paul II concerns the pope’s use
of the historical-critical method in biblical interpretation.
Other commentators have defended John Paul II’s method of biblical interpretation.
Kupczak states that “the pope consistently uses interpretative tools provided by the historicalcritical method in his reading of the Bible. This scientific exegesis leads to an integral reading of
biblical texts and takes into account both the richness of their original meanings and their roots in
ancient cultures.” 969 In addition to affirming the pope execution of the scientific tools in biblical
interpretation, Kupczak asserts that John Paul II does an integral reading of the Bible, which is a
point found in other commentators. Echeverria describes John Paul II’s integral reading of
Scripture in this way: “the pope assumes a hermeneutical approach to Scripture that treats it as a
whole, a canonical whole.” 970 A basic principle in an integral reading of Scripture, Echeverria
writes, is that “the unifying principle of the Scripture as a canonical whole is Christ.” 971 John
Paul II interprets Scripture from the basic principle of the fundamental unity of divine revelation.
In response to criticism that John Paul II presents incomplete passages, Echeverria says that
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being selective is not the same as being arbitrary, especially given an understanding of Scripture
as an organic whole. 972

B. The Role of Experience in Biblical Interpretation
In the end, Johnson’s critique of the method of biblical interpretation used by John Paul II
is other than his skill with scientific tools. Johnson challenges the relationship of experience and
Scripture. He challenges the priority given to Scripture as a source of divine revelation. Johnson
says: “Scripture is made not merely necessary but also sufficient for theology, and this it cannot
be.” 973 For Johnson, biblical interpretation that leads to moral, doctrinal statements, like those
found in the Theology of the Body, cannot be founded on biblical interpretation alone. He would
say that biblical passages alone are not a sufficient source for theology. Human experience must
have a more significant, and prior, place. In a word that includes, but also goes beyond, the
Theology of the Body, Johnson writes: “If…revelation is not exclusively biblical but occurs in
the continuing experience of God in the structures of human freedom, then at least an occasional
glance at human experience as actually lived might be appropriate even for the magisterium.” 974
For Johnson, human experience is the primary source for the revelation of God. Theology
should not start from the principle that Scripture norms human experience.
With this understanding of the relationship between Scripture and experience, Johnson
offers further criticism of the Theology of the Body. He writes:
John Paul II claims to be practicing “phenomenology,” but from the evidence of these
homilies, he seems to have paid little attention to actual human experience. Instead, he
dwells on the nuances of words in biblical narratives and propositions, while fantasizing
an ethereal and all-encompassing mode of mutual self-donation between man and woman
that lacks any of the messy, clumsy, awkward, charming, casual, and yes, silly aspects of
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love in the flesh. Carnality, it is good to remember, is at least as much a matter of humor
as of solemnity. In the pope’s formulations, though, human sexuality is observed by
telescope from a distant planet. Solemn pronouncements are made on the basis of
scriptural exegesis rather than living experience. The effect is something like that of a
sunset painted by the unsighted. 975
For Johnson, John Paul II does not adequately take into account human experience—both
methodologically and the variety that is experienced specifically each day throughout a
relationship.
Echeverria addresses the question of the relationship between Scripture and human
experience, even specifically engaging Johnson. Echeverria writes: “Johnson's position is
representative of an approach to biblical authority that is widely influential today…, namely,
making an appeal on behalf of ‘experience’ as that alternative source of moral conviction to
override scriptural authority and hence the clear teaching of Scripture.” 976 Framed a different
way, the question about the relationship of priority between Scripture and experience is whether
human experience is a source of theology, in a technical sense. Echeverria states:
experience is not a foundation, a source of revelation, a final arbiter of truth and
falsehood in the Church, from which the belief-content (fides quae) of the historic
Christian faith can be inferred and known. … This epistemic order of things is grounded
in the fact that experience is not a source of knowledge, but an organ of knowledge. 977
Echeverria asserts that with an understanding of experience and Scripture, like Johnson’s, then,
“Religion becomes privately engaging, a personal life-style choice, and nothing more—
obviously not about making truth claims regarding the living God who in an act of revelation
manifests and communicates something of himself and his plan of salvation, calling us to share
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in his divine life.” 978 For Echeverria, human experience on its own cannot be considered as
divine revelation.
Nevertheless, Echeverria acknowledges that experience is significant for theology as an
aide in “discerning the Word of God.” 979 This relationship of human experience assisting the
interpretation of biblical revelation is consonant with John Paul II’s approach. Echeverria says
that John Paul II “argues that the authority of God's Word revelation does not exclude
experience, but rather it is in the experience itself that the authority is acknowledged and
confessed.” 980 In the Theology of the Body, John Paul II says that experience is “an
indispensable point of reference.” 981 With regard to the role of experience in theology, the
conclusion here is that experience complements the Scriptures.
Noting John Paul II’s comments about the methodological importance of human
experience in biblical interpretation, Echeverria, linking the two, turns to the writings of Wojtyła
concerning experience. 982 Echeverria notes that, for Wojtyła, phenomenology is concerned with
experience of the personal subject and that this “experience is something irreducibly subjective,
personal, defying reduction, and so we must pause cognitively before man's lived experience.” 983
Wojtyła’s evaluation of lived experience culminates in the description of the integration of the
person, as a psychosomatic-spiritual unity, in the action, which points to the body, and which
Echeverria links with the Theology of the Body. 984 Echeverria’s analysis of John Paul II’s
biblical interpretation makes another connection between the writings of Wojtyła and the
Theology of the Body precisely concerning the significance of experience.
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Other authors have made similar observations concerning the role of experience in John
Paul II’s biblical interpretation. Waldstein notes that for John Paul II, despite his facility with
historical-critical scholarship, “His primary perspective, even as a reader of Scripture, is that of a
philosopher and a systematic theologian.” 985 The integral reading of Scripture points John Paul
II to the truth of the matter. And Kupczak writes: “In the papal ‘hermeneutics of gift,’ the Word
of God is accepted in faith, and then undergoes ‘philosophical exegesis,’ and its ‘biblical images
are translated to philosophical notions,’ so that the Word can shine with all the radiance of its
truth.” 986 For John Paul II, the “philosophical exegesis” often takes the form of the description
of human experience.

III. Scripture and Anthropology
In his philosophical anthropology Wojtyła acknowledges its point of contact with biblical
revelation.
Throughout Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła mentions biblical passages, both
explicitly987 and obliquely. 988 However, in Love and Responsibility, Scripture is parenthetical to
the theme and its development. Scripture passages are mentioned as points of contact with the
philosophical-ethical point being made. One clear example of this is how Wojtyła presents the
Gospel commandment to love, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18, Matt.
22:39, Mk. 12:31, Lk. 10:27), without specific citation. He says: “if the commandment to love,
and the love which is the object of this commandment, are to have any meaning, we must find a
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basis for them other than the utilitarian premise and the utilitarian system of values. This can
only be the personalistic principle and the personalistic norm.” 989 While the Gospel is explicitly
acknowledged, Wojtyła maintains a philosophical, not a theological, analysis—in this case
developing the personalistic norm. One less clear example is the chapter dedicated to justice to
the Creator. 990 In that chapter there are clear biblical and theological themes as points of
departure (e.g. marriage as sacrament and vocation). Though even in this case, Wojtyła asserts
the theological principles but offers philosophical-ethical explanations and comments. The focus
of Love and Responsibility remains on philosophical analysis, even when biblical passages and
theological themes are present.
Wojtyła also used the commandment to love as a point of reference in Person and Act.
Wojtyła says, “our aim is only to emphasize the confirmation it contains for our claim that the
reference system centered on ‘thy neighbor’ has a crucial significance in any acting and existing
‘together with others.’” 991 In other words, the biblical commandment coincides with the
philosophical anthropology that he is developing.
When Wojtyła considers the commandment to love with regard to love of God, however,
the connection between the personalistic norm and the commandment to love can only be
accepted in faith. In this context, Wojtyła quotes the whole commandment, writing “It is worth
recalling the commandment to love in its full form: ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all
thy heart and all thy mind and all thy soul, and thy neighbor as thyself.’” 992 The response to God
is made with the recognition of God’s work of redemption and sanctification. Wojtyła says:
“Revelation enables us to understand…that God relates to man as a person to a person, that his
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attitude to man is one of ‘love’. Thus the personalistic norm’ may be said to have its fullest
justification and its ultimate origin in the relationship between God and man.” 993 In this way, the
personalistic norm, as united to the commandment to love, can be understood in a theological
context. Despite this very strong connection between philosophy and theology, however, the
personalistic norm is understood on philosophical terms and is presented throughout Love and
Responsibility with regard to its strict philosophical content.
In the introduction of Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła comments on the role of Scripture
in his ethical writing. He says that his book, which is the fruit of pastoral work, is an exposition
of “an incessant confrontation of doctrine with life.” 994 In his role as a spiritual advisor he helps
to unite doctrine and revelation with the moral life. He further admits that concerning sexual
ethics he recognizes as a “frame of reference” these biblical texts, namely, “Matthew 5:27, 28,
Matthew 19:1-13, Mark 10:1-12, Luke 20:27-35, John 8:1-11, I Corinthians 7 (throughout),
Ephesians 5:22-33.” 995 Despite naming these Scripture passages in the introduction, they do not
enter thematically into the ethical analysis of Love and Responsibility. However, the list of
Scriptures noted in the above passage are found in the Theology of the Body. In the Catecheses
these passages are certainly more than a frame of reference, as they are taken up thematically.
And they are commented on through John Paul II’s philosophical exegesis.

IV. Reading the Theology of the Body in Terms of Philosophical Anthropology
The insights of the Theology of the Body come into greater relief through an intertextual
analysis with Person and Act and Love and Responsibility. This reading of the Theology of the
Body indicates the philosophical exegesis that he employed.
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A. Theology of the Body and Person and Act
The Theology of the Body describes the human person in three states: the original
situation (Gen. 2), in the state after original sin (Gen. 2-3), and life in the Resurrection (Matt.
22:24-30, Mk. 12:18-27, Lk. 20:27-40). In Person and Act, Wojtyła articulates inner human
experiences in detail, and these can elucidate what John Paul II says about each of these states.

1. Original Human Experiences
In the Theology of the Body, John Paul II describes the situation of the human person
before the Fall in Gen. 2, the original human experiences of original solitude, original unity, and
original nakedness.
Original solitude indicates the uniqueness of the human person in relation to the rest of
creation. Original solitude is revealed through subjectivity and self-determination. 996 In terms
of Person and Act, subjectivity is the recognition of the interiority of the human person, the level
of nature and the level of the person. 997 Self-determination, as the power of free will, of
freedom, is based on that interiority. Wojtyła says that “self-determination…provides the key to
the reality of the person we are attempting to reach.” 998 The uniqueness of the human person is
seen in specifically human acts. In the inner life of the person, self-determination is a
fundamental human act. Wojtyła describes human action as moving an experience of passivity
to an experience of activity, an experience of “it happens” to an experience of “I act.” 999 These
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passive and active experiences reveal the levels of the person that are at the foundation of the
recognition of the distinct reality of the human person in the visible creation.
One part of John Paul II’s description of original unity is somatic homogeneity, a
recognition that the other human person is also a human person with an interiority. 1000 In
Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology, the foundation of unity is the subjectivity of each
person. 1001
John Paul II describes original nakedness as a fullness of the experience of the body. 1002
In the experience of integration, Wojtyła says that the person is fully present in human action. 1003
Being “naked without shame” (cf. Gen. 2:25) is experiencing the fullness of integration of every
level of the person, without any disintegration. John Paul II says that in the original nakedness
the man and the woman were free with the freedom of the gift. 1004 That is, in more philosophical
language, there was no internal constraint on the human person, on the power of selfdetermination. The experience of the body, without shame, is an experience of the integration of
the psychosomatic, spiritual unity of the human person.
In the Catecheses, after presenting original solitude, original unity, and original
nakedness, John Paul II presents the spousal meaning of the body and the communion of
persons. The content of these Catecheses more closely aligns with Love and Responsibility. Yet
some points of contact can be noted with Person and Act. John Paul II says that “The human
body…contains ‘from the beginning’ the ‘spousal’ attribute, that is, the power to express love:
precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the
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very meaning of his being and existence.” 1005 In the language of Person and Act, this power of
the human person to love is built on the power of self-possession. Wojtyła says: “Being in the
possession of himself man can determine himself.” 1006 In similar language, John Paul II says
that “self-mastery is indispensable in order for man to be able to ‘give himself,’ in order for him
to become a gift.” 1007 Love, as an act of self-determination, is possible because of self-mastery
or self-possession.
The question of the self-gift of interpersonal love would be a question of “horizontal
transcendence,” which only gets a brief mention in Person and Act. 1008 In the Theology of the
Body, a mutual gift of self creates a communion of persons. The content of Person and Act that
would be a proximate foundation for communio personarum is the notion of intersubjectivity
through participation. Wojtyła says: “The ability to share in the humanness itself of every man is
the very core of all participation and the condition of the personalistic value of all acting and
existing ‘together with others.’” 1009 Participation aides the growing of the personalistic value of
each person. Intersubjectivity aides the self-fulfillment of each person. Wojtyła notes that
intersubjectivity by participation finds further direction in the commandment of love. He says:
“The commandment of love is also the measure of the tasks and demands that have to be faced
by all men—all persons and all communities—if the whole good contained in the acting and
being ‘together with others’ is to become a reality.” 1010 With its focus on the personalistic value,
the measure of self-fulfillment in Person and Act is the integration of the person in action. 1011
Self-gift is only spoken of in terms of self-possession and self-determination.
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2. The Experience of Concupiscence
John Paul II continues his theological anthropology by turning to the post-lapsidary state
of the human person, the “historical man.” He turns to a description of the inner experiences of
the human person, in the state after original sin. He turns to the “heart” that Christ mentions in
Matt. 5:28.
If the original situation of the human person was without shame (cf. Gen. 2:25), then the
historical situation is affected by an experience of shame and concupiscence. John Paul II
describes this experience as “a certain constitutive fracture in the human person’s interior, a
breakup, as it were, of man’s original spiritual and somatic unity,” 1012 which includes a “specific
threat to the structure of self-possession and self-dominion, through which the human person
forms itself.” 1013 In Wojtyłan language, this is an experience of the disintegration of the human
person. 1014
Regarding spousal meaning of the body, John Paul II notes that one effect of
concupiscence is that the human person has “difficulty in identifying oneself with one’s own
body.” 1015 The inner division is reflected in a difficulty in raising the experience of passivity to
the level of action. 1016
The new commandment of Matt. 5:27-28 (You have heard that it was said…But I say to
you) shifts the moral focus to a look with desire. John Paul II writes that Christ points to a look
with desire as an action that “has not yet transformed itself into an external act, it has not yet
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become an ‘act of the body,’” but is an action, nevertheless. 1017 John Paul II says that such a
choice, constrained by the sexual urge, results in a loss of the freedom of the gift. 1018 The
analyses of Wojtyła help to unpack the dynamics of the crucial moment of the encounter
between the man and the woman. Original innocence allowed the man and the woman to see
each other in the original nakedness free from any constrain of the sexual urge. 1019 Yet Wojtyła
illustrates that innocence does not mean a lack of complexity and depth. He says in Person and
Act:
The drive of sex, which relies on the momentous division of mankind into male and
female individuals, stems from the somatic ground and also penetrates deeply into the
psyche and its emotivity, thereby affecting even man’s spiritual life. …this does not
consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive
type. 1020
The encounter of the man and the woman stir up happenings, deeply—on psychic and somatic
levels. In the experience of concupiscence, this stirring is not yet a choice. The choice is to raise
these passive experiences to the level of action, to the level of the person, or to yield to the
psychosomatic dynamisms and to “look with desire” (cf. Matt. 5:28). As John Paul II said, the
look with desire is not yet an external act, but it already is a choice of the person, an inner
action—a choice that abnegates self-determination. 1021
There is a tension in that moment of making the choice to integrate the psychosomatic
dynamisms or to yield to them. John Paul II notes that there is conflict between desire and
communion, in the heart of the human person. John Paul II responds to some attempted
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resolutions of the inner conflict. 1022 Each, in their own way, accepts the disintegration of the
human person, and denies the possibility of the integration of the psychosomatic dynamisms.
The Theology of the Body reiterates the possibility of freedom, the possibility of not
being constraint by the sexual urge. John Paul II says that there is the possibility of a purity of
heart. Of the possibility of a pure heart, which comes from the words of Christ (Matt. 19:3-6),
the pope says:
Yet, Christ’s words are realistic. They do not attempt to make the human heart return to
the state of original innocence, which man left behind in the moment in which he
committed the original sin; rather, they point out to him the path toward a purity of heart
that is possible and accessible for him even in the state of hereditary sinfulness. 1023
To the perspectives that define the human person by concupiscence, John Paul II employs the
theological perspective of the human person as in the “status naturae lapsae simul ac redemptae
[the state of fallen and at the same time redeemed nature].” 1024 In Person and Act, the possibility
of the human person not being defined by concupiscence Wojtyła would simply recognize as the
possibility of the human person to choose freely between yielding to psychosomatic dynamisms
or performing a human act. In Person and Act, Wojtyła offers detailed analyses of the
integration of the soma and the psyche, which all assert the presence of self-determination and
confirm the possibility of increased freedom. 1025 Wojtyła speaks of the process of the becoming
of a human person 1026 and the possibility of increased psychosomatic-spiritual unity in the
person, 1027 as particular examples of the general perspective that the human person is not defined
by passivity.
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3. The Experience of the Resurrection
John Paul II describes the state of the human person in the resurrection in these words (cf.
Matt. 22:30): “The resurrection…will consist in the perfect realization of what is personal in
man.” 1028 Calling this new state and experience “spiritualization,” the pope offers that
spiritualization “signifies not only that the spirit will master the body, but…that it will also fully
permeate the body and the powers of the spirit will permeate the energies of the body.” 1029 This
is a part of the Theology of the Body that explicitly uses vocabulary that is likewise found in a
technical sense in Person and Act. The foundation in Person and Act is found in the general
recognition that the human person is a psychosomatic-spiritual unity that can increase that
unity. 1030
Despite their difference, in light of the Resurrection, John Paul II says that celibacy and
marriage have an anthropological similarity. In both cases, the human person must be attentive
to psychosomatic dynamisms. 1031 In both cases, the person must possess the freedom of the
gift. 1032 As has already been noted, in Wojtyła’s philosophical anthropology prior to any act of
self-determination is an act of self-possession. Prior to the gift of self—in celibacy, in
marriage—is self-possession. The connection and complementarity of marriage and celibacy is
found in the interiority of the human person.

4. The Sacrament of Marriage and Humanae Vitae
While much of what John Paul II says concerning the sacrament of marriage is beyond
the scope of Person and Act, some points of contact can be seen.
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When speaking of marriage in the dimension of grace, John Paul II says: “As a
sacramental expression of that saving power, marriage is also an exhortation to gain mastery
over concupiscence (as Christ speaks about in the Sermon on the Mount).” 1033 As an
exhortation, the call to self-mastery refers to the action of the human person. Thus, mastery over
concupiscence refers to the integration of the psychosomatic dynamism of the person raised to
the level of the person through transcendence and self-determination.
With regard to the language of the body and marriage in the dimension of sign, the pope
says that the external action of the spouses speaks self-gift. 1034 But it is only spoken in truth if
the external action is an expression of an inner freedom. 1035 That is, in philosophical language of
Wojtyła, interiorly the human person must be making an act of self-determination, rooted in selfpossession, having integrated the psychosomatic dynamisms in the action. The evaluation of
whether a lie or a truth was spoken by the language of the body is made through a consideration
of the interiority of the person.
In his consideration of the sacrament of marriage John Paul II includes an analysis of the
Song of Songs. The words of the Song articulate the inner experiences of the man and the
woman in a relationship of love. They are words that articulate the original encounter of man
and woman that was expressed in Genesis. The pope says: “What was barely expressed in the
second chapter of Genesis (vv.23-25) in just a few simple and essential words is developed here
in a full dialogue.” 1036 Building upon the exclamation of joy and exultation expressed in Gen.
2:23 (“This one, at last …”), the Song of Songs adds a mutual fascination. 1037 John Paul II says:
“The point of departure as well as the point of arrival for this fascination—reciprocal wonder and
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admiration—are in fact the bride’s femininity and the bridegroom’s masculinity, in the direct
experience of their visibility.” 1038 As in Genesis, in the Song of Songs there is a fascination with
the visibility of the beauty of the other—with the body—but it is a look that also sees the
interiority of the person. 1039 In other words, John Paul II says that, of the bridegroom and bride,
“the love that unites them is of a spiritual and sensual nature together.” 1040 The pope further
notes that it is a love that is ecstatic and peaceful. 1041
The biblical encounter of love in Genesis and in the Song of Songs describes a look at the
other that sees together the somatic and the spiritual elements of the other. These elements of the
other stir the psychosomatic dynamism in the one. In a moment of personal integration, the one
gives himself or herself to the other. The stirring of every level of the person accounts for the
ecstasy. The integration of the person accounts for the peace.
A deeper look at the philosophical anthropology of Person and Act gives further
articulation to the expression of the inner experience found in the biblical encounter. Wojtyła
describes the dynamism stirred by a stimulus as an experience of passivity, that somatically, he
calls, a reaction and psychically, he calls, an emotion. 1042 In the biblical “look” (cf. Gen. 2:23),
the one sees the male or female body, and, at the same time, the masculinity or femininity of the
other. These physical and non-physical values stir up reactivity and emotivity. Wojtyła
develops emotivity further. Emotivity can have a somatic expression that Wojtyła calls
excitement, which does not require a physical stimulus, 1043 and can be intense. 1044 But emotivity
can also have a psychic expression, which Wojtyła calls stirring emotions, or just emotions.
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Stirring emotions bring to the fore the psychic level of the person. 1045 These dynamisms can
have physical and non-physical causes, and, Wojtyła says, can be especially intense, “radiating
internally…to the whole of man’s psychical sphere.” 1046 The mutual fascination of the Song of
Songs 1047 and the beatifying beginning of Genesis 1048 carry the sense of the intensity of emotion.
Wojtyła comments further about emotivity in terms of the sexual urge. Originally
discussed in the context of the integration of the soma, Wojtyła says that the sexual urge “does
not consist in somatic reactions alone but also in a special psychical urge of the emotive
type,” 1049 and is associated with excitement. 1050 The biblical look stirs up not just excitement but
also emotion. With emotion directing the whole of the psychic sphere, the intensity in this case
cannot be understated. Further underscoring the intensity, Wojtyła asserts that the “psychical
strand in emotivity may be seen as running between corporality and spirituality, but far from
dividing them it interweaves with the one and the other, bringing them together,” 1051 adding a
“special vividness” to human action. 1052 The entire psychosomatic-spiritual unity of the person
is integrated in the biblical look.
These same insights from Person and Act apply to John Paul II’s treatment of Humanae
Vitae—and an understanding of the human person contained in it—when he says that “in
interpersonal relations in which the reciprocal influence of masculinity and femininity expresses
itself, what is set free in the psycho-emotive subject…is…a reaction …[and] another
reaction…‘emotion.’” 1053 These dynamisms must be integrated. John Paul II says that the
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freedom of the gift “presupposes that one is able to direct sensual and emotive reactions in order
to allow the gift of self…on the basis of the mature possession of one’s own ‘I’ in its bodily and
emotive subjectivity.” 1054 The gift of self is dependent on self-possession, is dependent on the
integration of psychosomatic dynamisms on the level of the person.
John Paul II defines the pastoral concern of Humanae Vitae to be about “the true good of
man,” 1055 the “authentic development of the human person.” 1056 The pastoral concern at work in
the Theology of the Body is the concern of being a human person individually and in community,
especially through the gift of self that creates the communion of persons. Wojtyła concludes
Person and Act with a sketch of interpersonal participation. Wojtyła says, “The ability to share
in the humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the
personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’” 1057 Wojtyła’s description in
Person and Act shows that authentically human action increases the psychosomatic spiritual
unity of the human person, and action, together with others, “serves the fulfillment of persons in
any community in which they act and exist.” 1058 The communion of persons of the man and the
woman in marriage, their true good, is built upon each performing authentically human action.

B. Theology of the Body and Love and Responsibility
As an analysis of interpersonal relationships, Love and Responsibility has clear
connections with the Theology of the Body and its hermeneutics of the gift. 1059
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1. The Communion of Persons
The words of Gaudium et Spes 24 highlight the essential human actions in a communio
personarum: giving and receiving. Wojtyła also notes the same in Love and Responsibility. 1060
The disinterested gift of self can only be given if the person is in self-possession. From the
perspective of the same individual, receiving is the reception of the other—the affirmation of the
other—which is the recognition that the other is a subject, not an object. That affirmation
likewise is possible only with self-possession, which has integrated the psychosomatic
dynamisms, which otherwise if yielded to, would reduce the other to an object of use. Because
of the same self-possession required for self-gift and affirmation, John Paul II says that the
actions are the same, that is, “the very act of giving becomes acceptance, and acceptance
transforms itself into giving.” 1061 Wojtyła says the same, when he says that that in the mystery
of reciprocity “acceptance must also be giving, and giving receiving.” 1062 The act of selfdetermination, made in full self-possession, then, is the gift of self, named by the Council, which
include receiving. In terms of Love and Responsibility, which does not contain the phrase
communion of persons, giving and receiving are contained in the response of love to the other.
Wojtyła says the proper and adequate response of love to a person is found in the “affirmation of
the value of the person.” 1063
John Paul II says that the spousal meaning of the body (cf. Gen. 2:23-25) is revealed in
the necessary gift of self, 1064 which is the response of love. If human love has its paradigm in the
love of husband and wife, then, the necessary response of love informs the person of the spousal
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meaning of the body. Person and Act notes an ethical ramification of the act of selfdetermination and its opposite. 1065 Love and Responsibility would underscore the ethical
obligation of self-gift and the affirmation of the other through the personalistic norm, which is
connected to, if not synonymous with, the ethos of the gift. 1066 In considering love as goodwill,
Wojtyła says goodwill longs for that which is good for the other. 1067 To find oneself, in the
words of the Council, is found in the reciprocal relationship of self-gift, is found in being for
another.

2. Concupiscence and Shame
With original sin, the ability to live the world as a gift was impaired (cf. Gen. 3:15-19).
John Paul II notes that an authentic communion of persons “is replaced by a different mutual
relationship, namely, by a relationship of possession of the other as an object of one’s own
desire,” 1068 an object which can be used. 1069
The anthropological need and the ethical obligation to give a disinterested gift of self
remains, even after original sin. That is, the obligation of the personalistic norm can be
discovered, even outside of theology. Significantly, not only the need and the obligation remain,
but the human ability to give a sincere gift of self also remains. The power of freedom is the
confirmation that authentically human acts are possible.
Freedom is aided by the positive meaning of shame. John Paul II says: “Shame has a
twofold meaning: it indicates the threat to the value and at the same time it preserves this
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value.” 1070 Shame opens avenues to establishing a sincere mutual gift of self. Shame ensures
that the mutual self-donation is sincere. Wojtyła says, “shame is a natural form of self-defence
for the person against the danger of descending or being pushed into the position of an object for
sexual use.” 1071 In a relationship of love, shame does not serve as a permanent wall of defense.
It is a temporary one to ensure that the gift of self and the affirmation of the other is sincere. 1072
Not yielding to psychosomatic dynamisms can be an intense challenge. The task is
difficult. The pope notes: “The spousal meaning of the body has not become totally foreign to
that heart: it has not been totally suffocated in it by concupiscence, but only habitually
threatened. The ‘heart’ has become a battlefield between love and concupiscence.” 1073 The
difficult task that occurs between the conflict of love and concupiscence is a life-long task.
Wojtyła writes, “the integration of the acting person is a task that lasts until the end of a man’s
life.” 1074 He continues, “Love should be seen as something which in a sense never ‘is’ but is
always only ‘becoming.’” 1075

4. Justice to the Creator
In the Theology of the Body, John Paul II grounds the practice of celibacy in Christ’s
revelation of the Resurrection: the renunciation of marriage for the sake of the kingdom of
heaven (Matt. 22:24-30, Mk. 12:18-27, Lk. 20:27-40). Celibacy is a response in love to God. 1076
In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła says that virginity is “conjugal love pledged to God
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Himself” 1077 and is “the self-giving of a human person wedded to God Himself,” which
anticipates eternal union with God. 1078 The Catecheses take up this assertion in a thematic way
further adding the element of God’s self-gift to the human person, 1079 while Love and
Responsibility thematically takes up the question of justice to the Creator.
Wojtyła briefly states that marriage obscurely points to love of a personal God. 1080 But,
the primary focus on marriage in Love and Responsibility is on justice to the Creator. Wojtyła
says, “Man can only be just to God the Creator if he loves his fellows. This principle has a
special relevance to the conjugal and sexual life of men and women. …It is impossible for a man
and a woman to behave justly towards God the Creator if their treatment of each other falls short
of the demands of the personalistic norm.” 1081
In the Theology of the Body, justice is fulfilled in Christ. The pope says: “It is precisely
in this man, in his ‘heart’ and thus in all his behavior, that the redemption of Christ bears fruit,
thanks to the powers of the Spirit that bring about ‘justification,’ that is, that cause justice to
‘abound’ in man, as the Sermon on the Mount insistently teaches (Mt 5:20), that is, to ‘abound’
in the measure God himself wills and expects.” 1082 Through Christ, justice to the Creator is
given and is fulfilled.

5. The Sacrament of Marriage and Humanae Vitae
The particular struggle of each person to give a sincere gift of self is a major focus in the
Theology of the Body (cf. Gen. 3:15-19).
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Among the reasons given for the Church’s rejection of contraception, the Catecheses
assert that the error of contraception is that their use is based upon a failure to make a sincere
self-gift. It is based on an anthropology that defines the person in some way as not free, in some
way as governed by concupiscence. John Paul II says: “Concupiscence…attacks precisely this
‘sincere gift’: it deprives man…of the dignity of the gift…and in some sense ‘depersonalizes’
man, making him an object ‘for the other.’” 1083 Even if the use of contraception does not
necessarily imply the use of the other person, the one is already defined as not free, not fully
capable of authentic human acts, as an object. John Paul II says: “This extension of the sphere of
the means of ‘the domination…of the forces of nature’ threatens the human person for whom the
method of ‘self-mastery’ is and remains specific. It…breaks the constitutive dimension of the
person, deprives man of the subjectivity proper to him, and turns him into an object of
manipulation.” 1084 In Person and Act, Wojtyła says, “the ‘personalistic’ value is prior to and
conditions any ethical values.” 1085 In Love and Responsibility, Wojtyła says: “Man is by nature
capable of rising above instinct in his actions. …If it were otherwise, morality would have no
meaning.” 1086 Moreover, Wojtyła says that the person “as such must be the real object of choice,
not values associated with that person, irrelevant to his or her intrinsic value.” 1087 In the end,
contraception depersonalizes both the man and the woman. By not directing the sensual and
emotive reaction in freedom, the use of contraception reduces both the husband and the wife to
an object.
John Paul II also notes that the sincere gift of self is accompanied by an intense joy, a joy
that is rooted in a mutual integration of the psychosomatic dynamism (cf. Gen. 2:23-25). In a
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first step towards that joy, Wojtyła says, “Indeed, self-determination…often require[s] that action
be taken in the name of bare truth about good, in the name of values that are not felt. It may
even require that action be taken against one’s actual feelings.” 1088 When self-determination is
made as an act of freedom, not by the psychosomatic dynamism, when the gift of self is sincere,
then, an act of true love can be made. Wojtyła says:
True love, a love that is internally complete, is one in which we choose the person for the
sake of the person,—that in which a man chooses a woman or a woman chooses a man
not just as a sexual ‘partner’ but as the person on whom to bestow the gift of his or her
own life. 1089
In this case, the sincere gift of self, carries with it, in the words of Wojtyła, “the particular
richness, variety and intensity of those emotional-affective experiences and states which occur
when the object of activity is a person of the opposite sex.” 1090 The integration of the
psychosomatic dynamism on the level of the person, in a mutual gift of self, again Wojtyła, is
accompanied by “sensual satisfaction, or emotional contentment, or a profound, a total joy.” 1091
In the Theology of the Body, the concern for the love between husband and wife is central
and can be seen as a particular application of the Gospel command to love. In this way, the
command to love is a unifying thread that runs through the philosophical works of Wojtyła and
the Theology of the Body.

V. Characteristics of an Adequate Anthropology
A primary purpose of the Theology of the Body is to present the foundation of an
adequate anthropology. The intersection of the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła with the
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Theology of the Body reveals John Paul II’s contribution to achieving that purpose through the
unique aspects of his theological anthropology.

A. Incommunicability and Communion
In the philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła, a fundamental principle is that the human
person is incommunicable. In Person and Act, he says that incommunicability is expressed as
self-determination. 1092 No one can act, from the inside, for another person. Participation by
intersubjectivity creates a unity between persons. Wojtyła says: “The ability to share in the
humanness itself of every man is the very core of all participation and the condition of the
personalistic value of all acting and existing ‘together with others.’” 1093 In Love and
Responsibility, Wojtyła affirms that, while incommunicability is certain, a unity can be created.
Wojtyła says, “what is impossible and illegitimate in the natural order…can come about in the
order of love and in the moral sense. In this sense, one person can give himself or herself, can
surrender entirely to another, whether to a human person or to God, and such a giving of the self
creates a special form of love which we define as betrothed love.” 1094 Concerning betrothed
love, Wojtyła talks about the “law of ekstasis,” where “the lover ‘goes outside’ the self to find a
fuller existence in another.” 1095 In a moral unity, Wojtyła admits of a unity of persons. 1096
In the Theology of the Body, however, the union of the husband and wife is spoken of in
terms of communion, a communion that is in the image of the communion of Divine Persons (cf.
Gaudium et Spes 24). The mutual, continual giving and receiving of the man and the woman
creates a union of persons. The mystery of creation and the mystery of redemption creates a
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communio personarum that is more than acting together or a moral unity. The spiritualization of
the human person in the resurrection, which creates the communion of saints, is anticipated
through grace in interpersonal relationships in this life. 1097 The communion of persons in
marriage is created by God that in some way crosses the threshold of incommunicability.
The works of Wojtyła and of John Paul II are careful not to state the intellectual absurdity
that somehow someone becomes able to act for another from the inside. Yet the alienation of
incommunicability is able to be overcome in a real way. Wojtyła asserts: “Numerically and
psychologically, there are two loves, but these two separate psychological facts combine to
create a single objective whole.” 1098 Theologically, this overcoming of the separation is called a
communion of persons.

B. Psychosomatic Spiritual Unity
Usually, philosophical and theological anthropologies discuss the human person in terms
of body and soul. Even Wojtyła acknowledges the human person in this way. Nevertheless,
Wojtyła has a very robust understanding of the body, speaking of it as a psychosomatic
dynamism. In Person and Act, he goes into great detail concerning the psychic level and the
somatic level of the person. Love and Responsibility likewise speaks of the unique workings of
the psychical and somatic elements in the human person, especially in a relationship of love. In
the Theology of the Body, John Paul II often refers to the psychosomatic element of the human
person in way that is consonant with the insights of Wojtyła.
Even if the phenomenological insights and articulations do not challenge a hylomorphic
metaphysical understanding of the human person, any evaluation of John Paul II needs to
1097
1098

cf. TOB 68:4.
LR, 84.
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account for the various levels and dynamisms of the psychosomatic spiritual unity of the human
person. An adequate anthropology cannot speak with less detail.

C. Male and Female
Anthropology is concerned with the human person. Usually, the human person is a
concept that can and must be spoken about irrespective of existence as a male or a female.
Neither the male, nor the female is anything other than a human person. Discussions of dignity
and of the relation of the body and soul, for example, are spoken of about every human person
equally.
In Person and Act, gender has no significant presence in the discussion of integrating the
psychosomatic dynamism on the level of the person. In Love and Responsibility, the
personalistic norm applies to men and women equally. Wojtyła makes some particular
comments about moral concerns for men and for women, separately. Yet these distinctions do
not enter the discussion in a way that would define their humanity differently.
In the Theology of the Body, John Paul II asserts clearly that the man and the woman
share in somatic homogeneity. They are equally human persons.
At the same time, John Paul II acknowledges their somatic heterogeneity. On one hand
this is a fact of creation: “male and female he created” (Genesis 1:27). The simultaneous
creation underscores the communion of persons that is both a given and a responsibility of the
human person, especially in the case of marriage. On the other hand, John Paul II implies a
theological meaning to the creation of the human person as male and female. 1099 The
fundamental human acts in a communio personarum, as an image of God, are giving and
receiving. John Paul II never says, explicitly, what seems apparent here: the male and
1099

cf. TOB 14:4.
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masculinity embodies giving, the female and femininity embodies receiving. John Paul II is sure
to not make such an explicit statement, lest it be taken out of context and overextended. In their
shared humanity, the ability and the responsibility of the sincere self-donation and affirmation of
the other is shared equally by the man and the woman. John Paul II asserts the complementarity
of male and female, of masculinity and femininity, while likewise asserting their shared
humanity. 1100
In the mystery of creation, the human person existing as male and female is a
fundamental revelation that, at the minimum, manifests the spousal meaning of the body, 1101
even if that meaning undergoes distortions. 1102
Given Wojtyła’s attention to the relationship of man and woman, of husband and wife—
philosophically, theologically, and artistically—given the centrality of the same relationship in
the Theology of the Body, an adequate anthropology, and its ethical implications, must have
some awareness of the mystery of creation.

D. Theology of the Body and Gaudium et Spes
The theological anthropology of the Theology of the Body is not the same as the
philosophical anthropology of Wojtyła. The content of the Catecheses goes beyond the content
of Person and Act and Love and Responsibility. Gaudium et Spes offers an understanding of the
human person that John Paul II incorporates into his theological anthropology. Two main
characteristics of the theological anthropology of the Theology of the Body are an understanding
of the human person, especially a communion of persons, as in the image of God, and as in a
relationship with God.
cf. TOB 10:1. Wojtyła also speaks of complementarity, cf. LR, 48.
cf. TOB 15:1.
1102
TOB 15:5.
1100
1101
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Gaudium et Spes 24 asserts that there is a likeness between the communion of the Divine
Persons and a communion of human persons. A sincere mutual gift of self, a communion of
persons, is in the image of the Trinity. John Paul II articulates this likeness with his focus on the
primordial sacrament of the communion of persons of the husband and wife. A fundamental
theme of the Theology of the Body is that the communio personarum of the husband wife is in the
image of God.
Another point asserted by Gaudium et Spes 24 is that the human person is created by God
for one’s own sake. John Paul II articulates that this is a creation out of love and is an invitation
to respond in love. 1103 While the major content of the Catecheses focuses on interpersonal
human love, John Paul II includes an understanding of a relationship with God as part of his
theological anthropology. As the Theology of the Body unfolds, he notes the different aspects of
a life in communion with God. John Paul II notes the relationship of God with the human
person. He says that in Gen. 2, the human person is acknowledged as a “partner of the
Absolute.” 1104 He asserts that a life of virtue is a “fruit of the human spirit permeated by the
Spirit of God.” 1105 Those who choose celibacy for the sake of the Kingdom are in a relationship
of love with God. 1106 Those living the sacrament of marriage receive grace from God. 1107 And
the relationship with God reaches its fullness in the resurrection, in the experience of
divinization, where the union with God “will thus be a fruit of grace, that is, of God’s selfcommunication in his very divinity, not only to the soul, but to the whole of man’s psychosomatic
subjectivity.” 1108

cf. TOB 13:4.
TOB 6:2.
1105
TOB 51:6.
1106
cf. TOB 84:1.
1107
cf. TOB 126:5.
1108
TOB 67:3.
1103
1104
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John Paul II roots his understanding that a relationship with God is part of a theological
anthropology in the words of the Council, which says that Jesus Christ reveals the human person
to oneself (cf. Gaudium et Spes 22).
For John Paul II, an adequate anthropology is one that includes “vistas that are closed to
human reason” (Gaudium et Spes 24).

VI. Theology of the Body and Rhapsody
If John Paul II jettisoned the role of philosopher in assuming the role of pontiff, he did
not jettison the role of poet. He acted in that role in presenting the Theology of the Body.
The anthropology and ethics of the Theology of the Body are concentrated on the inner
experience of the human person, even when considering an act of horizontal transcendence. 1109
The seemingly intransitive character of this analysis can obscure the great drama of the
formation of a sincere gift of self, of which the pope in conveying. It is a drama that is further
explicated by considering the works of Wojtyła, especially when he says: “Love is certainly a
drama…. Thus, the ‘dramatis personae’ discover the plot of this drama in themselves, perceive
their love as a psychological situation unique of its kind, and one of great and absorbing
importance in their inner lives.” 1110
Understanding love in this way also leads John Paul II to use language from artistic, and
non-technical, expressions. Philosophical thought, i.e. human reason, along with the
philosophical language, and human language in general, all reach a limit in their ability to
convey the intensity of love. Artistic expression is more able to capture the immensity of the
drama that takes place within the human person. For the Theology of the Body, Scripture is the
1109
1110

cf. PA, 150.
LR, 114.
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preeminent expression that can transcend the limits of human language, as is reveals the meaning
of human experience.
In coming to understand the Theology of the Body and its treatment of biblical texts, it is
worth noting a similarity with the artistic work of Wojtyła. In his plays, Job and Jeremiah,
Wojtyła does not present a systematic analysis of the biblical books. Instead, he presents inner
experiences of the title characters as the drama unfolds. As an example from Wojtyła’s poetry,
Thought—Strange Space considers the experience of Jacob. Wojtyła links the wrestling with
God of Jacob (cf. Gen. 32:22-32) with the wrestling of finding adequate words to express
truth. 1111 On one hand, these artistic examples show the freedom with which Wojtyła analyses
biblical texts—making connections based on the inner experience of the person. On the other
hand, Thought—Strange Space names an explicit recognition of the limits of speech to express
the deepest truths, especially about the human person.
This same free approach to a text can be seen in Wojtyła’s dissertation on St. John of the
Cross. 1112 And it can be seen in the way that Wojtyła presents the works of Vatican II in Sources
of Renewal. Again, he was not concerned with a systematic presentation of the various texts but
reworked them according to themes for his diocese. With regard to the Theology of the Body, the
last section on Humanae Vitae is likewise an example of allowing inner experience to dictate
how a text is presented and analyzed. Borrowing from Rice, the Theology of the Body is
synopsis.
Finally, the rhapsodic approach to material is seen in the way that John Paul II presents
the biblical texts in the Theology of the Body. The ensemble of biblical texts, find their
connection one to the other according to the question of the love of husband and wife in
Wojtyła, The Place Within, 53.
cf. Wojtyła, Faith According to St. John of the Cross. One example that illustrates this point is found on page
188, when Wojtyła is discussing the dark night of the soul, and pulls together about five disparate citations.
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1112
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marriage, over and above the more obvious connection of Gen. 2:24 that can be found
throughout the analyses. Matt. 19:5 and Eph. 5:31, for example, make explicit reference to Gen.
2:24. However, through his rhapsodic reading of Scripture, John Paul II underscores the
connection of the inner experience of the biblical figures of these biblical passages, rather than
the explicit intertextual citation.
Scripture itself justifies such a reading. John Paul II says that the second creation account
has a mythic character. 1113 He says that Eph. 5:21-33 is centered around a metaphor. 1114 He
notes that the Song of Songs is a poem. 1115 And the passage from Tobit that he discusses is a
prayer. 1116
In at least these inclusions of biblical citations in the Theology of the Body, John Paul II
chose texts that were artistic and rhapsodic of some form. He chose biblical passages that in
their literary form go beyond the limits of human expression. Regarding artistic expression,
Wojtyła says: “As in life, the word can appear as an integral part of action, movement, and
gesture, inseparable from all human practical activity; or it can appear as ‘song’—separate,
independent, intended only to contain and express thought, to embrace and transmit a vision of
the mind.” 1117
As song, as rhapsody, Scripture transmits the full depth of the theology of the body. The
richness of inner experience requires non-technical language. The world of inner experience
needs words that cannot come from philosophical reflection. Scripture further adds the
dimension of mystery, as an expression of divine revelation.

cf. TOB 3:1.
cf. TOB 87:3.
1115
cf. TOB 108:4.
1116
cf. TOB 115:3.
1117
Wojtyła, The Collected Plays and Writings on Theater, 372.
1113
1114
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VII. Conclusion
Throughout his academic career, Wojtyła encountered many anthropologies, but he was
not entirely satisfied with many of the answers that he found. With a metaphysical anthropology
he saw a lack in the details offered by a phenomenological description of the experience of the
human person. With a phenomenological description of a person’s experience, especially one’s
inner experience, he saw an inability to describe parts of the human person that go beyond
experience, especially the spiritual element of the human person. With a socio-political
anthropology, especially as articulated by the ruling parties of Poland during his lifetime, he saw
a failure to acknowledge the whole human person—body, soul, and spirit—in the governing
policies. Given his dissatisfaction with these other anthropologies, John Paul II offers his own,
as a contribution towards an adequate anthropology.
As my above analysis shows, it is fruitful to compare the philosophical anthropology of
Wojtyła with the Theology of the Body, especially as it assists in developing the philosophical
exegesis of the Catecheses. This sort of analysis bears the fruit of revealing the Wojtyłan
language and concepts that are at work in the Catecheses. More detail is given to the various
passages and phrases of the Theology of the Body than to what can already be seen taken on their
own. Such analysis shows the deep, consistent continuity of thought in the man who became
pope with the academic work he did before his papal election. Through his analysis of inner
human experience his thought consistently focused on the conditions necessary for the
establishment and the maintenance of interpersonal communion.
The assertion of the continuity of thought in John Paul II, however, does not fully answer
the apparent delineation that he maintained between his writings as pope and his pre-papal
writings. As noted before, after his papal election, John Paul II did not intervene in any of the

256

work on his philosophical writings (e.g. the translation of Person and Act). Despite the major
part of the Catecheses having come from a complete pre-papal manuscript, its existence was
acknowledged only decades after the conclusion of the series—with the insistence that the Italian
text is the authoritative text. It seems that for John Paul II ascribing a discontinuity between
Wojtyła and the Pope is appropriate, which underscores the distinction that can be made between
philosophical and theological anthropology.
For John Paul II, an adequate anthropology is one that recognizes and struggles with the
limits of human ability to convey a theological anthropology. The major distinction between the
anthropology of Wojtyła and the anthropology of the Theology of the Body is revelation. An
adequate anthropology is one that incorporates both faith and reason, one that incorporates
conclusions from both philosophical thought and biblical interpretation. By focusing on a
revelation and a relationship that goes beyond philosophy, the theological anthropology of the
Catecheses forms the basis of an adequate anthropology. From this perspective, for John Paul II,
in the Church, an anthropology must be a theological anthropology. An adequate anthropology,
examined by theologians and part of catechetical pedagogy, is one that takes Christian revelation
into account.
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APPENDIX
There are several notes to make concerning the numbering of the Catecheses. 1118
The Theology of the Body is the compilation of 135 Audiences.
The Addresses in Italian were compiled into one volume entitled Uomo e donna lo creò
(UD), which gives the foundations of the numbering of the Audiences. 133 Audiences are
numbered in the Italian volume. There are 134 Audiences included in UD. UD included one
Audience as an appendix. Waldstein, in his volume, inserted that Audience into its proper place,
numbering it TOB 95b.
Only 129 Audiences were delivered. UD contains the full text of TOB 108-116, even
though when delivered these nine Audiences were shortened into four. UD includes TOB 117,
which was not delivered, and does not include TOB 117b (according to Waldstein’s numbering)
which was delivered. TOB 95b and TOB 117b added to the 133 Audiences numbered in UD
account for the 135 Audiences that form the Theology of the Body.
The above notes account for the Audience number. The paragraph numbers were inserted
by John Paul II.
Not every Audience was included in the original Polish manuscript, for example TOB 10,
TOB 23, TOB 133. The titles in brackets were not in the Polish manuscript and are supplied by
Waldstein.
I have included here all of the headings and sub-headings of the Theology of the Body in
one outline, which were not organized as such in Man and Woman He Created Them. I intend
this synthetic outline to help the reader to appreciate in one glance the scope of the Catecheses.

cf. Waldstein, Man and Woman He Created Them, 5-11, 731-732. In these pages Waldstein explains in detail
the indications that I note here.
1118
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Part 1: The Words of Christ
Chapter 1: Christ Appeals to the “Beginning”
1. What Is Meant by “Beginning”?
Approaching Genesis
First Account of the Creation of Man
Second Account of the Creation of Man
The Perspective of the “Redemption of the Body” (Rom 8:23)
2. The Meaning of Original Solitude
A Twofold Context
Man on Search of His Essence
Solitude and Subjectivity
Solitude and the Meaning of the Body
The Alternative between Death and Immortality
3. The Meaning of Original Unity
The Unity of the Two
Dimensions of Homogeneity
“Communion of Persons”
“Flesh from my Flesh” (Gen 2:23)
The Unity of Becoming “One Flesh”
4. The Meaning of Original Nakedness
Introductory Observations about Genesis 2:25
Shame—A “Boundary” Experience
Attempted Reconstruction
Participation in the Visibility of the World
The Inner Dimension of Vision
Intimacy—The Hidden Meaning of Vision
5. Man in the Dimension of Gift
A. The Spousal Meaning of the Body
Creation as Giving
Giving and Man
Gift—Mystery of a Beatifying Beginning
Discovery of the “Spousal” Meaning of the Body
“Freedom of the Gift”—Foundation of the Spousal Meaning of the Body
The “Spousal Character” of the Body and the Revelation of the Person
The Spousal Meaning of the Body as the Fruit of Rootedness in Love
B. The Mystery of Original Innocence
Gift to the Human Heart
Original Innocence and Consciousness of the Spousal Meaning of the Body
Innocence at the Foundation of the Exchange of the Gift
Exchange of the Gift—Interpretation of Genesis 2:25
Theology of Original Innocence
The Root of the Ethos of the Human Body
The Foundation of the Primordial Sacrament—The Body as Sign
6. “Knowledge” and Procreation (Gen 4:1)
Between Poverty of Expression and Depth of Meaning
“Knowledge” as Personal Archetype
Fatherhood and Motherhood as the Human Meaning of “Knowledge”
Knowledge and Possession
Knowledge Stronger than Death
7. [Conclusion: An Integral Vision]
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TOB 1-86
1-23
1:1
1:2
2:2
3:1
3:4
5:1
5:2
5:4
6:1
6:3
7:3
8:1
8:1
8:4
9:2
9:4
10:2
11:1
11:1
11:3
12:1
12:3
12:4
13:1
13:2
13:2
13:2
13:4
14:2
14:5
15:1
15:3
15:5
16:3
16:3
16:4
17:1
17:4
18:1
18:4
19:3
20:1
20:1
20:4
21:2
21:7
22:5
23:1

Chapter 2: Christ Appeals to the Human Heart
1. In the Light of the Sermon on the Mount
Matthew 5:27-28—“Whoever Looks to Desire…”
Matthew 5:27-28—Ethical Meaning
Matthew 5:27-28—Anthropological Meaning
Matthew 5:27-28 Indicates a Further Dimension
2. The Man of Concupiscence
A. The Meaning of Original Shame
Casting Doubt on the Gift
Man Alienated from Original Love
Change in the Meaning of Original Nakedness
“Immanent” Shame
Sexual Shame
B. Insatiability of the Union
Corruption of the Consciousness of the Unitive Meaning of the Body
A Deeper Dimension of Shame
The Meaning of “Insatiability of the Union”
Where Does the Insatiability of the Union Come From?
C. The Corruption of the Spousal Meaning of the Body
Meaning—“Measure of the Heart”
Threat Against the Expression of the Spirit in the Body
Loss of the Freedom of the Gift
The Inner Measure of Belonging
3. Commandment and Ethos
A. It Was Said, “Do Not Commit Adultery” (Mt 5:27)
The History of a People
Legislation
The Prophets
Covenant
B. “Whoever Looks to Desire…”
Shift in the Center of Gravity
The Wisdom Tradition
The Inner State of the Man of Concupiscence
Christ’s Call to Halt at the Threshold of the Look
Concupiscence—Reduction of a Perennial Call
Concupiscence—“Communion” of Persons Versus “Urge” of Nature
C. “Has Committed Adultery in the Heart…”
A “Key” Change of Direction
A First Reading
A Second Reading
Purity of Heart as the Fulfillment of the Commandment
4. The “Heart”—Accused or Called?
A. Condemnation of the Body?
Manichaeism
The Correct Understanding
Anti-Value or Value not Sufficiently Appreciated?
B. The “Heart” Under Suspicion?
“Masters of Suspicion”
Essential Divergence
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24-63
24:1
24:1
24:2
24:4
25:3
26:1
26:4
26:4
27:1
27:3
28:1
28:4
29:1
29:1
29:4
30:5
31:1
31:5
31:5
32:1
32:4
33:3
34:1
35:1
35:1
36:1
36:5
37:3
38:1
38:1
38:4
39:1
39:3
40:1
41:2
42:1
42:1
42:5
43:2
43:5
44:1
44:5
44:5
45:1
45:4
46:1
46:1
46:4

C. Eros and Ethos
47:1
Eros as the Source of the “Erotic”
47:1
Ethos as an Inner Power of Eros
47:4
The Problem of Erotic Spontaneity
48:1
5. The Ethos of the Redemption of the Body
49:1
6. Purity as “Life according to the Spirit”
50:1
“Purity” and “Heart”
50:1
“Body” and “Spirit” according to St. Paul
50:5
“Works of the Flesh” and “Fruit of the Spirit”
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